Had enough? To say that these are 'personal attacks' and not a critique of his resume is wrong.
1. Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of intelligence analysts
who disagreed with him.
Mr. Bolton sought to remove Christian Westermann, a State Department
analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
who disputed language Mr. Bolton tried to use about Cuba and biological
weapons (which was Westermann’s proper role as INR’s representative
in the inter-agency clearance process). Mr. Bolton
sought his removal three times over a six-month period. Fortunately,
all of Westermann’s superiors rejected Bolton’s efforts. The
Secretary of State even took the extraordinary step of visiting the
INR analysts to make clear his support for Mr. Westermann.
Mr. Bolton sought to have removed from his portfolio the National
Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America, who told this
committee that some of the views Mr. Bolton expressed about Cuba
in a speech did not reflect the Intelligence Community assessment.
Mr. Bolton and his staff discussed the NIO’s removal over several
months and Mr. Bolton personally traveled to the CIA to seek his
removal, even though he had never met the officer and does not
know whether he ever read his work. All of the NIO’s superiors,
including the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, rejected
Bolton’s efforts.
2. In speeches and testimony, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought to
stretch intelligence to fit his views.
In the case of Cuba, Mr. Bolton sought repeatedly to exaggerate
the Intelligence Community’s views about Cuba’s possible biological
weapons activities and support for terrorism. This caused the CIA
to take the extraordinary step of republishing the Intelligence Community’s
standing views on Cuba and BW in the Senior Executive
Intelligence Brief, a daily publication for the policy community.
In the case of Syria, in three instances over the course of a year,
Mr. Bolton sought to inflate language about Syria’s nuclear activities
beyond what intelligence analysts regarded as accurate. The
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council ordered his staff to
resist these efforts. Mr. Bolton continued this effort as late as the
summer of 2003, when it was becoming clear that intelligence
about Iraq’s WMD programs had been fundamentally wrong.
Mr. Bolton’s pattern of going beyond his brief on sensitive subjects
in speeches that had not been properly cleared caused the
Deputy Secretary of State to order Mr. Bolton not to give any testi-
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mony or speech that was not personally cleared by the Deputy Secretary
or by the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of State. No other
senior State Department official was subject to this restriction.
3. In his relations with colleagues and subordinates, Mr. Bolton repeatedly
exhibited abusive behavior and intolerance for different
views.
In the case of Rexon Ryu, a highly regarded mid-level State Department
officer, Mr. Bolton wrongly accused Ryu of purposefully
withholding a document and, months later, denied him a significant
new assignment. Ryu’s immediate superior secured him an assignment
away from Mr. Bolton’s reach, and Ryu ultimately served
the Deputy Secretary of State with distinction.
In the cases of two unnamed State Department officers working
in the Nonproliferation Bureau, Mr. Bolton sought their removal
over policy differences. Their immediate superior refused to remove
them. More generally, officers in the Nonproliferation Bureau ‘‘felt
undue pressure to conform to the views of [Mr. Bolton] versus the
views they thought they could support,’’ according to the former
head of that bureau.
In the case of a State Department lawyer, Mr. Bolton wanted
him removed from a legal case based on a misunderstanding of a
position the lawyer had taken. The State Department Legal Adviser
and the Deputy Secretary of State insisted that the lawyer remain
on the case, and the Deputy Secretary took the extraordinary
step of sending Bolton a memo reminding him that the rules applied
to him.
4. Mr. Bolton Gave Misleading Testimony to the Committee on Foreign
Relations
In several respects, Mr. Bolton’s testimony has been misleading
and disingenuous:
Mr. Bolton told the committee that, after urging Acting Assistant
Secretary Tom Fingar to change Christian Westermann’s portfolio,
‘‘I shrugged my shoulders and moved on.’’ In fact, he tried again
a few days later, and again several months later.
Mr. Bolton told the committee he pursued the removal of the
NIO for Latin America only once, stating ‘‘I had one part of one
conversation with one person one time on Mr. Smith, and that was
it, I let it go.’’ In fact, getting rid of the NIO was under review by
Mr. Bolton and his staff for several months and after Mr. Bolton
traveled to the CIA to seek the NIO’s removal, Mr. Bolton told his
staff that ‘‘he didn’t want the matter to slip any further.’’
Mr. Bolton told the committee that he did not threaten or try to
have analysts punished because of their policy views. In fact, several
witnesses said he did just that.
Mr. Bolton told the committee that U.S. Ambassador to South
Korea Thomas Hubbard approved and supported his July 2003
speech in South Korea. In fact, Ambassador Hubbard himself contacted
the committee to correct the record and to make clear that
he had serious concerns about the speech which he conveyed to Mr.
Bolton at the time.
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Mr. Bolton told the committee that it was his decision to delay
testifying on Syria. Larry Wilkerson (Chief of Staff to Secretary
Powell) told the committee that the Deputy Secretary of State postponed
Mr. Bolton’s testimony because it did not reflect Administration
policy on a sensitive issue at a sensitive time.
Mr. Bolton’s supporters argue that none of this matters because
no officers lost their jobs and because the speeches and testimony
that Mr. Bolton actually delivered reflected the views of the Intelligence
Community. In fact, at least one highly regarded officer was
denied a career-enhancing assignment because of Mr. Bolton, and
Mr. Bolton did make public statements on the most sensitive issues
that over-stepped Administration policy or were at odds with the
views of the Intelligence Community.
But even if no officers had been penalized or unfounded statements
made, Mr. Bolton’s repeated efforts to remove intelligence
analysts and to stretch the intelligence to fit his views had a profoundly
negative impact. As Robert Hutchings, the former Chairman
of the National Intelligence Council, put it: ‘‘[W]hen policy officials
come back repeatedly to push the same kinds of judgments,
and push the Intelligence Community to confirm a particular set
of judgments, it does have the effect of politicizing intelligence, because
the so-called ‘correct answer’ becomes all too clear. . . . I
think every judgment ought to be challenged and questioned. But
. . . when it goes beyond that, to a search for a pretty clearly-defined,
pre-formed set of judgments, thenit turns into politicization.
And . . . even when it’s successfully resisted . . . it creates a climate
of intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.’’
In the wake of our intelligence failures in Iraq—including the
misuse of intelligence by policy makers—Mr. Bolton’s behavior
should not be rewarded. With the prospect of intelligence challenges
to come—including the need to convince other countries of
the threat posed by North Korea and Iran—Mr. Bolton’s singular
lack of credibility risks becoming a detriment to U.S. interests and
security.
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