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Strategies & Market Trends : Castpro - Fraud In The Making? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Markyj who wrote (20)11/14/2006 8:48:46 AM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 24
 
Beyond the SEC's Reach, Firms Sell Obscure Issues to Foreign Investors

By JOHN R. EMSHWILLER and CHRISTOPHER COOPER
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
please visit wsj.com

The call couldn't have been timed better. Adrian Lawlor, a Dublin computer-systems salesman, and his wife had just received a $17,000 settlement from a car accident his wife had been in when a broker from International Asset Management in Brussels rang him up. Speaking with an American accent, the broker told Mr. Lawlor he had just the ticket for entering the red-hot U.S. stock market.

"They said they had a wonderful investment opportunity for me," Mr. Lawlor says.

Although "absolutely green" when it came to stocks, Mr. Lawlor decided to sink most of the settlement into the broker's recommendations. That was in 1996, and he was happy for a time and unruffled when his broker moved from Brussels to Barcelona, Spain. But then he tried to sell some shares of a small-cap issue that had begun to stumble. The broker said he would make the sale only if Mr. Lawlor agreed to plow the proceeds -- and $10,000 more -- into shares of a tiny California company called ZIASUN Technologies Inc.

A Matter for the Police

Mr. Lawlor refused and then complained to Spanish regulators. Though the brokerage was based in Barcelona, Spanish regulators said they had no jurisdiction because IAM apparently didn't sell to Spaniards. "If you consider this situation a matter of fraud," Spanish regulators wrote, "the normal procedure is to get in touch with the police."

Instead of calling the police, Mr. Lawlor managed to sell some shares "by complaining bitterly to my broker." But still, he hasn't been able to unload his biggest holding, a stake in a troubled start-up that he bought for $6,000 and that is now worth about $90. He has lost contact with his IAM broker, who went by the name Steve Young.

"An Irish citizen buying U.S. stocks through a dealer based in Spain," Mr. Lawlor says. "The whole experience made me realize how alone I was."

Alone in a growing crowd, that is. Nurtured by economic liberalization and the steady rise in U.S. markets over the past decade, legions of Europeans and Asians have developed a STRONG appetite for stock investments. Much of the focus is on the U.S.; in just the 12 months ended March 31, foreigners bought $2.8 trillion worth of U.S. shares, up 65% from the previous 12 months, the U.S. Treasury says. After accounting for stock sales, net foreign purchases totaled $159.6 billion during the period. About 85% of that was from Europe.

Many Affiliates, Many Names

But as the global investor base broadens, a big problem has arisen: Investors are often venturing into a gray area that national regulators are either unable or unwilling to police. And that makes them particularly vulnerable to the likes of International Asset Management. This outfit and its many affiliates operating under many names throughout Europe and East Asia buy shares in small, obscure U.S. companies, some linked to IAM through equity or other ties, and then sell the stock to foreigners who often are ill-informed about the companies they are investing in, the difficulty of trading the stock and their own lack of regulatory protection.

IAM officials turned down repeated requests for interviews and have refused to identify the precise location of their Barcelona offices.

In recent years, investors from Athens to Australia have purchased millions of dollars of stock in U.S. companies from IAM and its affiliates. Many, like Mr. Lawlor, have found themselves unable to sell their shares or even get stock certificates, and nearly all are unable to get help from regulators.

Sudden Disappearance

Guy Fletchere-Davies, a 62-year-old carpet manufacturer in Melbourne, Australia, bought ZIASUN and other small U.S. stocks over several years from the Manila office of Oxford International Management, a brokerage firm with ties to IAM. Mr. Fletchere-Davies says his account was passed around among several Oxford salespeople and then to a successor firm. Late last year, "suddenly, the phone calls stopped and paperwork dried up," he says.

The Australian has since embarked on a frantic telephone journey from Manila to Jakarta to Manhattan to the British Virgin Islands in hopes of learning the fate of the nearly $150,000 that was to be his retirement nest egg. "We don't know who to talk to,'' he says. "We don't know where to go."

Nikolas Morokutti, a 26-year-old owner of a computer business in Innsbruck, Austria, thought he knew where to go when he had trouble getting his ZIASUN share certificates from IAM. He called the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The agency, he says, told him that it couldn't help because the shares were issued under Regulation S.

These Regulation S stock sales are allowed under a 10-year-old provision of U.S. securities law that is intended to allow American public companies to raise capital from experienced foreign investors without the onerous registration process required to sell stock in the U.S. Once sold abroad, Regulation S shares cannot legally be resold to U.S. investors for at least a year; they can, however, be sold to other foreigners during that period.

While hundreds of perfectly legal and legitimate S-share transactions occur each year, unscrupulous operators have found a way to exploit Regulation S to their advantage. The way it often works, a promoter that is at least nominally based outside the U.S. buys large blocks of S shares from American issuers at deep discounts and then sells them at huge markups to neophyte investors abroad.

The SEC doesn't comment on specific cases and won't comment on the current state of Regulation S. Non-U.S. regulators aren't much help either, though they periodically warn citizens to avoid boiler-room brokers operating outside of their home country. British stock regulators recently noted a sharp rise in the number of boiler rooms in continental Europe that target English residents. "The firms are not registered here, so it's up to our counterparts in other nations to regulate them, which is very frustrating," says Sarah Modlock of Britain's Financial Services Authority.

A Lot in Common

Over the past few years, IAM and related brokerage firms have marketed shares in about a dozen small U.S. companies. Overseas customers of IAM's offices in Barcelona often receive a monthly publication called "The Capital Growth Report," which mixes glowing reviews of the small companies in IAM's stable with commentary about well-known companies such as Compaq Corp. Several of the small companies have held stock in each other, used the same investor-relations firm or employed Jones, Jensen & Co., a Salt Lake City accounting firm, which is auditor of ZIASUN, a company that looms large in IAM's pitches.

In May, the SEC filed administrative charges against the accounting firm's two named partners, R. Gordon Jones and Mark F. Jensen, for "recklessly violating professional accounting and auditing standards" in an audit of a company unrelated to ZIASUN. Mr. Jensen denies wrongdoing. Mr. Jones didn't return phone calls.

The tale of IAM and its affiliates is deeply entwined with that of ZIASUN, based in Solana Beach, Calif., just north of San Diego, in a modest ground-floor office suite nestled between a freeway and the sea. An IAM affiliate has an address on the same floor of a Hong Kong office building as ZIASUN's office in that city, and ZIASUN maintains the Web sites of IAM and of some of its affiliates.

ZIASUN has operated under various names since it was founded and went public in 1996, and it has engaged in businesses ranging from motorcycles to soda dispensers. In news releases, it now bills itself as "a leading Internet technology holding company focused on international investor education and e-commerce." About 85% of ZIASUN's 1999 revenue came from a business that operates traveling seminars on Internet stock trading for $2,995 a pop. "You Can Become a Millionaire on Regular Pay," says one seminar flier.

In an April 1999 news release, ZIASUN said its 1998 audited earnings totaled $1.15 million, on $3.5 million in revenue. When the company filed financial results with the SEC last September, the audited 1998 sales had dropped to $2.3 million. In a later SEC filing, ZIASUN again revised downward its 1998 sales, to $760,529, and cut net income to $769,320. ZIASUN earnings included profits from securities transactions involving other public companies. Some of ZIASUN's securities holdings include companies that also issue large amounts of Regulation S stock and whose shares have been sold by IAM and affiliates.

ZIASUN officials decline to be interviewed, citing a pending lawsuit filed by ZIASUN in federal court in San Francisco against a group of Internet critics of the company for allegedly mounting a "cybersmear campaign" against ZIASUN. In a written statement in response to written questions, ZIASUN officials say they are "fully committed to preserving and developing the shareholders' equity."

More than half of ZIASUN's own 27 million shares outstanding have been sold to foreigners under Regulation S, according to the company's SEC filings. In two transactions in 1997, ZIASUN sold 15 million shares at 10 cents a share under Regulation S to foreign investors, whose identities didn't have to be disclosed in public records. At about the same time, investors in Europe and Asia say they received calls from salesmen from IAM and related brokerages offering ZIASUN stock at $4.50 or more a share. In the U.S. during the same period, ZIASUN, under previous corporate names, was trading on the Nasdaq Bulletin Board at between $1.25 and $5.50 a share on average daily volume of several thousand shares.

Vladimir Kaplan, a Zurich doctor, bought some of those ZIASUN S shares. His Barcelona-based IAM broker, Lynn Briggs, offered ZIASUN at $4.50 a share on Oct. 7, 1998 -- when the stock was trading in the U.S. for between $2.50 and $4 a share. Unable at the time to independently determine ZIASUN's stock price, Dr. Kaplan bought nearly 8,000 shares to start, and more over the ensuing weeks. Dr. Kaplan knew his broker as a senior portfolio manager at IAM and trusted his judgment, especially after Mr. Briggs flew to Zurich to make a personal sales call. What he says he didn't know: According to SEC filings, Mr. Briggs also was one of ZIASUN's founders. Mr. Briggs couldn't be located for comment.

Tapping Overseas Buyers

Titan Motorcycle Co., a Phoenix, Ariz., motorcycle manufacturer, is another favorite of IAM brokers. Between 1996 and 1998, Titan issued about 5.3 million shares of Regulations S securities in chunks to unidentified overseas buyers for an average price of $1.32 a share, even as clients such as Dr. Kaplan were purchasing stock in the company for far more. According to SEC filings, about a third of the company's total shares outstanding have been sold to foreigners.

Titan officials didn't return calls. In a brief written statement, Titan Chief Executive Frank Keery said that all company Regulation S sales "were conducted precisely as required by law." Titan's "knowledge of subsequent resale activities is essentially nil as these resales take place exclusively outside the U.S.A.," he added.

ZIASUN and Titan have something in common besides IAM. Bryant CRAGUN, a former president and chief executive of ZIASUN and now a consultant to the company, describes himself in court documents as "investment adviser and fund-raiser" for ZIASUN, Titan and other small companies whose shares are sold by IAM and related brokerages. He co-owns four Titan motorcycle dealerships.

Several investors say their brokers referred to Mr. CRAGUN as a senior official of IAM. Stefan Van Rooyen, a Swiss investor, says he was told by his Barcelona-based broker in June that Mr. CRAGUN was IAM's president. A recent SEC filing shows IAM has the same U.S. address as Mr. CRAGUN, at a gated condominium project in Solana Beach, not far from ZIASUN's headquarters.

In a letter, Mr. CRAGUN says he was never an IAM officer. He says he leases the condominium in Solana Beach. He acknowledges that between 1991 and 1997, he was chairman of Oxford International, a Philippine brokerage firm that markets many of the stocks IAM touts and that, according to SEC filings, has bought Regulation S shares in two such companies.

Mr. CRAGUN says the SEC spent five years investigating his role in selling Regulation S shares overseas and "never filed anything against me." An SEC spokesman declines to comment. An offering statement for an overseas investment fund founded by Mr. CRAGUN says he has a U.S. securities broker's license. The National Association of Securities Dealers says its records show that Mr. CRAGUN hasn't held a license since 1988. Mr. CRAGUN, in a written response, says that putting his license status in the present tense was a "typographical error."

Mr. CRAGUN says he sold his interest in Oxford in 1997 to a company headed by William STRONG, who shows up as an account representative on monthly statements received by several IAM customers. Mr. STRONG, who says he was merely an IAM consultant, confirms that he bought Oxford. He says IAM and Oxford are "essentially the same company. They are two different entities in the same arena with the same people."

In an April filing, Titan said it issued 724,638 shares of Regulation S stock early this year to Oxford International in connection with a 1996 loan. As Oxford's owner, Mr. STRONG says he never received any of the stock (doing so could violate Regulation S, since he's an American). Titan officials didn't respond to questions on this matter.

No Outward Signs

In Barcelona, IAM has in the past shared offices, telephones and personnel with at least three other brokerage firms -- including one owned for at least a time by Mr. STRONG. But the exact location of IAM's current office is a mystery. A phone receptionist provides only a mailing address. That address leads to a small office building that has no identifying signs and that on three visits during business hours was locked and dark. Another location, often cited on IAM's correspondence, is an unmarked and rundown suite of offices in an unfashionable part of town staffed by a woman who appears to run a phone service for dozens of companies. A woman who answered the phone at the firm's Manila office said all sales operations had ceased.

Several investors say their brokers, though hard to locate, have recently been pushing them to exchange stock in ZIASUN and other companies for shares in a British Virgin Islands-registered mutual fund called the Morgan Fund. Mr. Fletchere-Davies says he agreed to move his money into the Morgan Fund as an alternative to losing a large chunk of his investment in individual stocks, though he says he has been told he might not be able to cash out of the fund for at least several months.

A Morgan Fund brochure shows that Mr. CRAGUN, the former ZIASUN executive and former Oxford owner, is one of the fund's two directors. Mr. CRAGUN says he set up the fund because buying companies' shares directly "is way too much risk to individual investors."

Write to JOHN R. EMSHWILLER at JOHN.emschwiller@wsj.com and Christopher Cooper at christopher.cooper@wsj.com
==========================================

Stock promoter's divorce reveals life of luxury
David Baines
Vancouver Sun

Saturday, May 13, 2006
CREDIT: Vancouver Sun/Handout

From 1986 to 1997, Vancouver businessman Mark HARRIS worked in phone rooms that used high-pressure methods to sell stocks, most of dubious value, to people all over the world.

For more than a decade, Vancouver businessman Mark HARRIS made a fortune running boiler rooms -- high-pressure telephone stock sales operations -- in Europe and Asia. Unfortunately for his net worth, his wife Lori made a career out of spending it.

From 1986 to 1997, HARRIS worked in phone rooms that used high-pressure methods to sell stocks, most of dubious value, to people all over the world. Initially, he manned the phones himself, but eventually became involved in setting up and overseeing the sales operations.

For various reasons, some of them regulatory, he moved often -- from Spain to Hong Kong, Macau, back to Hong Kong, then to the Philippines, California and finally Vancouver. Throughout most of this period, he worked closely with BRYANT CRAGUN, owner of a boiler room operation that was rather grandly called Oxford International Management.

Wherever he went, Lori followed. It was a nomadic existence, but it had its rewards. In his peak earning years, he made more than $500,000 US a year.

Neither of them was shy about spending it. They employed a maid, a gardener, a chauffeur, even a dog-walker. Every year, for Lori's birthday, they went to Italy. During the beach season, they spent weekends on Boracay Island, about 90 minutes from Manila.

Aside from the occasional modelling job, Lori HARRIS did not work. She took Spanish lessons, she played tennis, she flew to Hong Kong to have her hair done. But mostly she shopped.

She bought Versace, Dolce & Gabbana and other expensive designer clothes. When her credit card at Saks Fifth Avenue exceeded her limit, she simply opened another account and purchased an $8,000 full-length mink coat. She shopped so much that she hired a personal shopper to help her.

In 1995, the couple began construction of a mansion on an acre of land in Osoyoos. The project, originally budgeted at 3,000 square feet and $500,000, ballooned to 6,000 square feet and $3 million, including an outdoor dining area modelled after the Four Seasons Resort in Bali and five Versace carpets costing more than $100,000.

In 1997, HARRIS returned to Vancouver to provide investor relations services for many of the same companies he had been selling by phone. Business was initially good, but by 2000, the market had collapsed. His income was decimated and his marriage in a shambles. In 2002 they separated.

Unable to agree on a division of assets, the couple went to court. In a 10-day trial earlier this year, and in a 14-page decision released just days ago, their private lives were laid bare, providing unique insight into the controversial and lucrative business of boiler room operators.

Not mentioned are the people who bought stock from HARRIS's telemarketers. According to newspaper accounts, court records and securities filings, many of them lost substantial amounts of money.

One was Guy Fletchere-Davies, a 62-year-old carpet manufacturer in Melbourne, Australia. He told the Wall Street Journal in August 2000 that he bought shares of ZIASUN Technologies Inc., which traded on the dreadful OTC Bulletin Board in the U.S., and several other junior stocks, from the Manila office of Oxford International Management, where HARRIS ran the telemarketing operation.

Fletchere-Davies said his brokerage account was passed around among several Oxford salespeople, then to a successor firm. In late 1999, "the phone calls stopped and the paperwork dried up." ZIASUN collapsed and he lost $150,000.

By this time, HARRIS had left Oxford and at CRAGUN's behest he had set up an investor relations business, Veritas Marketing & Communications Group Ltd., with offices in Vancouver and Solana Beach, Calif., to help promote ZIASUN and other stocks that Oxford was selling.

Oxford and Veritas have since shut down and CRAGUN has reportedly retired, but HARRIS continues to provide investor relations services through a private firm, Skylla Capital Corp., which operates out of a corner office in Park Place in downtown Vancouver.

Skylla is the grotesque six-headed monster in Greek mythology that swooped down on passing ships and sea creatures, but HARRIS denies that any of his business activities have been predatory: "Every company I have been associated with was fully registered and all the companies we recommended were legitimate," he said in an interview this week.

n

HARRIS is now 49, but his boyish good looks make him appear much younger. He dresses and speaks in a casual but calculated way. His cell phone rings incessantly. For the most part, he ignores the calls to focus on a Vancouver Sun reporter who, uninvited and unannounced, has dropped into his office.

According to the divorce action, HARRIS was born and raised in Calgary. He dropped out of school in Grade 11 and worked at a steel mill, as a truck driver, at McDonald's, and as a car salesman.

In 1986, he met and married Lori, seven years his junior. He began training as a stock broker, then a friend offered him a job with a firm called Indigo Investments in Torremolinos, Spain.

"He immediately began work as a telemarketer persuading prospective clients to purchase stock in companies," Judge Linda Loo noted in her judgment.

It was clear that he had an aptitude for the job. He made $5,000 in his first month. The following year, he got a better job as "telemarketing sales manager" for a firm called Equity Management Services in Marbella, Spain. It paid $10,000 per month plus a percentage of the business that the phone room generated.

However, the judge noted, "the job ended abruptly after about a year when the payroll failed to materialize." HARRIS told The Sun he's "not 100 per cent sure why it shut down." But in the fluid world of boiler rooms, such businesses disappear and reappear with alarming frequency and speed. In this instance, the phone team was offered similar work in Hong Kong starting the following week.

Within five months, HARRIS was back making $10,000 per month, but once again, the job suddenly ended, this time when the Hong Kong Securities and Exchange Commission intervened. Why the commission intervened is not explained.

HARRIS found work in a similar operation in Macau, but the couple found the living and working conditions unagreeable, so they decided to use their savings to travel throughout Europe and Asia.

In 1990, HARRIS returned to Hong Kong and teamed with BRYANT CRAGUN, a former senior vice-president with Goldman Sachs, in another telemarketing operation. Within months, however, Hong Kong regulators once again stepped in and the phone room was shut down. Once again, no reason is given. HARRIS told The Sun that, to meet capital requirements, the firm had posted shares of an OTC Bulletin Board company rather than a Nasdaq company, and the authorities refused to accept them.

The following year, in April 1991, CRAGUN established another telemarketing business in the Philippines, Oxford International Management, which styled itself as a "U.S. equity fund manager." He hired HARRIS to manage the phone room, with huge success.

Within four months, HARRIS was making $10,000 US per month, plus a percentage of sales. By 1993, the firm had grown to 50 employees and he was making more than $250,000 US per year. By 1995, the firm had offices in Spain, Brussels, Taipei, Indonesia and Bangkok, and he was making $500,000 US annually.

Life was good. The couple travelled extensively. Each Christmas they stayed at the Four Seasons Hotel in Bali. During the summer, they spent weekends on Boracay Beach, where HARRIS invested $200,000 in an aquasports business which provided them with boats and jet skis, but generated nothing in the way of profits. They also invested $85,000 in an Indian cuisine restaurant in nearby Subic Bay.

Lori was, by all accounts, an excellent hostess. She entertained HARRIS's business colleagues at Boracay Beach and helped arrange Oxford's annual Christmas party, which was attended by up to 400 guests. She also attended dinner meetings with Mark's clients and prospective clients.

"He considered his wife an asset because together, they were an attractive, well-dressed couple," Loo noted. But other than spending money, the judge said, "she took almost no interest in her husband's work or their finances."

In an interview this week, Lori HARRIS said she understood her husband was involved in "venture capital," but didn't know any details. "I knew it was telemarketing, but I didn't know the stocks or the names of the companies he was promoting," she said.

n

Oxford had a stable of junior companies that it organized, financed and promoted to retail investors. Among them were ZIASUN Technologies Inc. and Chequemate International Inc.

Both were listed on the OTC Bulletin Board, a trading forum that is virtually unregulated. In fact, prior to 1999, bulletin board companies didn't even have to issue financial statements.

ZIASUN and Chequemate financed their businesses by selling large blocks of stocks to foreign purchasers under a U.S. securities rule known as Regulation S.

Under this rule, issuers can avoid going through the onerous process of a registered stock offering by placing the shares with "accredited investors" outside the country. The condition is that these shares cannot be sold back to U.S. investors for at least a year.

CRAGUN, as an officer and director of ZIASUN and Chequemate, arranged for these companies to sell large blocks of unregistered stock to Oxford and related boiler rooms, which marked up the share price and hyped them to investors in foreign jurisdictions.

Problem was, neither Oxford nor its employees were registered to sell stock in Ireland, Switzerland, Australia or any of the others countries where the purchasers were located. Also, the companies were long on puffery and short on substance, which made them exceedingly risky investments.

According to a June 2002 article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, one of Oxford's clients was Australian rancher Wally Peart. Starting in 1994, he bought seven stocks from Oxford, including Chequemate, for a total investment of $130,000 US. Little did he know, but all of the companies had close ties to CRAGUN and associates.

Peart told the newspaper that, on Oxford's advice, he never sold any of the shares, ostensibly to maximize long-term gains. "Everything seemed to work OK, and they often invited me to visit them in Manila," Peart is quoted as saying. "However, in 1999, it all folded and my retirement fund disappeared."

HARRIS rejects the characterization of Oxford as a "boiler room." He said the firm made sure it was licensed in every jurisdiction in which it sold stock. However, when asked if the firm was licensed to sell stock to Australian investors such as Peart, he replied: "I can't answer that question. I don't know exactly."

He also said the companies that Oxford recommended were all legitimate companies and a lot of Oxford clients made money. "I bought IBM and lost a lot of money on it. It's all based on timing," he said.

He also said neither he nor CRAGUN have ever been accused of wrong-doing. CRAGUN told the Wall Street Journal that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission spent five years investigating his role in selling Regulation S shares overseas and it "never filed anything against me."

n

A large chunk of money supplied by investors like Peart found its way back to B.C.

The HARRIS's bought the acre of land in Osoyoos and began constructing their mansion. It had seven bathrooms and marble tiling throughout, even in the mechanical and laundry rooms.

They paid $35,000 for chandeliers, $40,000 for a wrought iron staircase and $25,000 for a desk for Mark's home office. In all, they spent $225,000 on furnishings. The total cost was more than $3 million. "It is the most expensive house in Osoyoos," the judge observed.

But the gravy train was coming to a halt. By 1996, Oxford had over 10,000 clients, but according to Loo, the stock market had turned and HARRIS "was forced to deal with unhappy investors."

CRAGUN opened an investment banking business in San Diego and invited HARRIS to join him. In October 1997, Mark and Lori moved to Del Mar, just outside San Diego, and rented a 3,200-square-foot ocean-view home for $4,750 a month. They also bought a Porsche 911 for $96,000 US and a 540 BMW for $65,000 US.

Within a few months, CRAGUN decided he wanted HARRIS to help him support the public companies that he was promoting. So HARRIS incorporated Veritas Marketing & Communications with offices in Vancouver and Solana Beach, Calif. He commuted back and forth, spending Tuesdays to Friday in Vancouver, and Saturday to Monday in Del Mar.

Veritas provided investor relations services for several companies, including ZIASUN. At its peak, it had 20 employees, but it was not a lucrative enterprise. HARRIS was paid in shares, which initially soared in value, but by the time they became free-trading, the share price had collapsed. ZIASUN, for example, rose to $30, but plunged to 30 cents by the time they were cleared for trading.

In 2001, HARRIS's total income slumped to $10,000, but Lori could not adjust to this new financial reality. As Judge Loo remarked: "Her passion for high-end designer fashions continued undeterred." Among the items she bought, over her husband's objections, was an $8,000 full-length mink coat from Saks. The following month, in September 2002, they separated.

"There is no doubt that Ms. HARRIS has a clothes-buying habit," the judge observed.

n

Since their separation, Lori has been living in the Osoyoos mansion, but Judge Loo has ordered that it be sold and net proceeds divided between them. She also ordered Mark to pay $150,000 spousal support in two equal instalments in January 2007 and January 2008.

It is not clear what Lori will do. "Mr. HARRIS has suggested avenues Ms. HARRIS might explore, such as being a veterinary assistant, because she loves animals, or being a personal shopper, because she has exquisite taste and enjoys interacting with people," Loo noted.

However, she added, Lori "has taken no real steps towards finding work or training because she claims she is too emotionally distraught...."

In 2003, Mark returned to Marbella, Spain, to set up offices for another telemarketing firm called Global Capital Asset Advisors. At about the same time, he began a common-law relationship with Jonni-Colleen Sissons, then a broker with IPO Capital Corp.

In January 2004, Sissons gave birth to their son in Malaga, Spain, and they have since returned to Vancouver. Sissons is now registered with Northern Securities and Mark is pursing his investors relations business through Skylla Capital.

He refuses to say who his clients are: "I have been advised by my lawyer not to say anything further to you."

dbaines@png.canwest.com

© The Vancouver Sun 2006

Copyright © 2006 CanWest Interactive, a division of CanWest MediaWorks Publications, Inc.. All rights reserved



To: Markyj who wrote (20)11/14/2006 8:49:51 AM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 24
 
You can also read about Castpro here junkfax.org



To: Markyj who wrote (20)11/14/2006 8:51:55 AM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 24
 
"Thereafter, defendant Robert Mason contacted him and stated that he would now be handling his account on behalf of Capitol, and solicited him to invest in several other companies. Mason introduced him to a Lynn Briggs, who Mason described as being a financial and investment consultant for Capital. Mason told Bowen that Briggs and Capital had a "close association with Ziasun" and other companies, including Chequemate International, Inc. (Chequemate), Loraca International, Inc. (Loraca), Asia4Sale, Inc. (Asia4Sale) and CASTPRO.com, Inc. (CASTPRO). Briggs touted Ziasun and the other companies for investment. Briggs told Bowen that no investor had ever lost money with these companies because of Capital's "close association and intimate knowledge" of the companies being recommended. Based upon the misrepresentations made by Robinson, Mason and Briggs, Bowen bought stock in Ziasun, Chequemate, Loraca, Asia4Sale, CASTPRO and Novamed, Inc, (Novamed), at a total cost of $365,625.50. Bowen alleged Robinson, Mason and Briggs were acting as agents for the companies in which he invested, including Ziasun. Further, Bowen alleged that their actions were taken at the direction of defendant Bryant Cragun, an alleged investment advisor and fundraiser for the companies Bowen invested in, including Ziasun."

===============================

Filed 3/8/04 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT BOWEN et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

ZIASUN TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.
D041142

(Super. Ct. Nos. GIC762921 &

GIC772344)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, J. Richard Haden, Judge. Affirmed.

James A. Shalvoy for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Smith, Chapman & Campbell, John S. Clifford and Stephanie P. Alexander for Defendant and Respondent.

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Ziasun Technologies, Inc. (Ziasun) on two consolidated actions filed by plaintiffs Scott Bowen and Lief Aa. Fredsted (together sometimes, plaintiffs), which alleged that they were defrauded by a "pyramid" or "Ponzi" scheme orchestrated by foreign brokerage houses from which they purchased shares of stock. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Ziasun, finding that there was no legal basis for or evidence to support plaintiffs' claims against Ziasun.

On appeal Bowen and Fredsted assert that the court erred in granting summary judgment when it found that (1) plaintiffs' claims brought under Business & Professions Code section 172002 had no application to the securities transactions at issue; (2) plaintiffs failed to provide any admissible evidence that Ziasun made any misrepresentations to plaintiffs and that Ziasun was not an offeror of securities; (3) no evidence supported plaintiffs' conversion and conspiracy claims; and (4) plaintiffs were not entitled to a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery. We conclude that the court did not err in granting summary judgment or in denying leave to conduct additional discovery and therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiffs' Allegations

Bowen is a resident of Australia. Fredsted is a resident of Norway. Ziasun is a publicly traded Nevada corporation that formerly had its headquarters in San Diego County.

In February 2001 Bowen filed a complaint in the San Diego Superior Court against Ziasun and others.3 Bowen's complaint alleged that Ziasun, acting in concert with others, sold approximately $365,625.50 of its stock and the stock of other publicly traded companies to Bowen by making misstatements and omissions of material fact. Bowen alleged that Ziasun failed to disclose that it was using investors' funds to perpetrate a pyramid or Ponzi scheme and that Ziasun's stock had little or no market value.

Specifically, Bowen alleged that in 1998, he was contacted by defendant Frank Robinson, who held himself out to be a senior consultant at Amber Securities Corporation (Amber), now allegedly known as defendant World Trade Financial Corporation (World Trade), who solicited him to invest in a company called Titan Motorcycles of America, Inc. (Titan). At that time Bowen did not invest.

In June 1999, Robinson contacted him again, soliciting an investment in Ziasun. Robinson stated that Amber had changed its name to Capital Assets, Ltd. (Capital). Based upon Robinson's solicitation, Bowen purchased 1,000 shares of Ziasun stock. However, he was not told that (1) the stock was restricted; (2) the funds he was investing would be used to finance criminal behavior, securities fraud, pornography, false corporate disclosures, and illegal business practices; (3) returns would be paid from new investors' funds; and (4) there was little or no market for the stock.

Thereafter, defendant Robert Mason contacted him and stated that he would now be handling his account on behalf of Capitol, and solicited him to invest in several other companies. Mason introduced him to a Lynn Briggs, who Mason described as being a financial and investment consultant for Capital. Mason told Bowen that Briggs and Capital had a "close association with Ziasun" and other companies, including Chequemate International, Inc. (Chequemate), Loraca International, Inc. (Loraca), Asia4Sale, Inc. (Asia4Sale) and CASTPRO.com, Inc. (CASTPRO). Briggs touted Ziasun and the other companies for investment. Briggs told Bowen that no investor had ever lost money with these companies because of Capital's "close association and intimate knowledge" of the companies being recommended. Based upon the misrepresentations made by Robinson, Mason and Briggs, Bowen bought stock in Ziasun, Chequemate, Loraca, Asia4Sale, CASTPRO and Novamed, Inc, (Novamed), at a total cost of $365,625.50. Bowen alleged Robinson, Mason and Briggs were acting as agents for the companies in which he invested, including Ziasun. Further, Bowen alleged that their actions were taken at the direction of defendant Bryant Cragun, an alleged investment advisor and fundraiser for the companies Bowen invested in, including Ziasun.

The complaint stated causes of action for unfair, unlawful and deceptive business practices under section 17200, common law fraud, securities fraud, injunctive relief, conversion and conspiracy.

In August 2001 Fredsted filed an action in the San Diego County Superior Court against Ziasun, as well as other individuals and one corporation (see fn. 2, ante). Similar to Bowen's complaint, Fredsted alleged that Ziasun, acting in concert with other individuals and entities, induced him to buy $108,840.10 worth of stock by making misstatements and omissions of fact. However, Fredsted did not allege that he ever purchased any Ziasun stock. Fredsted's complaint mirrored Bowen's in its allegations of a pyramid or Ponzi scheme and stated the same causes of action, with the exception of alleging contact with different individual agents who solicited his investment, and some different companies in which he invested.

Fredsted's complaint alleged that in January 2000 he was contacted by defendant Richard Swatman. Swatman told him that he was a broker and portfolio advisor with Capital and solicited his investment in Chequemate. He purchased 250 shares based upon the representations of Swatman.

Shortly after the initial purchase, he was advised of an increase in the price of Chequemate and was solicited by Swatman to purchase additional shares. After he agreed to buy the additional shares, Swatman told him that the stock was restricted and could not be sold for one year. Fredsted also alleged that he was not advised that (1) funds invested by him would be used by the defendants to finance activities involving criminal behavior, securities fraud, pornography, false corporate disclosures, and illegal business practices; (2) returns on his investment would be made from new investors' funds, i.e., a pyramid or Ponzi scheme; and (3) that little or no market existed for the Chequemate stock.

According to Fredsted, shortly after he opened his account with Capital defendant James Howard contacted him and advised him that he would now be his account manger, and solicited him to invest in Asia4Sale, CASTPRO, RealestateFederation.com (REF) and Broadcast International (Broadcast). Howard arranged a meeting between himself and Briggs, who Howard represented to be a consultant for Capital and as having a "close association" with the companies being touted. At the meeting, Briggs touted the stock of several companies and represented that he was closely affiliated with Broadcast. Between January and December 2000, based upon the misrepresentations of Swatman, Howard and Briggs, Fredsted invested $108,840.10 in the stock of Broadcast, Chequemate, REF, Asia4Sale, and CASTPRO. Fredsted further alleged that their actions were taken at the direction of defendant Cragun, who allegedly was an investment advisor and fundraiser for the companies in which he invested, and Ziasun as well.

The court thereafter consolidated Bowen's and Fredsted's actions.

C. Summary Judgment Motion

1. Ziasun's moving papers

In July 2002, Ziasun brought a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for summary adjudication of issues. Ziasun argued that the first through third causes of action brought under section 17200 were without merit because that statute did not apply to securities transactions. Ziasun argued that the fourth cause of action for fraud failed as Bowen and Fredsted could not show any facts demonstrating that plaintiffs had purchased Ziasun stock or that Ziasun defrauded them. Ziasun argued that the fifth cause of action for securities fraud was without merit because (1) there were no facts showing that it violated the law on securities fraud; and (2) Ziasun was not a seller or offeror of securities. Ziasun asserted that the sixth cause of action for injunctive relief failed as there was no viable cause of action to support this remedy. Ziasun asserted that the seventh cause of action for conversion was without merit as there was no identifiable sum of money that it was unlawfully interfering with. Finally, Ziasun argued that the eighth cause of action for conspiracy was without merit as there was no evidence that Ziasun conspired with anyone else to commit any wrongdoing.

In support of the motions, Ziasun submitted the declaration of D. Scott Elder, the vice president of INVESTools, Inc., the successor merger company of Ziasun. According to Elder, Fredsted was never a shareholder of Ziasun, and Ziasun never had any direct dealings with either plaintiff. Elder also stated that Ziasun was never the parent company of Asia4Sale and never exercised any control over that company. Ziasun had no part in any alleged scheme against plaintiffs and, to Elder's knowledge, no Ziasun employees ever engaged in any insider trading. According to Elder, Ziasun never converted anything belonging to plaintiffs and never directed any communication to plaintiffs. Elder also denied that Ziasun was engaged in any conspiracy with any other defendants to deprive plaintiffs of money or property.

According to Elder, defendant Cragun resigned from Ziasun as a consultant in 1998 and never held a position with Ziasun as an officer, director, agent or employee at the times relevant to the plaintiffs' complaint. Similarly, Elder stated that Briggs ceased his affiliation with and resigned from Ziasun in 1998, before the events alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. Elder also stated that none of the other defendants was ever an agent or employee of Ziasun.

Ziasun attached to its motion Fredsted's responses to Ziasun's requests for admissions, wherein Fredsted stated that he lacked sufficient information or belief to admit or deny whether he had any facts supporting his allegations. Ziasun also submitted both plaintiffs' responses to interrogatories, wherein plaintiffs did not identify any facts supporting their allegations.

2. Discovery dispute

Following the filing of plaintiffs' complaint, Ziasun obtained an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 1030 requiring plaintiffs to each post a bond of $25,000 within 10 days to secure payment of costs to Ziasun should it prevail, as a condition of allowing plaintiffs' action to proceed.4 Plaintiffs were unable to post the bond within the 10 days ordered by the court and Ziasun brought a motion to dismiss the complaint.

In June 2002, plaintiffs noticed a deposition for Ziasun's person most knowledgeable (PMK). Ziasun objected to the deposition notice on the basis that (1) plaintiffs had not timely posted the bond ordered by the court and the action was therefore subject to dismissal; and (2) the deposition was overbroad, burdensome and harassing, seeking 78 categories of issues for the PMK to testify about and 212 categories of documents. Ziasun did not appear at the deposition.

In July 2002, plaintiffs brought an ex parte application to shorten time for an order compelling the deposition of Ziasun's PMK. The court denied plaintiffs' motion without prejudice on the basis that Ziasun's motion to dismiss was pending. In July 2002, the court denied Ziasun's motion to dismiss as the bonds had been posted, albeit in an untimely fashion. The court also thereafter granted Ziasun's ex parte application to continue the trial date to October 2002.

In August 2002, plaintiffs brought a second ex parte application for an order shortening time to bring a motion to compel the deposition of Ziasun's PMK. Plaintiffs argued that they had noticed the deposition of Ziasun's PMK, but Ziasun did not appear for the deposition and the deposition was necessary to oppose Ziasun's pending motion for summary judgment. The court took Ziasun's motion for summary judgment off calendar and ordered that each side was "entitled to depose the parties and persons most knowledgeable."

On September 3, 2002, plaintiffs renoticed the deposition of Ziasun's PMK for September 18, 2002. However, on September 6, 2002, the court reset Ziasun's summary judgment motion for September 13, 2002, to be heard at the same time as the parties' discovery disputes.

3. Plaintiffs' opposition

In opposing Ziasun's motion, plaintiffs (1) objected to the evidence submitted by Ziasun; (2) argued that triable issues of fact existed precluding summary judgment; and (3) argued that the motion should be denied or continued to allow them to conduct further discovery. However, plaintiffs did not submit any legal authority disputing the legal basis for Ziasun's summary judgment motion.

In opposition to Ziasun's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted the declaration of their counsel, James Shalvoy, their own declarations, and documentary evidence. In Shalvoy's declaration he referenced several items of documentary evidence submitted with plaintiffs' opposition. First he identified excerpts from a deposition transcript in another case wherein a witness by the name of Allen Hardman, president of Ziasun, testified that Briggs worked for Cragun in some unknown fashion. He also attached a copy of a lawsuit filed by Cragun in which Cragun stated that he had served as an investment adviser and fundraiser for Ziasun, Titan, Chequemate, Dynatec, Loraca and Bevex. Shalvoy also attached a copy of a Nevada certificate of corporate information showing that as of April 2000 Cragun was president and Briggs was secretary and treasurer of a company named Applied Technology Consultants, Inc. Shalvoy attached a Nevada annual list of officers, directors and agents for Ziasun, filed in April 1999, wherein Briggs's name was crossed out as president of Ziasun and the name Tony Tobin is handwritten in. Hardman was listed as a director of Ziasun. Shalvoy attached a copy of a 1998 Nevada annual list of officers, directors and agents for a company called Best Way, USA, showing Briggs as president. .

Shalvoy also attached a copy of an article from the South China Morning Post, which alleged that Ziasun, when it was known as Momentum Internet, "ran sex-related businesses" and "was behind a stable of porn Web sites and phone chat lines that promised Bangkok Babes and China Dolls." Shalvoy also attached a copy of a 1999 press release that stated that Amber Global Limited, acting as agent for Amber, was successfully prosecuted for dealing in securities while unregistered. Shalvoy also detailed his attempts to take the deposition of the PMK for Ziasun and requested that Ziasun's motion be denied because plaintiffs had been unable to conduct discovery necessary to oppose the motion.

Fredsted's declaration essentially mirrored his complaint, with a few items of documentary evidence attached. It detailed his interactions with Swatman, Howard and Briggs, their representations to him, and their alleged improper activities concerning the stock in which he invested, and his purchase of stock in Broadcast, Chequemate, REF, Asia4Sale, and CASTPRO, all as detailed above. Fredsted also attached to his declaration business cards for Briggs, showing him to be a managing director of The Amber Group and an "investment relations officer" for Broadcast. He also attached a copy of an article from the Wall Street Journal concerning, among other things, Ziasun's alleged activities. He attached a brochure he received from Howard that stated that Ziasun was the "parent company" of Asia4Sale. He stated that his investments were now worthless.

Bowen's declaration also essentially mirrored his complaint, again, with a few additions. He related his contacts with Robinson, Mason and Briggs, their solicitation of his investment in Ziasun, Chequemate, Loraca, Asia4Sale and CASTPRO.com, and the alleged illegal and improper activities surrounding his stock that he purchased. He also detailed the purchase dates of his stock in Ziasun and attached invoices for those stock purchases. He attached an e-mail correspondence he received describing the relationship between Ziasun and Asia4Sale. He stated that the investments he made were now worthless.

Ziasun filed a reply to plaintiffs' opposition, not only addressing plaintiffs' opposition on the merits, but also filing written objections to much of plaintiffs' evidence.

D. Court's Ruling

In September 2002, the court granted Ziasun's motion for summary judgment by telephonic ruling. The court found that the first through third causes of action brought under section 17200 failed as a matter of law because section 17200 "does not apply to securities transactions." The court found that the fourth cause of action for fraud did not have merit because plaintiffs had not produced evidence that they ever purchased shares of Ziasun. The fifth cause of action for corporate securities fraud failed because plaintiffs could not show that Ziasun violated the statute, was a seller or offeror of securities or made any misrepresentation to plaintiffs. The sixth cause of action for injunctive relief was found to have no merit because no specific identifiable sum of money was involved.5 The eighth cause of action for conspiracy failed because plaintiffs could not show that Ziasun participated in any concerted action, or that a common plan to commit tortious acts existed. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate good cause for a continuance of the motion for summary judgment to conduct further discovery.

Plaintiffs requested oral argument. At that hearing, the court addressed plaintiffs' request for further discovery based upon their inability to proceed with the deposition of Ziasun's PMK. The court stated that its notes showed that as of the ex parte hearing on August 15 it had given them the permission to go forward with the deposition of the person most knowledgeable for Ziasun. Counsel for Ziasun argued that plaintiffs did not move forward with discovery on a timely basis, never made efforts to resolve the discovery dispute and did not try to set the deposition of Ziasun's PMK in a timely manner after the court gave it permission to take that deposition. The court took the matter under submission and thereafter confirmed its telephonic ruling. In doing so, the court specifically addressed plaintiffs' request for further time to conduct discovery:

"The Court notes that at an ex parte on 7/17/02 the court continued the date to October 18, 2002. At ex parte on 8/15/02 each side sought a motion to compel discovery. The Court set a global motion for September 13, 2002. The Court stated each side was entitled to reasonably depose the parties and the Persons Most Knowledgeable (PMK). However, Plaintiff[s] failed to ever accomplish this."

This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

On an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we independently examine the record to determine whether a triable issue of material fact exists. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) In performing our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing parties (here Bowen and Fredsted), resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in their favor. (Id. at p. 768.)

"[T]he party moving for summary judgment [(here Seacoast)] bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. fn. omitted (Aguilar).) "A defendant [moving for summary judgment] bears the burden of persuasion that 'one or more elements of' the 'cause of action' in question 'cannot be established,' or that 'there is a complete defense' thereto. [Citation.]" (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o).6) In such a case, the defendant bears the "initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

If the defendant meets its burden of production, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make its own prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Ibid.)

II. Analysis

A. Section 17200 Claims

Bowen and Fredsted assert that the court erred in finding that section 17200 does not apply to securities transactions. Although this is a question of first impression in California, we find federal and out-of-state authority persuasive on this issue and conclude that the court did not err in granting Ziasun's motion on this basis.

Section 17200 provides in part: "[U]nfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." Section 17200 is known as California's "little FTC Act," which mirrors its federal counterpart, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 United States Code section 45 et seq. (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1263-1264.) Historically, the FTC has not viewed the FTC Act as reaching securities transactions. (Russell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (Conn. 1986) 510 A.2d 972, 977 (Russell) ["The FTC has never undertaken to adjudicate deceptive conduct in the sale and purchase of securities"].)

Further, federal cases (some, admittedly unpublished) have held that California's section 17200 also does not apply to securities transactions. (See Dietrich v. Bauer (S.D. NY 1999) 76 F.Supp.2d 312, 351; Perera v. Chiron Corp. (N.D.Cal. 1996) 1996 WL 251936; Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Greenberg (C.D.Cal. 1993) [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,409, affd. Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. v. Greenberg (9th Cir. 1995) 60 F.3d 834 ["Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 is inapplicable to securities transactions"].)7

Additionally, at least 15 other jurisdictions that have considered whether investment securities are within the scope of their consumer protection statutes have reached the same conclusion, holding that claims based upon securities violations are not actionable under those statutes. (See Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp. (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 388 [Hawaii law] (Spinner); Russell, supra, 510 A.2d 972 [Conn. law].)8 Only three states have ruled that their little FTC acts apply to securities transactions. (See Denison v. Kelly (M.D.Pa. 1991) 759 F.Supp. 199 [Pa. law]; Onesti v. Thomson & McKinnon Securities, Inc. (N.D.Ill. 1985) 619 F.Supp. 1262 [Ill. law]; State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell (Ariz. 1983) 667 P.2d 1304 [Ariz. law].)

No published decision in California has yet reached the issue. However, based upon persuasive federal and out-of-state authority,9 we conclude that section 17200 does not apply to securities transactions. Spinner, supra, 849 F.2d 388, a Ninth Circuit case interpreting Hawaii law, is instructive.

In Spinner, the Ninth Circuit was interpreting Hawaii's little FTC Act, which is almost identical to California's. (Spinner, supra, 849 F.2d at p. 389.) The court there concluded that in enacting Hawaii's little FTC Act, the "primary intent of the legislature was to protect consumers from unethical business practices resulting in relatively small commercial injuries. . . . Actions involving securities, such as the ones alleged in this case, are not typically on the agenda of consumer advocates." (Id. at p. 391.) The court there also relied upon the fact that its federal counterpart, the FTC Act, "has not been applied in a securities context since 1923. [Citation.]" (Spinner, supra, 849 F.2d at p. 391.)

The Spinner court also relied on decisions interpreting other states' little FTC Acts, including Russell, supra, 510 A.2d 972, 977, wherein that court stated: "The FTC has never undertaken to adjudicate deceptive conduct in the sale and purchase of securities, presumably because such transactions fall under the comprehensive regulatory umbrella of the Securities and Exchange Commission. . . . [T]he plaintiff has cited no case in which the FTC or a federal court has applied the FTC Act to a securities transaction and we have found none. . . . Consequently, in this case, taking our guidance from the FTC, we must construe [the little FTC Act] as not purporting to cover transactions for the purchase and sale of securities." (Citations omitted, fn. omitted.) The Connecticut statute interpreted in that case is also similar to Hawaii's and our own. (Spinner, supra, 849 F.2d at pp. 391-392.)

There is nothing to suggest that the intent of the California Legislature in enacting section 17200 was any different from the intent of the Hawaiian Legislature: "to protect consumers from unethical business practices resulting in relatively small commercial injuries." (Spinner, supra, 849 F.2d at p. 391.) Further, California cases hold that "we may turn for guidance to the jurisprudence arising under the 'parallel' [citation] section 5 of the [FTC Act] [citation]. 'In view of the similarity of language and obvious identity of purpose of the two statutes, decisions of the federal court on the subject are more than ordinarily persuasive.' [Citations.]" (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 185.) Because, as discussed, ante, the FTC has never applied the FTC Act to securities transactions, and nothing in section 17200 indicates a different intent, we are persuaded that section 17200 should also not reach such transactions.

In support of their assertion that section 17200 does apply to securities transactions, plaintiffs cite Roskind, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th 345. However, that case is inapposite.

In Roskind, the court only held that federal securities laws do not preempt section 17200 claims, concluding: "Application of state laws such as [section 17200] to forbid the practice of trading ahead would not impair or conflict with any provision of federal law, but would be consistent with the purposes and aims of federal law." (Roskind, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 354, fn. omitted.) In doing so, the Roskind court relied in part upon the federal securities law, in particular, 15 United States Code section 78bb, which provides that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist in law or in equity." (Roskind, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 355.)

However, we are not presented here with the question of whether federal securities law preempts section 17200, but rather whether that section and its federal counterpart apply to securities transactions at all. Indeed, Roskind rejected as "dictum" the statement in the unpublished federal court decision Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Greenberg, supra, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,409, that "it seems likely that [section] 17200 is preempted entirely by federal securities laws. [Citation.]'" (Roskind, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 355.) The court in Roskind characterized that statement as dictum because the court in Shearson Lehman was presented not with the issue of preemption that was decided in Roskind, but rather decided (as we do here) that section 17200 "did not apply" to securities transactions. (Roskind, supra, at p. 355.) The Roskind case is inapplicable and does not support a conclusion that section 17200 applies to securities transaction.

In sum, we conclude, based upon the fact that the FTC Act has never been applied to securities transactions, and federal and state authority from 15 other jurisdictions have held that their little FTC Acts do not apply to securities transactions, section 17200 does not apply to securities transactions and the court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' first three causes of action on that basis.

B. Fraud Claim

Bowen and Fredsted next assert that the court erred in dismissing their fourth cause of action on the basis that they presented no admissible evidence that they ever purchased Ziasun shares or that Ziasun made any misrepresentation to them. This contention is unavailing.

1. Evidentiary issues

Before we turn to the merits on this claim, we must address an evidentiary issue raised by plaintiffs. They assert that because Ziasun objected to all of their evidence submitted in opposition to the motion, the court did not rule on the objections, and Ziasun did not make a request that it do so at the hearing, all of their evidence must be deemed admissible and part of the record on review. We conclude that this assertion does not support a reversal of the court's decision.

At first blush, plaintiffs' assertion appears to have some merit. In Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225 (Sambrano), a decision by a different panel of this court, we held that it was not enough for a trial court to state that it has only considered admissible evidence, rejecting the holding of Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1410. Rather, we held in Sambrano that it is incumbent upon the trial court to make specific rulings on a party's objections to evidence and, if the party making the objections does not make a request that the court rule on them at the hearing, the objections are deemed waived and all evidence may be considered by the reviewing court. (Sambrano, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 234-238.) However, despite that conclusion, in Sambrano we elected not to treat the objections to the plaintiffs' evidence as having been waived. We held that this was proper as we could determine from the record that the evidence would have been inadmissible as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 241.)

Here, we elect, as we did in Sambrano, to not consider all evidence as having been admitted on a waiver theory. Rather, as we discuss in the following section, because we may easily determine that plaintiffs' evidence as a matter of law did not create a triable issue of fact, we need not decide whether the court impliedly overruled Ziasun's objections to evidence when it failed to expressly rule upon them.

2. Analysis

In order to prevail on a claim of fraud, a plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant knowingly made a false representation; (2) the representation was made with the intent to deceive or induce reliance by the plaintiff; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages. (Wilkins v. National Broadcasting Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1081.

Here, we decline to decide if the court was correct in finding that there was no evidence proffered by plaintiffs to show that they purchased stock in Ziasun. Rather, we affirm the court's ruling because no evidence was presented that Ziasun made any misrepresentations, either directly or through agents, to Bowen or Fredsted.10

Bowen and Fredsted detailed in their declarations their interactions with various individuals who allegedly induced them to purchase shares of stock. However, plaintiffs submitted no evidence showing that any of them, at the time plaintiffs purchased their stock, were agents of Ziasun. The evidence at most showed that at some time previous to the relevant time period, Briggs and Cragun worked for Ziasun in some capacity. Indeed, Ziasun even admitted as much in their moving papers. However, nothing was submitted showing that they or any of the other individuals with whom they dealt was employed by, or affiliated in any way with Ziasun at the relevant time. In fact, plaintiffs did not produce any evidence that their monies were used as part of a pyramid or Ponzi scheme, or that any of the other alleged wrongdoing occurred. The only evidence presented was that certain individuals induced them to purchase stock that is now worthless. There is no triable issue of material fact with respect to plaintiffs' claim for fraud.

C. Securities Fraud Claim

Plaintiffs assert that there is a triable issue of fact that they can prove a claim for securities fraud. This contention is unavailing.

Corporations Code section 25401 provides:

"It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or offer to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral communication which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."

To state a claim under this statute, a plaintiff must show thus show that the defendant was "selling" or "offering" a stock to the plaintiff, while making a false statement by means of a written or oral communication. The statute is not, however, intended to reach corporate issuers such as Ziasun, unless they were engaged in active solicitation or trading of their stock. (Courtney v. Waring (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1440.)

As with the fraud claim, plaintiffs submitted no evidence that could establish a claim for securities fraud. There was no evidence produced that Ziasun was itself engaged in solicitations for the purchase of its stock, nor that it made any false statements in communications, either directly, or through its agents. The court did not err in granting summary judgment on the fifth cause of action for securities fraud.

D. Conversion Claim

Plaintiffs assert that triable issues of material fact prevented a summary adjudication of their claim for conversion. We reject this contention.

Conversion is defined as an act of willful interference with personal property, done without lawful justification, by which any person entitled thereto is deprived of the use and possession of the personal property. (de Vries v. Brumback (1960) 53 Cal.2d 643, 647.) However, "[m]oney cannot be the subject of [a claim for] conversion unless a specific identifiable sum is involved." (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 614, p. 710, italics omitted.)

Here again, plaintiffs submitted nothing showing that Ziasun unlawfully interfered with any personal property of plaintiffs. Therefore, we need not decide if plaintiffs' identification of specific amounts of sums they invested made them sufficiently identifiable to support such a claim. The court did not err in granting summary judgment on the fifth cause of action for conversion.

E. Conspiracy Claim

Plaintiffs assert that the court erred in granting summary judgment on the seventh cause of action for conspiracy. This contention is unavailing.

"The elements of [an action for] civil conspiracy are the formation and operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an act [or acts] done in furtherance of the common design." (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 845-846.) A plaintiff asserting a conspiracy claim must produce evidence showing the formation of the conspiracy, its operation, an overt act or acts committed by one or more of the conspirators pursuant to the common design, and resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 631.)

For the same reasons as discussed with regard to the claims for fraud, securities fraud and conversion, plaintiffs cannot make a claim for conspiracy. There was no evidence submitted showing that the individual defendants, in inducing plaintiffs to purchase stock, were part of a conspiracy with Ziasun, nor what that alleged conspiracy was. The court did not err in granting summary judgment on the seventh cause of action for conversion.11

F. Request for Continuance To Conduct Discovery

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h) provides: "If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion, or order a continuance . . . ." "The non-moving party seeking a continuance 'must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]' [Citation.] The decision whether to grant such a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court." (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) Consequently we review the decision under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.

The summary judgment motion was heard over a year after the filing of plaintiffs' complaint. No reason is given by plaintiffs as to why they failed to conduct all necessary discovery during that time. Further, plaintiffs did not move expeditiously to obtain a date for the deposition of Ziasun's PMK after the filing of Ziasun's motion for summary judgment, even though the trial date was continued and the motion was taken off calendar and rescheduled for a date three weeks later than the original hearing date. The court did abuse its discretion in refusing to deny Ziasun's motion or grant a continuance of the hearing date in order to allow plaintiff to conduct further discovery.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

NARES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McINTYRE, J.

O'ROURKE, J.