"Now, I'm not suggesting that anyone is at fault here, since a discussion based on the economic criteria affecting service providers is a perfectly legitimate one to have. Only, an analysis of service provider-centric issues must be distinguished from the impact on, and by, externalities, as well, in order to provide a more complete picture, IMO."
We're in agreement generally, and specifically. I'm just not sure John is on the same wavelength.
(John, I'm not trying to talk "around" you. I hope you're reading this dialogue, because that should eliminate the potential for misunderstood meanings, and wasted discussion)
I quite agree that whether or not the Asian companies involved are making a profit is a valid question. My best information is that they are - because of the way policy was constructed, as alluded to in the linked oreillynet article:
"Government investment in Japan and South Korea took many forms, some of them subtle.
Bleha writes, “Authorities set out to devise significant incentives to persuade Japanese companies to invest in new ultra-high-speed cable, especially in rural areas….The government used tax breaks, debt guaranties, and partial subsidies….It made well-considered and timely decisions to allot cost-free spectrum for each new mobile-phone generation. In so doing, it gave up badly needed revenue, but it retained full control over the terms of licensing and the flexibility to reassign spectrum according to future technological developments.”
The ITU report on Korea highlights how bonds and tariffs on telephone use contributed to universal phone service (p. 6). The government offered low-interest loans to bring high-speed access to apartment complexes(p. 12). It provided networked computer systems in schools. And it spent a lot on its own computer systems, which is now one of its top ten expenditures (p. 32).
The most outstanding expenditure mentioned in the Korea report is, “In 1999 and 2000, the government provided Facilities-based Service Providers (FSP) with US$ 77 million, at a very low interest rate, to invest in broadband networks.” The effect was to create services worth over seven billion dollars and five to eight thousand jobs (p. 32)."
The system of incentives in Iceland, Hong Kong, Sweden and Japan differs in each case. But in none is it a straight cash transfer: it's more sophisticated than that.
Where has it been an abused subsidy? In the United States.
newnetworks.com
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On your subsequent comments about the availability of HSI, and being ahead or behind, I suggest that it's more complex than a simple time variable.
You may have noted in my followups that in Japan (for instance) they are teaching themselves how to create digital content.
I'd like to suggest that there's a co-dependent learning curve that comes with HSI. This may be what you're saying, here:
"During the ramping stages this has been a determining factor for businesses seeking to relocate their data centers, circumstances centering on work at home capabilities, new-found capabilities for so-hos and SMBs, etc. But as the nation, indeed as the rest of the world, fills out with comparable levels of HSI, a new norm is set, and the differentiating factors then become those of higher "relative" speeds and other enhancements."
I think it's comparable to the set of competencies that had to be developed for television, for example: new cameras, lighting, editing, sound, graphics, presentation techniques, and so on.
HSI will dictate new ways to incorporate commercial content and support, to teach, to schedule, and monitor audience response, to inform - you get the idea.
IMO, high-throughput networks will create whole new operating models for delivering content. Working from the edge, these will be decentralized (even democratized perhaps), and will be in a state of flux not only as societies move up the HSI ladder, but even when they get to the top.
Effective use of HSI will demand something of societies that use it. I believe the Japanese demonstrate understanding of that truth.
Jim |
