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To: unclewest who wrote (189290)12/13/2006 4:22:06 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793964
 
Nixon goes to China--on short-changing the U.S. Military [Rich Lowry]
I believe there is no way a liberal Democratic administration would have been able, in the post-9/11 environment, to run-down and over-stretch the U.S. military the way the Bush administration has by giving it ambitious missions without significant new resources and manpower. This is very much a Nixon-to-China kind of phenomenon, because a liberal wouldn't have won the acquiescence of the Right to such a thing. But Bush has mostly gotten it—and, moreover, conservative audiences still give Rumsfeld standing ovations! Here is part of a disturbing Washington Post article today:

"Beyond that, however, the Army would have to cobble together war-depleted units to form complete ones to dispatch to the new conflict — at the risk of lost time, unit cohesion and preparedness, senior Army officials said. Moreover, the number of Army and Marine combat units available for an emergency would be limited to about half that of four years ago, experts said, unless the difficult decision to pull forces out of Iraq were made.

"We are concerned about gross readiness . . . and ending equipment and personnel shortfalls," said a senior Marine Corps official. The official added that Marine readiness has dropped and that the Corps is unable to fulfill many planned missions for the fight against terrorism.

Senior Pentagon officials stress that the U.S. military has ample air and naval power that could respond immediately to possible contingencies in North Korea, Iran or the Taiwan Strait.

"If you had to go fight another war someplace that somebody sprung upon us, you would keep the people who are currently employed doing what they're doing, and you would use the vast part of the U.S. armed forces that is at home station, to include the enormous strength of our Air Force and our Navy, against the new threat," Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a briefing last month.

But if the conflict were to require a significant number of ground troops — as in some scenarios such as the disintegration of Pakistan — Army and Marine Corps officials made clear that they would have to scramble to provide them. "Is it the way we'd want to do it? No. Would it be ugly as hell? Yes," said one of the senior Army officials. "But," he added, "we could get it done."

According to Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top U.S. commander for the Middle East, the Army and Marine Corps today cannot sustain even a modest increase of 20,000 troops in Iraq. U.S. commanders for Afghanistan have asked for more troops but have not received them, noted the Iraq Study Group report, which called it "critical" for the United States to provide more military support for Afghanistan...

...The U.S. military today could cobble together two or three divisions in an emergency — compared with as many as six in 2001 — not enough to carry out major operations such as overthrowing the Iranian government. "That's the kind of extreme scenario that could cripple us," said Michael E. O'Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution.

corner.nationalreview.com



To: unclewest who wrote (189290)12/14/2006 3:39:42 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793964
 
Army "Future": Fewer Drones
Defense Tech
The other day, Inside Defense broke the news that the Army was shaving billions off of its massive modernization program, Future Combat Systems. Now, we're starting to get some details. Turns out the drones are the ones getting the axe.
FCS originally envisioned four types and sizes of unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, buzzing over soldiers' heads. The littlest ones would join platoons. Slightly bigger drones would be assigned to companies. Batallion commanders would supervise an even larger UAV. And the biggest of 'em all -- an armed, robotic helicopter -- would work for the brigade.

Those four classes of UAVs are now being trimmed down to two; just the tiniest and the most gargantuan drones will remain. There will still be other robotic planes in the Army's arsenal -- the hand-held Ravens, the Shadows, and the big, high-flying, bad-ass Warriors.

But the move is the latest in a series of efforts to scale down the once-grandiose FCS vision. First to go were the all-electric, laser-firing, next-gen fighting vehicles. Then, the requirement that those vehicles fit into a C-130 transport plane. And after that, the high-tech uniforms that were supposed to electronically tie the grunts to the larger Army. With the vehicles' designs still very much in flux -- and with the network connecting all of those drones and vehicles together still facing major roadblocks -- who knows what will be left, when FCS finally deploys?

UPDATE 3:55 AM: Speaking of those little Raven drones, it looks like the Marines will start using 'em, too. Inside Defense says that the Corps has given up on its own mini-UAV, the Dragon Eye. During the Iraq invasion, Marines found the drone "too flimsy," and didn't stay in the air nearly long enough. Some fixes were made. But the things still had a nasty habit of "break[ing] apart upon repeated landings." So it's out with the Dragon Eyes. In with the sturdier Ravens.

defensetech.org



To: unclewest who wrote (189290)12/15/2006 4:42:16 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793964
 
How Winning Is Expensive
Strategy Page

December 14, 2006: Wartime supply demands for the U.S. Army are costing more than anyone anticipated. As in past wars, the army quickly adapted to unforeseen combat conditions. In every war, there are lots of unforeseen conditions. No one has yet found a way to get around that. But the solution has been expensive. Consider the cost of the gear a soldier wears into combat. Before September 11, 2001, if was about $8,000. Now it's $25,000.

The additional money went to new, and more effective, armor, better first aid gear, personal radios and new uniforms. All this saves lives, resulting in American troops having the lowest casualty rates in modern history, rates that are about a third of those suffered by troops who fought in Vietnam. But it costs money, especially for the extensive medical facilities waiting for the dozen or so casualties that occur each day.



But the biggest additional expenses have been base building, base maintenance, and transportation. Since Vietnam, the army has learned that it's wise to do all you can to maintain troop morale. All these guys and gals are volunteers. They can be remarkably effective, if you treat them right. That means really tight security for American bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. There have been only a few casualties in those bases as a result of billions spent on building and equipping them. New electronic surveillance equipment does wonders to spot terrorists trying to get in, but this stuff is expensive. The bases have air conditioning for most of the troops living quarters. This was a smart move, because trying to sleep in all that heat is rough for Americans coming in from a life where comfortable sleeping quarters are the norm. The food and other amenities are excellent. While combat troops may spend days at a time "outside the wire" (off base), roughing it, they know that when they get back to base, they can catch a shower, unwind with some video games, and sleep in cool comfort. All this makes a big difference in troop effectiveness, but it costs money.



Another major expense was protecting the trucks that brought in all the supplies (especially water and fuel) to those bases. A basic hummer, that cost $33,000 in 2001, now costs over $200,000 in Iraq, tricked out with armor and electronics (jammers to defeat IEDs). Armor kits for larger trucks can cost up to $100,000 per vehicle.



Training costs have gone up, because it quickly became clear that, in wartime, troops needed more practice with their weapons, and real ammunition. That, along with pay raises (mainly linked to inflation), raised the cost per solider per year from $75,000 in 2001, to over $120,000 today. The Department of Defense is buying over a billion rounds of small arms ammunition a year, compared to 250 million 2001. Most of that is used in training, not combat.



Air freight is costing billions of dollars a year, most of being supplied by civilian contractors. This is crucial in Afghanistan, where there are few roads, or railroads.



While a lot of additional money (nearly half a trillion dollars) has been provided for the war on terror, the distribution of that money has changed, in recognition of the fact that the army is doing most of the fighting. But the navy and air force are still getting more of the defense budget, per capita, than the army. That's because the air force and navy use much more expensive weapons (warships and warplanes). The navy and air force are shedding people, and some programs, but because of the long lead time for building ships and aircraft, most of the procurement budget is locked in for years to come. So the army has to scramble for money, despite all the cash being thrown at the war effort.

strategypage.com



To: unclewest who wrote (189290)12/18/2006 10:33:09 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793964
 
Infantry: Things That Really Matter
Strategy Page
December 18, 2006: What's the next big technology that will change the way infantry operate? In other words, the "next big thing?" Most likely portable fuel cells, because all the electronic devices troops are carrying need juice.



In the last century, there have only been a few of these breakthrough technologies. Many appeared during World War I. Things like the combat (steel) helmet (reduced casualties a lot), mortars (portable fire power), land mines (easier to defend a position) and automatic weapons for individual soldiers (the U.S. BAR and the German 9mm machine pistol). The assault rifle showed up during World War II, along with the bazooka (and its variations, like the German weapon that led to the RPG), giving the infantry more portable artillery.



A major innovation that showed up in the 1960s was the night vision scope, a hand held device that enabled you to see at night. Another 1960s development was Kevlar, a fabric that made a bullet proof vest that was light enough to wear. This was enhanced in the 1980s with the development of ceramic plates that made possible truly bullet proof armor. Casualty rates came way down as a result.





The 1970s saw the end of conscription, and an all-volunteer force. Professional infantry are, all things being equal, much more effective than conscripts.



A major new tech in the 1980s was laser tag (MILES, where laser pointers were attached to guns, and soldiers wore sensors to tell them when they were hit). This allowed for very realistic training exercises, and troops going into combat for the first time, after MILES training, now had a good appreciation for battlefield realities. This is another technology that is hardly known, much less appreciated, by civilians. But the troops know it to be a lifesaver.



The 1990s saw the arrival of GPS, which did two very important things for the infantry. First, it made it much harder to get lost. This is a big deal for the infantry, who are always plunging into unknown territory. GPS also made possible JDAM, the GPS guided smart bomb. This revolutionized air support and gave the infantry a lot more firepower.



The 1990s also saw the widespread introduction of the personal radio for the infantry. This came as a result of more powerful, and smaller, radio technology. The grunts basically adopted stuff that was coming on to the civilian market.



Another 1990s breakthrough infantry tool for the infantry was the micro-UAV. Weighing under ten pounds, battery powered and with endurance of about an hour, these revolutionized infantry tactics. Company and platoon commanders could now get a real-time, birds eye view of the battlefield. This gave U.S. troops a tremendous advantage, saved many American lives and forced the enemy to operate much more slowly.



Perhaps the most important 1990s technology for the infantry was the Internet. Now the grunts could talk to each other, share combat experiences and ways to be use new technology, and which new tech was worth using in combat. The Internet doesn't get much recognition in this respect, but for the grunts, it has been huge. Computers have become a big deal, and laptops or PDAs are often carried into battle by some officers.



And the buzz on the Internet has been that batteries are becoming a big problem. All those electronic gadgets draw lots of juice, and running out of batteries is becoming a bigger problem than running out of ammo. Fuel cell technology has been in development for over a decade, and the first practical models are arriving to replace generators. This year, some troops got a 20 pound device, about the size of a briefcase, that put out 200 watts, and could be used to recharge batteries. But the 2007 models will be much smaller (half the size of a brick, but lighter) Fuel cells will keep getting smaller, until, sometimes next decade, they can replace the actual batteries. That will be just in time, because the troops are getting wearable computers and videocams on their helmets. The Internet is coming to the battlefield, and that will require a lot more battery power.

strategypage.com



To: unclewest who wrote (189290)12/23/2006 5:07:08 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793964
 
Obstacles to a Larger U.S. Army
Strategy Page
December 22, 2006: Proposals to increase the size of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps has to contend with several realities. First, recruiting more troops, training them, and creating new units for them, will take time. Individual and unit training takes about a year. Even after new training facilities are built, you're not going to get more than one new brigade a year. You're also going to need some place to put the new troops. Some old facilities are available, but they have to be refurbished. Based on current costs, each new trooper will cost about $120,000 a year, plus the cost of new facilities (a one time cost of up to $50,000 per soldier or marine.)

At the end of the Cold War, the army had 800,000 troops, and sixteen divisions (55 brigades, including independent brigades). That was cut during the 1990s. The current force has 500,000 troops, ten divisions and 43 brigades. The current army organization is different from what it had fifteen years ago. The army is a leaner organization, with more support services outsourced to civilian firms, and a larger proportion of troops in combat units.

Adding 100,000 troops to the army, would probably result in nine additional brigades. But it would take six or seven years to reach this number, and would make the army a less effective organization during that period. That's because thousands of experienced troops would have to be taken from existing units, in order to provide trainers for the new troops, and leadership for the new units. Because it's a wartime situation, the army has a deep bench. Lots of combat experienced troops of known capabilities. But the loss of these troops to training duties will make some units less capable.

There will also be some problems with troop quality. With the economy booming, and unemployment so low, standards will have to be reduced a few percent in order to bring in an additional 15 percent or so new recruits each year. The quality drop will have more of an impact in the media, with frenzied news stories, than it will with any actual battlefield effect.

The main thing coming out of this plan is the apparent decision to keep troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere, for a decade or more to come. Not much has been said about that, or the fact that expanding the army and marines will take years.