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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Peter Dierks who wrote (15605)12/15/2006 12:25:54 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Panned in Baghdad
Iraqis reject the Baker-Hamilton report.

Friday, December 15, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST

Iraq Study Group Chairmen Jim Baker and Lee Hamilton have spent the past week defending their report against withering criticism here in the U.S. But the more revealing reaction has been from Iraq itself: "Unrealistic," "inappropriate" and "very dangerous" are among the kinder words used by Iraq's leaders to describe the ISG's work.

Consider Jalal Talabani. A secular-minded Kurd who has probably done more than any other leader to reach out across the country's sectarian divides, Iraq's President is no doubt sympathetic to the report's calls for "national reconciliation." But he reacted strongly to the ISG's suggestion that American support for his democratically elected government be conditioned on its meeting U.S.-determined "milestones" toward that goal. That, he said, was an "insult to the people of Iraq."

Mr. Talabani was also critical of the ISG's specific ideas for achieving reconciliation. Having helped bring such Sunni leaders as Adnan Dulaimi into the political process, he clearly understands the importance of giving the Sunnis a fair deal. But he bristled at the report's idea that reconciliation should be achieved through concessions to members of Saddam's Baath Party and other Sunni rejectionists. Fellow Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani echoed that criticism, saying the ISG wanted to reward "those who are against the political process and have conducted acts of violence."

On the issue of improving Iraq's security forces, Mr. Talabani also objected to the idea of embedding more American advisers inside Iraqi units. Like a number of Iraqis to whom we've spoken, Mr. Talabani believes one key to better security is increasing the freedom of Iraqi Army units to carry out independent operations based on their own intelligence and judgment. "Many people ask why there is no security, and that's because our hands are tied. The Prime Minister cannot move 10 soldiers from one place to another" without U.S. authorization, he said.

We think embedding is a useful idea, though that isn't the same as U.S. control of those units. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agrees with Mr. Talabani on this, and he argued for more control of the Iraqi Army during his recent meeting with President Bush. While the PM's public reaction to the ISG report was much more muted, Mr. Maliki's advisers have made it clear they are as troubled as Mr. Talabani. "We were told there would not be pressure as such," said one. "If they do not support the government it will look as if they do not do what they preach [about democracy]," said another.

Shiite leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who met with Mr. Bush last week, also said the ISG report "includes inaccurate information that's based on dishonest sources." Other Shiites objected to the ISG's suggestion that provisions of the Iraqi constitution, which was overwhelmingly ratified in a referendum last year, be reopened for debate. Iraq's Sunni leaders, meanwhile, were somewhat less critical of the ISG report. But they were hardly enthusiastic either.

We offer this roundup not because these Iraqis are infallible on how to move their country forward, and in fact they often disagree. But their reaction exposes the flawed conception of the ISG process, which is that a group of unelected American "wise men" were going to come up with policies that would somehow save Iraq's elected government from itself. "The report has a mentality that we are a colony where they impose their conditions and neglect our independence," the pro-American Talabani said pointedly.

This Iraqi criticism also underscores that the ISG report was less about winning in Baghdad than about splitting political differences in Washington. As Mr. Bush re-examines Iraq policy with an eye toward announcing significant changes early next year, we trust he understands better than the ISG that a partnership with the Iraqi government is essential to any successful outcome.

opinionjournal.com



To: Peter Dierks who wrote (15605)12/21/2006 12:39:35 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
A Reagan Strategy
The right way to negotiate with Syria and Iran.

BY ABRAHAM D. SOFAER
Wednesday, December 20, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST

The Iraq Study Group's recommendation that the Bush administration drop its preconditions and negotiate with Syria and Iran has been praised as a "no-brainer"--and condemned as an improper effort to reward rogue regimes. Neither reaction is correct. Negotiating with enemies can be a useful aspect of effective diplomacy. But successful negotiations with enemies result not from the talks themselves but from the diplomatic strategy that accompanies them. The group's recommendations deserve support, but must be effectively integrated into President Bush's strategy of ending state-sponsored terror.

The arguments against negotiating with Syria and Iran were also made against negotiating with the Soviet Union, and by some of the same people. Soviet misconduct easily matches that of Syria or Iran in aggression, oppression, murder, support for terrorist groups, and mendacity. President Reagan challenged Soviet behavior by supporting groups fighting communist intervention, building the military, strengthening NATO, condemning human-rights violations, commencing a missile-defense program, and conveying the message of freedom in every way possible. George Shultz supported these efforts but sought to negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to increase stability, reduce nuclear weapons, attain freedom for oppressed groups, and enhance understanding. To make negotiations possible the U.S. adopted specific policies, including:

• Regime acceptance. The U.S. refrained from activities aimed at destroying the Soviet regime it was seeking to influence, while vigorously denouncing its political and moral legitimacy.

• Limited linkage. Negotiations on human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations were pursued without linkage to Soviet conduct, enabling negotiations to proceed while the U.S. responded firmly through deeds.

• Rhetorical restraint. Reagan vigorously criticized the Soviet system and its behavior, but promised not to "crow" when the Soviets agreed to U.S. proposals, enabling Soviet leaders to avoid being seen as capitulating to U.S. demands.

• Self-interest. U.S. negotiating policy was based on convincing the Soviets to act in their own best interests.

The Iraq Study Group's "external" strategy for Iraq contains several elements necessary for successful diplomacy: the need for both incentives and "disincentives"; negotiations "without preconditions"; and negotiations that are "extensive and substantive," requiring a balancing of interests. The general incentives identified by the group are unlikely, however, to lead to constructive discussions. While Syria and Iran should realize that preventing a breakdown in Iraq is in their interests, they see great advantages in having the U.S. lose strength and credibility in a costly effort to help a state they are relieved to see powerless. The notion that they will help in order to have "enhanced diplomatic relations" with the U.S. assumes that states will do what they know the U.S. wants simply because Washington will not otherwise talk to them. The pronouncements that accompany this Bush policy exemplify the sort of rhetoric that discourages cooperation. The possibility of obtaining U.S. assistance in joining the WTO would be a real incentive in an ongoing negotiation, but it is not a credible incentive in the context of hostile confrontation and proliferating sanctions.

The incentives proposed for negotiating with Syria are, by contrast, concrete and substantial. Syria would benefit economically from a stable Iraq, and getting back the Golan Heights would give President Bashar Assad's standing a much needed boost. Syria has no deep commitment to Hezbollah or Hamas to prevent it from accepting peace with Israel and increased cooperation in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian areas, in exchange for the Golan and a constructive role in the area. But the Iraq Study Group too casually assumes that the U.S. can secure "Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon." The "full cooperation" of a sovereign state in such situations must be negotiated, rather than made a precondition. Convincing Israel to give up the Golan Heights will also be difficult, and Syria's help in securing the release of Israeli soldiers seized by Hamas and Hezbollah is a good place to start. While the security threat posed by returning the Golan has largely been worked out in prior negotiations, the challenge posed by Syria's claim to access to the Sea of Galilee, and the meaning of a "full and secure peace agreement" will require great efforts. Still, bringing Syria into a responsible nationhood is an objective well worth pursuing.

The anger and scorn heaped on the Iraq Study Group for advocating negotiations with Syria echo the opposition to negotiating with the Soviet Union. But Syrian behavior must be addressed, not just condemned. Egypt, too, wrongfully supported terrorism against Israel after the 1967 war, and launched the 1973 war, to get back the Sinai. Yet, the U.S. properly urged Israel to negotiate with Egypt, and the peace between them serves the interests of both countries. Similarly, an agreement to return the Golan in exchange for peace would have the support of most Israelis and the current Israeli government, and would be consistent with governing Security Council resolutions and the principle that precludes acquiring territory by force.

The Iraq Study Group is probably right that Iran is unlikely to agree to negotiate with the U.S. to bring stability to Iraq. The distrust between the U.S. and Iran suggests that negotiations between them should commence on limited issues, in a noncontroversial forum. The U.S./Iran Tribunal in The Hague might well work. Iran resents that many of its significant claims against the U.S. remain unresolved there after over 20 years. The U.S. should offer to negotiate these claims on an expedited basis. As progress is made, the dialogue would likely expand to include such issues as Afghanistan, Iraq, commercial matters and human-rights concerns. (During my negotiations with Iran as legal adviser between 1985 and 1990, we resolved many cases and discussed other issues; my interlocutor eventually agreed, for example, that the fatwa against Salman Rushdie could not be enforced in any state outside Iran.) A successful negotiation will include Iranian demands, such as an end to efforts at regime change. Major change in Iran is in fact more likely to result from normalization and internal activities, than by opposition groups seeking to overthrow the regime.

Finally, any effort to negotiate with Syria or Iran will fail if based only on incentives. The Iraq Study Group's proposal lacks a program of sufficient pressure to make diplomacy potentially successful. James Baker was able to convene the Madrid Conference in 1991 only after the U.S. had expelled Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The effort to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program should continue as forcefully as possible. Multilateral sanctions helped get Libya to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. A clear warning that Syria and Iran must end all forms of state-sponsored terrorism, as now required by Security Council resolutions, must be a central element of U.S. negotiating policy, backed with meaningful preparations for action. The power of the U.S. to inflict damage on its enemies remains substantial, despite current difficulties in Iraq. While it is now difficult to contemplate military action against Syria or Iran, continued sponsorship of terror against other states will eventually provoke the American people, if not the international community, to exercise their right of self-defense through affordable wars of destruction instead of costly nation-building exercises.

No one can convey this message more effectively than George Bush, who remains determined to prevent a future of state-sponsored terror. He should accept the Iraq Study Group's sound message on negotiating with enemies but supplement it with the toughness that effective diplomacy demands.

Mr. Sofaer, George P. Shultz Senior Fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution, was legal adviser to the Department of State from 1985 to 1990.

opinionjournal.com



To: Peter Dierks who wrote (15605)1/2/2007 5:25:43 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
So, Saddam Is Dead . . .
But the way of the world remains Saddam's.

BY MARK BOWDEN
Tuesday, January 2, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST

Now that they have hanged Saddam Hussein, perhaps we can begin to appreciate the irony and the lessons of his demise.

Any nation is, at heart, an idea. Once people started organizing themselves in groups larger than their own blood lines, they had to invent reasons for considering themselves part of something bigger--tribes, city states, feudal kingdoms, nations, empires. Language, customs, religion, ideology and geographic proximity have all served. The idea of a state that accepts as equal citizens people from all corners of the globe, a nation founded on abstract principles, is a relative newcomer. We have been trying to get the people inhabiting a large swath of land between and on both sides of the Tigris and Euphrates to embrace the concept. It is an ongoing struggle with less-than-encouraging results.

One of our better allies in promoting this idea was none other than Saddam, who may have died the last true believer in a multiethnic, nonsectarian Iraq. He made his idea of Iraq real by ruthlessly suppressing dissent, particularly with the Shiite majority, by enforcing obedience from Sunnis and the Kurds, and by resisting (or co-opting) the vision of Islamist radicals. American leaders wrestling with Moqtada al-Sadr and his ilk have doubtlessly found themselves admiring the dictator's success, if not his methods.

The old tyrant had long been out of touch with his country, locked behind the high walls of his palaces, protected by body doubles and flattering liars, moving from secret bed to secret bed. The hand-written letter he purportedly released from prison last week, when it became apparent he was to be executed, showed once more how disconnected he was. He addressed the Iraqi people as one, and encouraged them to rise up against the American occupiers. "Do not trust those who speak of Shias and Sunnis," he wrote. Except for the part about attacking Americans, it might have been written by one of the Pentagon's propaganda contractors.

In fact, no one who cares about the idea of Iraq is rooting for the U.S. to depart any time soon. Saddam could be excused, perhaps, because he had lived in a fantasy world for years. Those who advocate it here are transparently heedless of its consequences in Iraq, the operative notion being to avoid shedding more American blood for a cause deemed hopeless or unworthy or both. Unless something dramatic happens soon to alter the sorry trends, it will eventually be the policy of our country.

Saddam had long since ceased to be the beloved figure he believed himself to be. In this stubborn insurgency there has been little evidence of him as a rallying point. His death did not provoke violent recriminations or even much angry rhetoric. Once he was toppled, once deprived of his vicious state apparatus, he ceased to be relevant. Just as the resistance never stopped or even slowed after his capture, the deaths of his sons or the arrests or killings of the other leading Baathist figures on the notorious U.S. military deck of cards, it will not be affected by his death. Saddam was bigger than the bloody divisions that now preoccupy his people. None of the various murderous factions are fighting for his vision of a greater Iraq. The Sunnis are fighting to resist Shiite domination, the Shiites to rid themselves of Sunni oppression, and the Islamists just to frustrate the democratic vision of the U.S.

We Americans consistently underestimate the deep hatreds that divide people. Our political system is designed to wrestle peacefully with the divisions of race, class, ethnicity, religion and competing ideological or geographical interests, and has generally worked as intended--the Civil War being the one glaring exception. Generations have struggled to live up to ideals of tolerance and diversity. When we look out at the world, we tend to see millions longing to get past the blood feuds, to be, in short, more like us. George Bush and the neocon intellectuals who led us into Iraq are just the latest in a long line of evangelical Americanists. No matter how many times history slaps us in the face, the dream persists.

Nine years ago, in the epilogue to "Black Hawk Down," I quoted an unnamed State Department official (he was Michael Sheehan, ambassador for counter-terrorism) as follows: "The idea used to be that terrible countries were terrible because good, decent, innocent people were being oppressed by evil, thuggish leaders. Somalia changed that. Here you have a country where just about everybody is caught up in the fighting. You stop an old lady on the street and ask her if she wants peace, and she will say, 'Yes, of course, I pray for it daily.' All the things you would expect her to say. Then ask her if she would be willing for her clan to share power with another to have that peace, and she'll say, 'With those murderers and thieves? I'd die first.' People in these countries . . . don't want peace. They want victory. They want power. Men, women, old, and young. Somalia was the experience that taught us that people in these places bear much of the responsibility for things being the way they are. The hatred and killing continues because they want it to. Or because they don't want peace enough to stop it."

The statement is too harsh, as Mr. Sheehan himself agrees (he was at that point a veteran of Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia). Any effort to characterize millions with the expression "these people" is unfair and wrong. But there is a principle here struggling to emerge: Before a state can exist where there are deep-rooted, competing interests, there must be some broadly accepted concept of a nation strong enough to at least compete with parochial interests. There must be some generally accepted idea of a nation.

Mr. Sheehan was wrong about one thing. Somalia didn't change anything. Substitute Iraq for Somalia in the quote, and the observation is as accurate today as then. Maybe we need to better appreciate that our nation remains an exception. I believe that in the long run people on this planet will embrace democracy and diversity, but we are not there yet. I still nurse hope that Iraqis will abandon blood feuds for compromise and a democratic future, but it appears to be a longer shot today than three years ago, and it was a bad bet then. Mr. Bush has staked his legacy on it.

So, the tyrant is dead. We may have facilitated his bad end, but, sadly, violence, oppression and fear remain the time-tested ways of forging a nation state out of disparate parts. Until Mr. Sheehan's doctrine is no longer true, the way of the world will remain Saddam's.

Mr. Bowden is the author, inter alia, of "Black Hawk Down" (Atlantic, 1999).

opinionjournal.com



To: Peter Dierks who wrote (15605)1/2/2007 9:11:32 PM
From: sandintoes  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
ROFLOL I read the first line and thought that sounds like Ann. Sure enough. She has a style that is uniquely her own.