To: sea_urchin who wrote (14198 ) 1/23/2007 1:25:06 PM From: Crimson Ghost Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 22250 Released IDF documents reveal ethnic cleansing effort in South Lebanon posted by Helena Cobban HaAretz's Amos Harel has an informative reconstruction of the decsionmaking last summer within the Israeli General Staff, over crucial aspects of the-- failed-- war against Hizbullah. This reconstruction gives a lot more background and context to the chaos and indecisiveness in the decisionmaking that were evident at the time (and that I wrote about in my Boston Review article, here.) Harel writes: The outgoing Chief of Staff Dan Halutz strongly opposed a broad ground operation until the very last stage of the war... even though the two General Staff members also from the air force - Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin and Major General Idan Nehushtan - supported such action. What is surprising is that the two major generals who supported a broad ground offensive at an early stage - Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky and Chief of Operations Gadi Eisenkot - changed their views as the war continued and then hesitated to carry out such an offensive. A Haaretz probe in recent weeks has enabled, for the first time, a reconstruction of critical parts of the exchanges during a series of meetings headed by the chief of staff... The General Staff emerges from the exchanges as seemingly confused and hesitant. Harel appears to base much of his report on actual transcripts of some of the key meetings, though he nowhere provides any sourcing or provenance, or even any comments about that matter. We have to take his account on trust. The article is all extremely interesting. But the most disturbing part is his account of a key July 16 meeting about the possibility of trying to seize the substantial southern town of Bint Jbeil (normal population: around 30,000 souls): on July 16, Bint Jbail is raised for the first time as a target for a possible IDF operation. Major General Benny Gantz, head of the ground forces, makes the recommendation to the chief of staff. "Hassan Nasrallah's victory speech [in May 2000 after the IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon] was made in Bint Jbail. We must dismantle that place, it is a Shi'ite place - and they must be driven to the North. I would even consider a limited ground operation in this area, which can be held." ... The former chief of staff, Moshe Ya'alon, emphasized the need to "stamp the psyche" of the enemy. [That was favorite theme of Ya'alon's, with regard to the Palestinians, back when he was still chief of staff... You'll note that though his approach inflicted horrendous damage on the Palestinians, for some reason it still failed to persuade them to 'cry uncle.' Perhaps Ya'alon lacks any capacity to learn? ~HC] He was talking about the importance of symbolism. It turns out that in the second Lebanon war the "stamping" happened to us. The focus on the damage to symbols emerges over and over throughout the war. The fact that Bint Jbail, a Shi'ite town, became a bloody trap and the Golani Brigade suffered eight dead on the morning of July 26, only intensified the IDF's obsession with the place. Harel has long excerpts from what appears to be the transcript of a crucial meeting July 26-- a day when the IOF suffered a particularly bloody setback in Bint Jbeil. He notes that during that meeting, The chief of staff reiterates the possibility of intensifying the air operation, including the targetting of civilian infrastructure in Beirut. "I intend to put this once more on the [government's] table. I say that before we start moving divisions, [to the rivers] Awali, Zahrani, Litani, it does not matter. We must bring Lebanon to a different place." Throughout Harel's account you can certainly see the deep indecisiveness that was reigning in the General Staff. He gives no sign of what was going on at the political level at that time, or in the interface between the two. Those meetings would be interesting to learn this much about, too. But at the end of the day it is the frustration these guys feel that comes acorss the strongest. He concludes with this utterance that military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin reportedly made on July 28: On the matter of the Katyushas, we must show that it is possible to defeat this thing, otherwise it will follow us for years. Apparently this can only be done on the ground ... Come on, our fathers beat all the Arab states in six days and we are not able to go in with two divisions and finish off [the area] south of the Litani?"