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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: one_less who wrote (218940)	2/17/2007 1:33:47 AM
From: cnyndwllr	Respond to of 281500

So it is Iraqis who must distinguish between those who would strive for a common goal vs those who would seek dominance as a subgroup. Some stability must be obtained so that Iraqis Rough, re: "You asked me to offer some specific strategic direction for us in relation to the dilemma in Iraq, which I did and I founded my comments on the logic of the options available.." Yeah, I caught those "specific strategic directions." Let's see: "There is still quite a bit of personal vascillation because they aren't sure they would be safe under the new government. We can facilitate this by using our military to make it as safe as possible for Iraqis to distinguish and isolate the oppositional forces." Sure, that's the ticket, we use our military to make it safe for the Iraqis to "distinguish and isolate the oppositional forces." But wait, didn't you post that your goal was to make sure that Iraqis weren't oppressed when we left? And wasn't the point of my reply, the one you where you "don't see a connection," that the "oppositional forces" are no more radical than any other Iraqi force, i.e., there are no moderate forces in Iraq? But maybe I missed something in your strategy? You also posted that: "The option of agreeable particians is also within the realm of consideration to achieve this same outcome." I had a professor once who put officious words together so poorly that he was impossible to understand. Half the class thought he was way over their heads-brilliant. I did understand what he was saying and I knew how empty his head was. I've since come to understand that when people can't state things plainly they usually don't have clue. But I understood this: "Then, we continue to bolster the Iraqi security forces so that the need for our military support is gradually reduced." But, once again, what if the Iraqi security forces are Shiite controlled and complicit in the brutal oppression of Sunnis? Now do you see why it's important to ask whether there is a moderate group in Iraq that has the will and the strength to take power? Arming, training and propping up an intolerant, radical and brutal Shiite majority will not achieve your goal of using American lives and treasure to prevent the "brutal oppression" of Iraqis. "In the mean time the Iraqi culture has to be invitational toward those who've been marginalized by the conflicts so that there are realistic venues to build a stable and inclusive community." You'll have to excuse me again, I've never learned the language of blind hope. Finally, your last comment was that: "We can continue to help in the rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and institutions, and we can facilitate international improvements toward economic strength." Yes, we could do that but what will that gain us when there exists no moderate, rational, just-minded group to take the reins of power in Iraq? It's like saying we could give economic aid to the faction engaging in genocidal warfare in the Sudan. We could, but why would we? I think you should reread what I wrote and consider it more thoughtfully. I'll even repost it for you: The men fighting for power in Iraq are not moderates. There may no longer be any recognizable moderate block in Iraq. It is radicals versus radicals, Shiites versus Sunnis, Kurds for Kurds and sect versus sect. A moderate majority of Iraqis willing to fight and die for moderation in Iraq was a pipe dream. Ed