To: PROLIFE who wrote (18028 ) 2/27/2007 10:13:27 AM From: E. T. Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588 Al Qaeda By Daniel Byman Page 1 of 1 March/April 2007 The terrorist network was on life support after September 11—until a new front opened in Baghdad and revived its mission. “The Americans are between two fires,” declared Osama bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2004. “If they remain [in Iraq] they will bleed to death, and if they withdraw they will have lost everything.” Zawahiri’s grim prediction has proven correct. As the United States and its Iraqi allies falter, bin Laden and the broader jihadist movement are emerging victorious. Before the United States invaded Iraq, al Qaeda was on the ropes. The United States and its coalition partners had rousted it from Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban, while a global manhunt was steadily shutting down jihadist cells from Morocco to Malaysia. Perhaps equally important, many Islamists, including fellow jihadists, harshly criticized bin Laden for having rashly attacked a superpower and, in doing so, causing the defeat of the Taliban, the only “true” Islamic regime in the eyes of many radicals. Then the invasion of Iraq breathed new life into the organization. On an operational level, the United States chose to divert troops to Iraq rather than consolidate its victory in Afghanistan and increase its chances of hunting down bin Laden. Today, al Qaeda is reconstituting itself in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Politically, Iraq vindicated bin Laden’s argument that the primary enemy of the Muslim world was not the local Muslim autocrats, but the “faraway enemy,” the United States. The Iraq invasion has inspired a new generation of young Muslims around the world. The war outraged Muslim militants, many of whom embrace bin Laden’s form of violence. Iraq itself witnessed the most dramatic revival. Saddam had crushed the jihadists in Iraq with his iron fisted rule, but today the country is full of them, with foreign fighters increasingly playing second fiddle to domestic jihadists. Those jihadists who come to Iraq are forming a network similar to the one formed in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet struggle. Some will die there, but not enough, not all of them. Many will survive and return to their home countries with increased fervor, a more coherent ideology, and a Rolodex filled with contacts. These fighters will not necessarily be under bin Laden’s control, but they will be part of the broader movement that bin Laden has now succeeded in fostering. The jihadists are also becoming far more lethal. The improvised explosive devices used in Iraq are of increasing sophistication and will be used in other jihads, whether in Kashmir, Chechnya, or Somalia. So, too, is suicide bombing, which has now become such a common tactic that it no longer draws gasps. Already (and with painful irony), these techniques are regularly showing up in Afghanistan. Withdrawal carries its own dangers for counter terrorism. Though the United States may leave, many jihadists will stay in Iraq to fight Iraqi foes. The anti-American struggle is widely popular, and jihadist propaganda is creatively stressing their role in undermining the U.S. campaign. The credibility of these fighters will embolden the movement, convincing them that the United States and other foes can be defeated, if only Muslims will continue the fight. Perhaps most ominously, parts of Iraq might become a new safe haven for the movement. Jihadists based in western Iraq launched the bloody 2005 attacks in Jordan that killed 60 people. Similar attacks are likely as Iraq goes from jihadist front line to a base for the next struggle.foreignpolicy.com