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Strategies & Market Trends : John Pitera's Market Laboratory -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: John Pitera who wrote (7622)3/2/2007 9:00:24 PM
From: Davy Crockett  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 33421
 
Thanks very much for posting those articles... lots of interesting reading. Guess I'm waiting for the other shoe to drop <ng>



To: John Pitera who wrote (7622)3/2/2007 9:13:44 PM
From: John Pitera  Respond to of 33421
 
FIL--From the Fremont SEC filing:

Fremont General Corporation (the "Company") could not file its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 by March 1, 2007 without unreasonable effort or expense for the reasons set forth below.

In light of the current operating environment for subprime mortgage lenders and recent legislative and regulatory events, Fremont Investment & Loan, the Company's wholly owned industrial bank subsidiary ("FIL"), intends to exit its subprime residential real estate lending business. Management and the board of directors are engaged in discussions with various parties regarding the sale of the business.

Additionally, the Company expects that it, FIL and the Company's wholly owned subsidiary, Fremont General Credit Corporation ("FGCC"), will enter into a voluntary formal agreement, to be designated as a cease and desist order (the "Order"), with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC"). Among other things, the Order will require FIL to cease and desist from the following:

o Operating with management whose policies and practices are detrimental to FIL;

o Operating FIL without effective risk management policies and procedures in place in relation to FIL's brokered subprime mortgage lending and commercial real estate construction lending businesses;

o Operating with inadequate underwriting criteria and excessive risk in relation to the kind and quality of assets held by FIL;

o Operating without an accurate, rigorous and properly documented methodology concerning its allowance for loan and lease losses;

o Operating with a large volume of poor quality loans;

o Engaging in unsatisfactory lending practices;

o Operating without an adequate strategic plan in relation to the volatility of FIL's business lines and the kind and quality of assets held by FIL;

o Operating with inadequate capital in relation to the kind and quality of assets held by FIL;

o Operating in such a manner as to produce low and unsustainable earnings;

o Operating with inadequate provisions for liquidity in relation to the volatility of FIL's business lines and the kind and quality of assets held by FIL;

o Marketing and extending adjustable-rate mortgage ("ARM") products to subprime borrowers in an unsafe and unsound manner that greatly increases the risk that borrowers will default on the loans or otherwise cause losses to FIL, including (1) ARM products that qualify borrowers for loans with low initial payments based on an introductory rate that will expire after an initial period, without adequate analysis of the borrower's ability to repay at the fully indexed rate, (2) ARM products containing features likely to require frequent refinancing to maintain affordable monthly payment or to avoid foreclosure, and (3) loans or loan arrangements with loan-to-value ratios approaching or exceeding 100 percent of the value of the collateral;

o Making mortgage loans without adequately considering the borrower's ability to repay the mortgage according to its terms;

o Operating in violation of Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, in that FIL engaged in transactions with its affiliates on terms and under circumstances that in good faith would not be offered to, or would not apply to, nonaffiliated companies; and

o Operating inconsistently with the FDIC's Interagency Advisory on Mortgage Banking and Interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs.

The Order will also require FIL to take a number of steps, including (1) having and retaining qualified management; (2) limiting the Company's and FGCC's representation on FIL's board of directors and requiring that independent directors comprise a majority of FIL's board of directors; (3) revising and implementing written lending policies to provide effective guidance and control over FIL's residential lending function; (4) revising and implementing policies governing communications with consumers to ensure that borrowers are provided with sufficient information; (5) implementing control systems to monitor whether FIL's actual practices are consistent with its policies and procedures; (6) implementing a third-party mortgage broker monitoring program and plan; (7) developing a five-year strategic plan, including policies and procedures for diversifying FIL's loan portfolio; (8) implementing a policy covering FIL's capital analysis on subprime residential loans; (9) performing quarterly valuations and cash flow analyses on FIL's residual interests and mortgage servicing rights from its residential lending operation, and obtaining annual independent valuations of such interests and rights; (10) limiting extensions of credit to certain commercial real estate borrowers; (11) implementing a written lending and collection policy to provide effective guidance and control over FIL's commercial real estate lending function, including a planned material reduction in the volume of funded and unfunded nonrecourse lending and loans for condominium conversion and construction as a percentage of Tier I capital; (12) submitting a capital plan that will include a Tier I capital ratio of not less than 14% of FIL's total assets; (13) implementing a written profit plan; (14) limiting the payment of cash dividends by FIL without the prior written consent of the FDIC and the Commissioner of the California Department of Financial Institutions; (15) implementing a written liquidity and funds management policy to provide effective guidance and control over FIL's liquidity position and needs; (16) prohibiting the receipt, renewal or rollover of brokered deposit accounts without obtaining a Brokered Deposit Waiver approved by the FDIC; (17) reducing adversely classified assets; and (18) implementing a comprehensive plan for the methodology for determining the adequacy of the allowance for loan and lease losses.

In addition, the Company is analyzing, in connection with the preparation of the Company's consolidated financial statements as of and for the period ended December 31, 2006, the FDIC's criticism with respect to the Company's methodology for determining the carrying value of the Company's residential real estate loans held for sale.
...
In addition, the Company is analyzing, in connection with the preparation of the Company's consolidated financial statements as of and for the period ended December 31, 2006, the FDIC's criticism with respect to the Company's methodology for determining the carrying value of the Company's residential real estate loans held for sale.

The Company will report a net loss from continuing operations for the fourth quarter of 2006 as compared to net income of $54.5 million for the fourth quarter of 2005. The net loss to be reported for the fourth quarter of 2006 will be due in part to increased provisions for loan repurchase and repricing, valuation and premium recapture reserves. In light of the Company's reported operating results for the nine months ended September 30, 2006, and the fact that the Company will report a net loss for the fourth quarter of 2006, the Company's operating results for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006 will represent a significant change from the Company's operating results for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005.

The Company is unable to estimate its results of operations for the fourth quarter of 2006 and full-year 2006 until it completes its review of its methodology for determining the carrying value of its held-for-sale residential real estate loan portfolio, as discussed above.



To: John Pitera who wrote (7622)3/8/2007 11:27:15 PM
From: John Pitera  Respond to of 33421
 
The Mortgage Mess Spreads---The subprime lending industry is getting hammered, and hedge funds and investment banks are feeling the pain

by Mara Der Hovanesian and Matthew Goldstein

The canaries in the coal mine are keeling over fast. After years of easy profits, the $1.3 trillion subprime mortgage industry has taken a violent turn: At least 25 subprime lenders, which issue mortgages to borrowers with poor credit histories, have exited the business, declared bankruptcy, announced significant losses, or put themselves up for sale. And that's just in the past few months.

Now there's evidence that the pain is spreading to a broad swath of hedge funds, commercial banks, and investment banks that buy, sell, repackage, and invest in risky subprime loans. According to Jim Grant of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, the market is starting to wake up to the magnitude of the problem, entering what he calls the "recognition stage." Says Terry Wakefield, head of the Wakefield Co., a mortgage industry consulting firm: "This is going to be a meltdown of unparalleled proportions. Billions will be lost."

Hedge funds, those freewheeling, lightly regulated investment pools, seem particularly vulnerable. BusinessWeek has learned that $700 million Carrington Capital and $3 billion Greenlight Capital may have gotten badly burned because of their intricate dealings with New Century Financial, a major subprime lender whose stock has plunged 84% in four weeks amid a Justice Dept. investigations into its accounting. Magnetar Capital, a $4 billion fund formed two years ago, may be on shaky ground, too. The question is, how many others may be suffering? "This is a very opaque industry, so no one really knows," says Mark M. Zandi, chief economist and co-founder of Moody's Economy.com (MCO) "My guess is that if you look at the top hedge funds, they're bearing most of the risk."

Bigger Losses

Not that big commercial and investment banks will go unscathed. Citigroup (C), HSBC (HBC), and Countrywide Financial (CFC) have boosted their estimates of losses and warned of credit troubles. Sanford C. Bernstein analyst Brad Hintz predicts that the subprime meltdown will result in earnings reductions for Bear Stearns (BSC), Lehman Brothers (LEH), Goldman Sachs (GS), Merrill Lynch (MER), and Morgan Stanley (MS).

Among hedge funds, Greenwich (Conn.)'s Carrington seems particularly vulnerable. Managed by ex-Citigroup banker Bruce M. Rose, the fund was launched in 2003 with $25 million in seed money from New Century, which owns about a 35% equity stake. Such an intimate tie between a lender and a hedge fund is highly unusual, say analysts. Carrington specializes in turning subprime mortgages into sophisticated bonds called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and selling them to other investors. Not surprisingly, New Century is one of Carrington's biggest suppliers, providing 17% of the loans in a recent deal. Another major supplier is Fremont General (FMT), which says it plans to exit the subprime business.

With Carrington on the verge of losing loans from two major providers, the fund, which counts Citigroup as an investor, seems to be in a bind. Rose says he expects the market for subprime loans to pick up again and is in talks with several lenders to buy mortgages. "We have no exposure to New Century as a corporate entity," he says. "Our deals have outperformed just about everything out there."

"Stress Scenario"

One clear loser is David Einhorn, manager of hedge fund Greenlight Capital, who made a big, ill-timed gamble on the subprime sector when he fought his way onto New Century's board last March. Greenlight, which regularly posts double-digit annual gains, is down about 2.5% on the year; its stake in New Century, valued at $109 million at the start of the year, has shrunk to $21 million. Einhorn's seat on New Century's board prohibited him from selling even as the lender warned that it would restate most of its 2006 earnings results and said federal prosecutors are investigating its accounting. Einhorn, through a spokeswoman, declined to comment. (Late on March 7, Einhorn notified New Century that he is stepping down from the board. His resignation was confirmed by Greenlight in a regulatory filing early Thursday).

Some on Wall Street point out that Magnetar showed bad timing, too, by entering the subprime arena last year just as the underwriting quality of subprime loans began to deteriorate rapidly (table). For now, Magnetar isn't showing any outward signs of trouble. A person familiar with the fund says it took steps to minimize its exposure to the subprime market, and a Magnetar spokesman says the fund is doing well.

Other hedge funds that have feasted on mortgage-backed securities will be hit hard if rating agencies start downgrading them, as is widely expected. That would be likely to send their values plummeting. "This is indeed a stress scenario," says Glenn T. Costello, co-head of the residential MBS Group at Fitch Ratings. Kevin J. Kanouff, who heads bond surveillance for Clayton Holdings (CLAY), a consulting firm for institutional investors, adds that "hedge funds are getting very nervous about their investments."

But those downgrades likely won't come right away. Observers say ratings agencies may rely on some models that don't fully account for the recent explosion in exotic mortgages, such as interest-only loans. Says Susan Barnes, managing director in the U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities group of Standard & Poor's, which, like BusinessWeek, is a unit of The McGraw-Hill Companies (MHP): "Our models are continually adjusted and enhanced." Adds Fitch's Costello: "There's a clear trend that we've expected higher and higher losses."

Commercial and investment banks have many tendrils in the mortgage business, too. They earned fat fees during the housing boom by packaging loans into pools and selling them to investors. That market is shrinking as subprime lenders and investors pull in their horns, leaving banks holding risky loans.

Up the Food Chain

There's also growing talk that many firms, in particular Goldman Sachs, incurred steep losses in trades based on the ABX subprime index. As market makers, the big banks were forced to take the other side of clients' short trades, or bets that the index would fall. When the index plunged 34% in the first 10 weeks of the year, the banks lost. Goldman, which reports first-quarter earnings on Mar. 13 and is a big player in the ABX market, declined to comment.

In another case of dreadful timing, Citigroup disclosed on Feb. 28 that it recently upped its stake in New Century to over 5%, adding some 1 million shares just weeks before New Century revealed the investigation by federal prosecutors. Citigroup declined to comment.

The biggest fear is that the trouble will move up the food chain. The same questionable lending practices that were used for subprime mortgages during the boom were also used for regular, or "prime," mortgages—among them low or zero downpayments, loose loan-to-value ratios, and exotic mortgages with low up-front payments that balloon later.

While subprime loans accounted for 20% of mortgages originated last year, David Liu of UBS estimates that fully 40% of last year's loans are "showing a lot of signs of stress." Says Nouriel Roubini, economics professor at New York University's Stern School of Business: "The risk that prime borrowers will start to feel financial stress in 2007 cannot be underestimated."