To: TobagoJack who wrote (15153 ) 3/9/2007 10:25:38 AM From: Crimson Ghost Respond to of 217860 The US and Iran, in Iraq posted by Helena Cobban One week ago today we were sitting in the lobby of our hotel in Amman, Jordan, talking with the very smart and well-informed Middle East analyst Joost Hiltermann about the interactions that US power now has in and over Iraq with Iraq's much weightier eastern neighbor, Iran. (Hiltermann has worked on Iraq-related issues for many years, including for several years now as the senior Iraq analyst for the International Crisis Group.) He said, Well, the US and Iran agree on two things inside today's Iraq-- but they disagree on one key thing. What they agree on, at least until now, is the unity of Iraq, and need for democracy or at least some form of majority rule there. What they disagree on is the continued US troop presence there. Because the US basically now wants to be able to withdraw those troops, and Iran wants them to stay! He conjectured that the main reason Iran wants the US troops to stay in Iraq is because they are deployed there, basically, as sitting ducks who would be extremely vulnerable to Iranian military retaliation in the event of any US (or Israeli) military attack on Iran. They are, in effect, Iran's best form of insurance against the launching of any such attack. I have entertained that conjecture myself, too, on numerous occasions in the past. So I was interested that Hiltermann not only voiced it, but also framed it in such an elegant way. (For my part, I am slightly less convinced than he is that the decisionmakers in the Bush administration at this point are clear that they want the US troops out of Iraq... But I think they are headed toward that conclusion, and that the developments in the region will certainly continue to push them that way.) From this point of view, we might conclude that the decisionmakers in Teheran-- some of whom are strategic thinkers with much greater experience and even technical expertise than anyone in the current Bush administration-- would be seeing the possibility of "allowing" the US to withdraw its troops from Iraq only within the context of the kind of "grand bargain" that Teheran seeks. The first and overwhelmingly most important item in that "grand bargain" would be that Washington credibly and irrevocably back off from any thought of pursuing a strategy of regime change inside Iran or from any threats of military force against it. Under this bargain, Washington would need to agree, fundamentally, that despite serious continuing disagreements in many areas of policy, it would deal with the regime that exists in Teheran-- as in earlier decades it dealt with the regime that existed in the Soviet Union-- rather than seeking to overthrow it. Teheran might well also ask for more than that-- including some easing of the US campaign against it over the nuclear issue, etc. But I believe there is no way the mullahs in Teheran could settle for any less than a basic normalization of working relations with Washington-- that would most likely be exemplified by the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the two governments-- in return for "allowing" the US troops to withdraw from Iraq. There are numerous paradoxes here. Not only has Washington's wide distribution of its troops throughout the Iraq has become a strategic liability, rather than an asset, but now the heirs of the same Iranian regime that stormed the US Embassy in the 1970s and violated all the norms of diplomatic protocol by holding scores of diplomats as hostages there are the ones who are, essentially, clamoring for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Washington. ... Meantime, however, a great part of the steely, pre-negotiation dance of these two wilful powers is being played out within the borders of poor, long-suffering Iraq. For the sake of the Iraqis, I hope Washington and Teheran resolve their issues and move to the normal working relationship of two fully adult powers as soon as possible. One last footnote here. I do see some intriguing possibilities within the Bushites' repeated use of the mantra that "All options are still on the table" regarding Iran. Generally, that has been understood by most listeners (and most likely intended by its utterers) to mean that what is "on the table of possibilities" is all military options-- up to and perhaps even including nuclear military options, which the Bushites have never explicitly taken off the table with regard to Iran. But why should we not also interpret "all options" to include also all diplomatic options? That would certainly be an option worth pursuing.