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Politics : Rat's Nest - Chronicles of Collapse -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Wharf Rat who wrote (5644)3/19/2007 6:11:43 PM
From: Wharf Rat  Respond to of 24223
 
Comments to the National Petroleum Council
by Randy Udall

(Note: Commentaries do not necessarily represent ASPO-USA's positions; they are personal statements and observations by informed commentators.)

On October 5, 2005, U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman requested that the National Petroleum Council conduct a study of global oil and natural gas supply. The motivating concern stated by the Secretary was an investigation into the timing of and responses to peak oil-the plateauing and subsequent decline of world oil production. Hundreds of organizations and individuals have contributed input to the process.

During two multi-hour web-cast teleconference calls on February 23 and March 1, the NPC heard comments from Colin Campbell, Jean Laherrere, Robert L. Hirsch, Steve Andrews, Congressman Roscoe Bartlett, Matt Simmons, Randy Udall, Roger Bentley, Richard Heinberg, and several others.

A draft of the study is due during April, with the final report ready by late June, 2007. For further information, check periodic postings of informational power-point slides on the NPC’s website (www.npc.org).

In response to the NPC’s summary of their March 1 call, Randy Udall wrote back to emphasize and expand on a number of points.

March 12, 2007

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I think the phone call summary is generally fair and comprehensive. If I can weigh in on a few points:

The NPC has a wonderful opportunity to reframe the discussion around peak oil. After thoroughly studying the evidence, I hope that you conclude, as many of us have, that peak oil is
near. If that is your conclusion, I urge you to communicate that finding in succinct, sober language. It's time to speak truth to power. Likewise, if you conclude that peak oil is a chimera, and those of us that were on the last call are grievously mistaken, chronic pessimists, nervous Nellies, please say that, loud and clear.

Personally, I would much rather you say, "Heed Not Chicken Little," than have you try to please both sides with the kind of waffling language that is found in so many reports. Whatever your results, an imaginative communication strategy will be necessary to disseminate them.
A few specific points. You write that "production from several countries has peaked." In this case, "several" means almost 60. Yes, most of these were no-account wonders, petroleum beggars like Germany, Peru, Guatemala, and Romania. Oil production in these countries was clearly constrained by geology.

More importantly, production has also peaked in ten of the twenty nations that today produce 85% of the world's oil. In some of these nations, including the UK, US, Norway, and Indonesia, geological constraints are clearly the primary cause. In other post-peak countries, including Mexico, Iran, Libya, Venezuela, and Iraq, causation is more complicated. To confuse the calculus, production in some post-peak countries could increase; in Iraq and Venezuela it could, some day, in a safer world, perhaps exceed their earlier highs.

Oil production is increasing in places like Brazil and Angola due to deepwater technology, falling in places like Nigeria, restrained in the UAE due to governmental decisions, close to a re-peak in Russia, at the cusp of peak in China and, Stuart Staniford would argue, in Saudi Arabia. The future course of production in these countries is governed by a complex mix of geology, investment, access, politics, manpower, rigs, war, etc. I would like to stress that, in the last five years, a large number of very competent, analytical people, linked together by the Internet, have brought serious intellectual horsepower to bear on the true state of world oil production. Yes, peak oil has attracted its share of conspiracy theorists and Birkenstockers, but some of the work that is being published at the Oil Drum, Energy Bulletin, in books and blogs, and by consulting groups like PFC Energy and John S. Herold Inc., is more seminal than anything found in World Energy Outlook.

You write that peak is not "about running out." Indeed, it's the opposite. At peak the world will have more oil available than it ever had before. Peak is not the end, it's the zenith.

You write that the "effect of supply shortfalls" will be significant. It's useful to put a number to this. Losing one Mb/d is losing 2 quads, equivalent to about 80 nuclear power plants worth of energy, or two trillion cubic feet of gas.

You write that "peaking is about ‘rates’ and ‘risks’ and less about endowment." This is true if we are talking about the "global endowment." It's much less true when we are talking about individual countries.

You summarized that "the role of natural gas liquids, condensates, and unconventional oils may be overstated." It's critical to explore CERA's contention that NGLs will provide something like 10 Mbd of new capacity due to the expansion of global gas supply, and that the slate will get lighter, not heavier. If true, this has enormous implications. The question of NGLs is, frankly, an area that the peak oil community has not dissected with the same rigor it has crude oil and condensate. What percentage of the growth in NGLs will be a 1:1 replacement for crude oil? How will developments in global gas, including project delays, intersect with global liquid demands?

As for unconventional oil, these things are hugely misunderstood. Having 150 billion barrels of tar sands in North America is not like having 10 Prudhoe Bays on the shelf. Suggesting that coal liquids will ride to the rescue (hey, the Nazis did it!) is not responsible policy. Spending billions in federal RD to develop the "hydrogen economy" does not reassure. Congress is overwhelmingly staffed by lawyers. I have met some of these notables, and with the exception of Rep Bartlett, most of them are energy illiterates, if not energy cretins.

Indicators of peak oil. If you read the tea leaves, there are literally dozens of these: major oil companies prospecting for reserves not with the drill bit but with the wallet; a willingness to pay $100 million on a single deepwater wildcat; China buying Africa with recycled Wal-Mart dollars; Exxon spending $1.2 billion a month to preserve production; Chevron's ad campaign; Putin and Chavez having the cojones to go mano a mano with Bush; three carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf; Statoil scouring for leftovers; Cantarell's gag reflex; a quadrupling of rigs in Saudi Arabia; suggestions that Burghan and Ghawar have peaked, the latter confirmed by CERA; discovery rates falling; Shell's willingness to contemplate oil shale, which has been described as a very-low-quality, high-ash coal; "tar sands fever" as per 60 Minutes; Toyota's development of hybrid drive, and so forth.

Net energy and, I would add, carbon intensity deserve more understanding since they will be critical screens as we move ahead.
Some final thoughts on the message and the tone: Some oil and gas people have viewed peak oil proponents as dissing the industry. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Most of us find it absolutely astounding that gasoline and other petroleum products can be produced so reliably, in such extravagance, with such remarkable technology, and sold at such bargain rates. We see images of offshore production platforms and are dazzled by their complexity. We read about drilling in 10,000 feet of water and celebrate your ingenuity.

Humans have always sought perpetual motion, and for a moment, the petroleum industry has given it to us. The problem is that you have 300 million Americans who take $2.50 gasoline for granted in a country whose architecture, land use patterns, agriculture, prosperity, and cast of mind have been have been built around cheap oil. These oil tribe people, and their political leaders, don't care about peak oil, they care only about price. Meanwhile, the Chinese are where we were in 1910, with car sales doubling every three years.

Henry Groppe has said, "There is no surplus, there is no shortage, there is only price... We ran out of $2 oil a long time ago, $20 oil in 2001, $30 oil in 2003, $40 oil in 2005."

If oil production is going to peak sometime within the next few thousand days, if we are gradually going to run out of $50 oil and then $60 oil, the NPC would be doing a huge service by giving the nation a heads-up call. It sometimes seems that the peak oil movement has been shouting down a well. Your organization has the status, clout, and respect to be heard.

In any case, thanks for doing this study. We appreciate the outreach efforts and the diligence you have brought to bear.

Randy Udall directs CORE (Carbondale, CO) and is one of the co-founders of ASPO-USA.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Editorial Notes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This commentary was just published in ASPO-USA's "Peak Oil Bulletin" (March 19, 2007), edited by Tom Whipple, and available free by email from ASPO-USA.

Richard Heinberg's comments to the National Petroleum Council are online at Energy Bulletin.

-BA
Published on 19 Mar 2007 by Peak Oil Review (ASPO-USA). Archived on 19 Mar 2007.

energybulletin.net



To: Wharf Rat who wrote (5644)3/19/2007 6:28:15 PM
From: Wharf Rat  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 24223
 
Comments to the National Petreoleum Council
by Richard Heinberg


(Note: Commentaries do not necessarily represent ASPO-USA's positions; they are personal statements and observations by informed commentators.)

On October 5, 2005, U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman requested that the National Petroleum Council conduct a study of global oil and natural gas supply. The motivating concern stated by the Secretary was an investigation into the timing of and responses to peak oil—the plateauing and subsequent decline of world oil production.

Hundreds of organizations and individuals have contributed input to the process. During two multi-hour web-cast teleconference calls on February 23 and March 1, the NPC heard comments from Colin Campbell, Jean Laherrere, Robert L. Hirsch, Steve Andrews, Congressman Roscoe Bartlett, Matt Simmons, Randy Udall, Roger Bentley, Richard Heinberg, and several others. A draft of the study is due during April, with the final report due by late June, 2007. For further information, check periodic postings of informational powerpoint slides on the NPC’s website (www.npc.org).

The statement by Heinberg to the NPC is included below.

The failure of official agencies

Official agencies have consistently failed to accurately forecast national and regional oil production peaks. Three examples:

During the 1960s, the U.S. Geological Survey issued successive reports forecasting a peak in U.S. oil production around the year 2000; this followed M. King Hubbert’s controversial forecast of a peak around the year 1970. Confounding the official view, U.S. oil production did reach its maximum in 1970 and has been generally declining ever since, despite the subsequent discovery of the largest conventional oilfield ever found in North America—on the North Slope of Alaska—in 1968.

In their International Energy Outlook (IEO) 2001 report, the EIA stated that “The United Kingdom is expected to produce about 3.1 mb/d by the middle of this decade, followed by a decline to 2.7 mb/d by 2020,” implying a peak around 2005. Britain’s oil production from the North Sea actually peaked in 1999, two years before this forecast was issued, at 2.684 mb/d, declining to less than 1.7 mb/d by 2005.

In their IEO 2003 report, the EIA predicted that the country of Oman was “expected to increase output gradually over the first half of this decade” with “only a gradual production decline after 2005.” In fact, Oman’s production had already peaked in 2000, three years before the forecast was published.

Reasons for failure

Why were these agencies wrong? There are several possible reasons. One has to do with psychology. The oil industry is comprised of people whose job entails supplying the very lifeblood of modern industrial society. They do this job with some pride. They may therefore understandably perceive suggestions that oil production may soon peak as an affront to their competence.

This notion seems supported by the irrationality of the way in which many in the industry (including representatives of CERA and ExxonMobil) typically mischaracterize the evidence and arguments of the depletionists, and ridicule the messengers rather than engaging in an honest discussion of issues and a dispassionate search for the truth. This same psychological motive may also partially explain repeated failures to foresee national peaks in oil or gas production.

People in the industry are attempting an impossible task—to continuously increase the supply of a non-renewable resource. That they should eventually fail to do this is no reflection on their technical competence or the degree of their effort. Meanwhile, society desperately needs realistic assessments of this vital resource rather than macho assurances.

Moreover, there is typically insufficient appreciation of the powerful influence of giant oilfields on the depletion curves of large regions. Giant oilfields tend to be found early in the exploration history of a region; and, when they go into decline, the entire region tends to peak, since smaller fields, even when found in great numbers, usually cannot make up for the decline of the giants—at least, not for long.

It seems to me that these tendencies that have caused official agencies to miss national production peaks are also leading them to miss signs of the impending global peak. The facts that most of the world’s giant fields were discovered decades ago and that we are now seeing declines in the world’s largest oilfields—Cantarell, Burgan, Daqing, and possibly Ghawar—should certainly be setting off alarm bells.

However, many analysts have lulled themselves into complacency by, for the purposes of calculation, treating low-grade hydrocarbon resources as if they were conventional oil, thereby arriving at inflated figures for world oil reserves. The likely production rates from the heavy oil in Venezuela, the Alberta tar sands, and the oil shales of Colorado will not be sufficient to offset declines from giant fields of conventional oil. The “peak oil” discussion is not about reserves, it is about flow rates.

The state of the industry

Further, the industry is ill equipped to make up for declines in the larger fields by heroic efforts at exploration. If new fields are to be tapped quickly enough and in sufficient quantity to avert a near-term peak (if that is even possible in principle), then extraordinary rates of drilling will be required. However, these efforts must overcome the following hurdles:

Equipment is aging: the average floating drilling rig is 22 years old, the average jackup rig is 24 years old, the average land rig is 25-30 years old. [biz.yahoo.com/e/061103/nov10-q.html]

There is currently a global shortage of rigs, and the cost of renting them is skyrocketing (E & P costs are up 53% in past 2 years, according to Rigzone). More rigs are being built, but that takes time. “That means companies are getting less and less bang for the bucks they put into exploration and production, despite high commodity prices. And with oil well below last year’s $76.70 record . . . companies may consider delaying, if not canceling, some projects.” (Houston Chronicle, Feb. 13 [www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/4548658.html (Link seems broken. See editors notes below.)])

There is also a shortage of trained personnel, since the industry has been shedding geologists and engineers for the past two decades. “As an aging generation of workers retires, industry experts say the resulting shortfall in skilled labor could lead to an increase in delays and problems on mega oil and gas projects…. Over the next decade, a wave of retirements will strip the industry of its most skilled project managers, just as some of the most complex operations ever attempted are supposed to come on stream. The combination, they said, could very well lead to an increase in delays.” [www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=41306]

Conclusion: It is reasonable to assume that the peak is here or very close

Meanwhile, we observe that world production of crude + condensate has been static or declining since May 2005, when it achieved just over 74,000,000 barrels/day. This has happened in the context of very high prices—which should, under ordinary circumstances, have been incentive to expand production. This suggests that regular conventional oil has already peaked.

The peak for all liquids cannot be far behind.

Consequently, I see no plausible scenario in which a liquid fuels crisis arising within about 5 years can be averted on the supply side. This is too little time in which to compensate for declines by producing large quantities of liquids-from-coal or biofuels, if that is even possible. And that in turn means that demand-reduction strategies will be required in order to balance the available supply with requirements for transport fuels. The sooner such strategies are identified and implemented, the better the prognosis for societal adaptation.

Richard Heinberg is the author of three books on oil depletion, including The Party's Over and The Oil Depletion Protocol. He travels internationally to speak on the subject and is a recipient of the M. King Hubbert Award for Excellence in Energy Education. He explains "Peak Oil" in several film documentaries, including Leonardo DiCaprio's upcoming "11th Hour."

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Editorial Notes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The comments by Heinberg appear in the March 12 edition of the Peak Oil Review, edited by Tom Whipple, an “executive summary” of weekly news from ASPO-USA. Registration is required for access, but is free.

It looks as if the link to the Houston Chronicle article is at a different location and requires registration to view.

-BA
Published on 1 Mar 2007 by ASPO-USA / Energy Bulletin. Archived on 12 Mar 2007.
energybulletin.net