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Microcap & Penny Stocks : Naked Shorting-Hedge Fund & Market Maker manipulation? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: ravenseye who wrote (2397)3/28/2007 1:51:05 PM
From: rrufff  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5034
 
sec.gov

Subject: File No. S7-12-06
From: Bob O'Brien
March 27, 2007

The Commission's decision to re-open Reg SHO for comment, is rather shocking, and appears to be nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to provide the industry another bite at the apple to register comments that were previously entered as an afterthought to the requested comment period.

Does the SEC have anything to say about the US Chamber of Commerce formally requesting Senate hearings into naked short selling? Any comments to that?

How about the hundreds of letters pointing out the inequity inherent in allowing options speculators to hedge their put positions by naked short selling equity securities - an exemption to common sense delivery requirements that only benefits options speculators at the considerable and direct expense of equity security investors? Are those the comment letters you wish to have made part of the record? The ones asking for an explanation of how allowing one market's speculators to prey on another market's investors, by being allowed to fail delivery in equity markets for the sole purpose of having windfall free hedging for their derivative transactions - are those the ones you wish to memorialize? I have long been curious what part of Section 36's allowance of exemptions, to the extent as necessary for the protection of investors, and for the public good, are consistent with empowering derivatives market makers to create from thin air shares of stock, that only the issuer is empowered to issue, and ignoring that limitation, sell the phantom shares as though real, to investors who receive no warning that the goods they bought were fake )as in lacking any of the parcel of rights of the genuine article).

How does that protect me, as an equity investor? I understand how it protects the interests of the larger banks and brokers engaged in that wholly separate derivatives market, but how does it protect me, an equities security investor, and the company I bought, from unknown levels of dilution whenever the MMs feel like turning on the printing presses?

And how does grandfathering help me? How does that exemption, which DID NOT RECEIVE ANY COMMENT PERIOD AS REQUIRED BY THE COMMISSION's OWN RULES, protect me as an investor? I understand exactly how it protects the miscreants who use it to enable them to generate millions of non-existent shares, fattening their coffers with the money collected for a product never delivered - but how does it protect me?

For that matter, isn't it true that the SEC has no authority to create these sorts of exemptions, which clearly can be shown to harm investors? That its supposed right to do so rests in everyone ignoring that it CAN'T create exemptions that aren't necessary for investor protection - meaning my protection, not the protection of the profitable trading for some billion dollar options trading house?

When the SEC allows a broker to place a "securities entitlement" into an investor account, representing it as a placeholder for a legitimate equity security, and then that security doesn't show up due to all these exemptions - and yet the broker continues to represent the securities entitlement to the client as being equivalent to a "real" share - when it is in fact wholly absent any of the rights - how does that safeguard my protection? How am I protected?

Isn't it in fact the case that the 1933 Act, in its definitions, describes precisely what constitutes a security, and then further describes what constitutes an issuer authorized to issue that security, as well as the registration process? And isn't it a fact, that by allowing securities entitlements to be traded in the market, exactly like bona-fide securities, that the SEC is empowering brokers to become issuers, and allowing them to issue a new class of security - the security entitlement unsupported by any genuine share, but presumably representing an intention to deliver a share at some unknown future point - and that this class of security is unregistered, and non-exempt from registration, and thus the brokers are issuing and trafficking in unregistered securities? A major violation of securities rules, and the law?

How can the SEC allow brokers to create this new type of derivative - an IOU for a share at some unknown time in the future (it having already failed the T+3 requirement) - when that derivative matches 100% of the 1933 Act's description of a "security" - but a different one than advertised, rather one created by the broker, who then fits 100% of the criteria by the 1933 Act for an "issuer?"

When did it become legal and advisable in the SEC's opinion for brokers to engage in the sale and issuance of unregistered securities, as defined by the 1933 Act, and by what right does the SEC ignore that breach of its predecessor rules and laws?

So here are my comments.

The SEC is allowing Wall Street to create and trade unregistered securities, in violation of the 1933 Act (not the 1934 Act), and pretending that it's no big deal. It routinely ignores that absent prompt settlement and delivery of a one for one stock share to support the electronically generated securities entitlement, that securities entitlement becomes a security by every test the 1933 Act affords us - an unregistered, non-exempt one, the issuance of which is a legal violation.

The SEC unlawfully railroaded grandfathering down the throat of the American public, who likely didn't know that in order for it to be lawful, it would have required the comment period it failed to be subjected to.

The SEC has been aware of this duplicitous sleight of hand since the grandfathering started. There could be no comment, because the only possible comment is that it was a godsend windfall for anyone larcenously or abusively naked short selling in the markets. So it just skipped that important formality.

It also knows full well that it is NOT empowered by Section 36 to authorize exemptions to delivery, where they violate basic premises of investor protection. Allowing any participant to take a buyer's earnest money, and then refuse to deliver the shares paid for, FOR WHATEVER REASON other than extremely temporary clerical error, is the antithesis of investor protection, and cannot be an acceptable use of that exemption. And yet the SEC does it anyway, because nobody seems willing to force the SEC to obey the rules and laws that created it, and dictate its behavior. So instead it passes sweetheart loopholes designed to allow Wall Street's participants to run roughshod over investors, and delays anything that could reform those loopholes for as long as humanly possible.

So far we are now being treated to ANOTHER comment period, after the last one closed six months ago. Why? Because the industry claims that some of its members are so grossly abusing the exemptions that they represent the majority of the problem in some issues?

And why, precisely, is it a good idea to let them continue to engage in behavior which bears not the slightest resemblance to bona-fide market making, but rather flagrant abuse of that ill conceived and unlawful exemption?

Why is this worthy of more comment? They've been doing it to us for YEARS now. YEARS. Money paid, no stock delivered. Simple.

That this comment period exists hints at an artifice to try to get the comments the industry couldn't bring itself to submit on time originally, this time, on the official record. The industry, so accustomed to failing to deliver - late, if at all - did that with the comments, too. And thus it's kind of hard to pass whatever watered down farce the commission is contemplating absent the ill-conceived arguments of those pulling the purse strings, so it is time to give them all another shot at it.

Does anyone believe we are fooled by this?

Does the absence of a Congressionally-appointed special prosecutor mean that you will get away with it, yet again, as there is nobody watching the watchers? When the US Chamber of Commerce demands hearings, and instead gets this laughable comment period request, is beyond troubling.

That we are still discussing whether fraud is wrong, or inadvisable, or damaging, should trouble every remaining investor in our capital markets. Per Reg SHO, the answer to being successful in American markets is simple: Take the investor money, refuse to deliver what was bought, pocket the money, and then dare anyone to do anything about it.

It's worked rather well for the last 8 years. Many companies have been run out of business, countless investors damaged or destroyed, a crisis of confidence apparent in the exodus of IPOs and dollars from our markets, and Wall Street is racking up bigger bonuses and more astounding wealth than at any point in its history.

That has certainly served investors well.

Why not another 8? We could spend most of a decade commenting on it.

Or not.

Regards,

Bob O'Brien
www.TheSanityCheck.com



To: ravenseye who wrote (2397)4/2/2007 12:26:15 PM
From: rrufff  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 5034
 
A few posts by Patch and Truthseeker that deal w/ 2 issues we've discussed here:

1) Abuse of MM exemption

2) How do you determine whether a non-reporting pinkie's fails are over the threshold limit?

Message 23415115

To: TheTruthseeker who wrote (98891) 3/30/2007 10:10:57 AM
From: Patchie 1 Recommendation Read Replies (1) of 98938

Actually Floyd, Alan is WRONG.

Until recently the requirement to be on the SHO list required that the company be a filing company such that the 0.5% fails level could be accurately calculated. Therefore the excuse that a share structure is unknown is bogus. Only recently did that change to where a minimum dollar value was assigned to those non-filing pink sheet companies. The non-filing pink sheets being a small minority of all companies listed on SHO. If that was Alan's issue he should have blocked the changes to the calculation process and not this more global issue.

What a short sighted buffoon.

As for the SHO list mean that a company was "illegally" naked short sold is an interpretive issue.

Does a market maker using an exemption to naked short do so illegally? You would say no 100% of the time because the exemption exists. But when a fail persists for months and it was a fail held under this exemption you have to question whether that meets the standards of market making.

How do you know that a market maker did not get caught on the wrong side of a market when making a market and created additional naked short positions to protect that initial position taken. Is that market making or market manipulation?

Lots of areas without transparency. What we do know is that the exemption was to address "temporary" volatility issues and there is nothing temporary about months long fails.

============================================================

Message 23415208

To: who wrote () 3/30/2007 10:34:48 AM
From: Patchie 1 Recommendation of 98938

As defined in Rule 203(c)(6) of Regulation SHO, a “threshold security” is any equity security of any issuer that is registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, or that is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act (commonly referred to as reporting securities), where, for five consecutive settlement days:

There are aggregate fails to deliver at a registered clearing agency of 10,000 shares or more per security;

The level of fails is equal to at least one-half of one percent of the issuer’s total shares outstanding; and

The security is included on a list published by a self-regulatory organization (SRO).

A security ceases to be a threshold security if it does not exceed the specified level of fails for five consecutive settlement days.

=============================================================

3210. Short Sale Delivery Requirements

(a) If a participant of a registered clearing agency has a fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency in a non-reporting threshold security for 13 consecutive settlement days, the participant shall immediately thereafter close out the fail to deliver position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity.

(b) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to the amount of the fail to deliver position that the participant of a registered clearing agency had at a registered clearing agency on the settlement day immediately preceding the day that the security became a non-reporting threshold security; provided, however, that if the fail to deliver position at the clearing agency is subsequently reduced below the fail to deliver position on the settlement day immediately preceding the day that the security became a non-reporting threshold security, then the fail to deliver position excepted by this paragraph (b) shall be the lesser amount.

(c) If a participant of a registered clearing agency has a fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency in a non-reporting threshold security for 13 consecutive settlement days, the participant and any broker or dealer for which it clears transactions, including any market maker that would otherwise be entitled to rely on the exception provided in paragraph (b)(2)(iii) of SEC Rule 203 of Regulation SHO, may not accept a short sale order in the non-reporting threshold security from another person, or effect a short sale in the non-reporting threshold security for its own account, without borrowing the security or entering into a bona-fide arrangement to borrow the security, until the participant closes out the fail to deliver position by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity.

(d) If a participant of a registered clearing agency reasonably allocates a portion of a fail to deliver position to another registered broker or dealer for which it clears trades or for which it is responsible for settlement, based on such broker or dealer's short position, then the provisions of this rule relating to such fail to deliver position shall apply to the portion of such registered broker or dealer that was allocated the fail to deliver position, and not to the participant.

(e) A participant of a registered clearing agency shall not be deemed to have fulfilled the requirements of this rule where the participant enters into an arrangement with another person to purchase securities as required by this rule, and the participant knows or has reason to know that the other person will not deliver securities in settlement of the purchase.

(f) For the purposes of this rule, the following terms shall have the meanings below:

(1) the term "market maker" has the same meaning as in section 3(a)(38) of the Exchange Act.

(2) the term "non-reporting threshold security" means any equity security of an issuer that is not registered pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act and for which the issuer is not required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of the Exchange Act:

(A) for which there is an aggregate fail to deliver position for five consecutive settlement days at a registered clearing agency of 10,000 shares or more and for which on each settlement day during the five consecutive settlement day period, the reported last sale during normal market hours for the security on that settlement day that would value the aggregate fail to deliver position at $50,000 or more, provided that if there is no reported last sale on a particular settlement day, then the price used to value the position on such settlement day would be the previously reported last sale; and

(B) is included on a list published by NASD.
A security shall cease to be a non-reporting threshold security if the aggregate fail to deliver position at a registered clearing agency does not meet or exceed either of the threshold tests specified in paragraph (f)(2)(A) of this rule for five consecutive settlement days.

(3) the term "participant" means a participant as defined in section 3(a)(24) of the Exchange Act, that is an NASD member.

(4) the term "registered clearing agency" means a clearing agency, as defined in section 3(a)(23)(A) of the Exchange Act, that is registered with the Commission pursuant to section 17A of the Exchange Act.

(5) the term "settlement day" means any business day on which deliveries of securities and payments of money may be made through the facilities of a registered clearing agency.

(g) Pursuant to the Rule 9600 Series, the staff, for good cause shown after taking into consideration all relevant factors, may grant an exemption from the provisions of this rule, either unconditionally or on specified terms and conditions, to any transaction or class of transactions, or to any security or class of securities, or to any person or class of persons, if such exemption is consistent with the protection of investors and the public interest.

==========================================================

Message 23415373

To: Patchie who wrote (98896) 3/30/2007 11:27:45 AM
From: TheTruthseeker 1 Recommendation Read Replies (1) of 98939

Subject to the requirements of NASD Rule 3210

Where, for five consecutive settlement days, there are aggregate fails to deliver at a registered clearing agency of 10,000 shares or more and the reported last sale during normal market hours would value the aggregate fail to deliver position at $50,000 or more.

When this occurs, the security becomes subject to mandatory close-out requirements outlined in NASD Rule 3210.

The allowed values are:
Y = Yes, if the issue is subject to mandatory close-out requirements of Rule 3210.
N = No, if the issue is NOT subject to mandatory close-out requirements of Rule 3210.