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Ahmedinijad’s Plan “B” - The Circus Continues
By Walid Phares (bio)
With the decision to release the 15 British sailors, the Ahmedinijad Circus resumes its tales. Morphing from a “long story” to a “sensational scoop” the powerful Khomeinist propaganda machine has produced a better end to the hostage crisis: release them now and invest heavily in their “merciful liberation.” Hence the new debate worldwide as of the first hours of this day is about the Mullahs “freeing” the British personnel, not anymore about their “abduction”, and certainly not the other crucial stories, from UN sanctions on the nuclear standoff, the Iranian operatives arrested in Iraq, or the domestic opposition to Ahmedinijad. The war of images is on, powerful, and still in the hands of Tehran, or rather in the sophisticated “PR machine” at the service of the regime.
The abrupt change in direction operated by the Khomeinist decision-makers, from long-lasting crisis to blitz-solution is the product of a strong advice given by the “PR machine,” most of it based in the West, realizing how catastrophic would have been a stretching of the hostages’ crisis in time. Ahmedinijad wanted time but his advisors realized that the operation has been exposed in the world court of opinion, and hence had to cease and morph. But why did the “advisors,” mostly (Western-hired) ask the Mullahs to release the British at once and “use” the decision to the advantage of the regime? Here are the very objective and heavy reasons:
1) Simply because the basis behind this punctual operation was systematically eroded in one week: Analysis exposing the role of the Iranian intelligence in Iraq, the defection of Iranian military officials, and the rise of protests inside the country explained what was the regime trying to dodge. The surfacing of this analysis both in Western and Arab media stripped the Iranian PR machine from its “juice.” Few around the world still believed that the Mullahs were concerned about a British breach of Iranian waters. It was all about “creating” an international incident to flee the above realities. Hence the “Psy-ops” architects quickly ordered a change in direction.
2) In addition, the Iranian management of the “hostage operation” was making mistake after mistake in the eyes of their professional publicists. Showing the detainee on TV, parading them, forcing the female soldier to wear a scarf and filming her as she smokes, then forcing the captured sailors to write letters and deliver televised speeches was the worse possible action the “captors” could have done. The direction taken by the managers of the detention was becoming untenable to the regime. They saw its ballistics as read by the general Western reaction to it: There were no international sympathies for the Iranian story of “thrusting water sovereignty” but, instead, growing frustration with Ahmedinijad’s “Jihadi mayhem.”
3) Once the real objectives of the operation were circulating in media reporting worldwide, the margin for Iranian maneuvering shrunk dramatically. When a projection of what the Mullahs wanted to do with the “hostages” over time became widely understood, the regime’s ability to surprise the public with a circus-like actions collapsed: For most of the potential future acts were exposed in advance, hence stripping the ability for the Khomeinists to be “creative.” Since most of these scenarios were “uncovered,” following them nevertheless was not advised: Hence all the possible options that pro-regime students will be staging demonstrations, the hostages dispersed, more videos released, and “Western mediators” will be landing in Tehran to blast London and Washington became obsolete. While it is true that Teheran won the first round of the match by shifting international focus to the “hostage crisis” instead of the UN sanctions. But because of its speedy recourse to “raw moves,” Ahmedinijad was about to lose the entire “psychological war” with his foes. Indeed, political critics in Britain and in the West would have been completely discredited had they began what they were scripted to do: visit the hostages and blame their countries. Rumors say they refused to engage in a losing battle of public opinion for they have political instincts. Thus, the genius mind behind Tehran’s “world operations” sounded the alarm: Stop the operation and revert to “Plan B.”
4) And what urged the change of direction as well was a little point made to the Iranians via posted analysis that any action taken against the British sailors, especially that the latter were operating under UN mandate, will be considered for future legal action internationally. As I underlined in several interviews about the subject throughout the crisis, any mistreatment, abuse of rights, and even “Khomeinist” court procedures would be considered as material for action against the regime and the perpetrators in front of international courts. The “PR international room” that helps the Iranian regime maneuver in world affairs knows this is very dangerous for their business. For if it is discovered that not only the Mullahs but also “Western mercenaries” have been involved in this breach to international law, a devastating action could be targeting the interest groups backing and advising Ahmedinijad on communications and diplomacy.
5) And in the big picture, as I argued in my previous assessment of this crisis, playing brinkmanship with the UK, US, and the regional forces opposed to the Tehran Khomeinist elite, was highly risky. It is very possible that the Iranian leadership read the elevated risk as they watched both immediate reactions and long term reactions: Talking about supporting Iran’s opposition is by itself scary for the regime. The price for detaining 15 sailors, with all the Circus Tehran was readying itself for wasn’t worth extending support to four major ethnicities inside Iran and to various social movements rising against the elite, by the adversaries. The risk was widening too much for a long-scenario; it had to be modified to a new direction.
So what is the new “direction?”
First, President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad “got rid” of the sailors, but in the most sumptuous way: A major press conference, extending awards to the “captors,” and embracing the “captives,” all the ingredients of a bad dream movie. The sailors apologize again, greet the regime, smile to the cameras and are shipped back to their country. That is what the international media would carry as images of the ending of this episode. But what would the servicemen and particularly the servicewoman say afterwards, the propaganda machine will have all the time –and funds- to deflect and take care of.
Two, the “new story” will allow Ahmedinijad to use the statements prepared for the long captivity immediately. Instead of a gift to the British people for Christmas, it was revamped as an “Easter Gift.” Theologically, he is walking on eggs with Christian faith. For Christians believe Christ “ascended” to heaven not “passed” as Ahmedinjad termed it. But that is a just little religious detail. Probably the advisors of the Iranian President weren’t ready to release them on a religiously “complicated” Easter but on a commonly accepted Christmas: Another little theological detail.
Ahmedinijad criticized Britain for deploying leading seaman Faye Turney, one of 15 detainees, in the Gulf, pointing out, as reported by the AP, that she is a woman with a child. He said: “How can you justify seeing a mother away from her home, her children? Why don’t they respect family values in the West?” Very interesting statement coming from a regime that sent one million children to die on the mine fields during the Iran-Iraq war with a key to heaven hanging around their necks; a regime that has special women units to fight the infidels, and has been supporting women suicide bombers, including married ones with children. More interesting is the fact that Ahmedinijad is compassionate with British women who chose freely to serve their country and not compassionate with Iranian women whom he oppresses. He has, a few weeks ago, thrown many Persian females in jails, torturing them and forcing them to abandon their quest for freedom. Faye Turney is the woman type he is really afraid of: she symbolizes the free woman, who despite the fact that she is a mother, has decided to serve thousands of miles away in full equality with men.
Then the Iranian President turns to the real stuff: the arrest by US forces of a number of Iranian operatives, charged with Terror activities inside Iraq. Over the past months, Coalition forces have arrested a number of Iranian facilitators operating within Iraq. One of them is an “Iranian” diplomat: Jalal Sharafi. Ahmedinijad, revealing his emotions about the case said “if we had wanted to exchange Jalal Charafi with the rest of the Britons we would have exchanged him for 100,000.” The short sentence is revealing: It was about 15 British sailors versus Iranian Terror operatives. But the long term psychological operation failed, it was replaced by a short one.
The Iranian risky adventure was smartly designed but poorly executed. There seems to be a gap between the “architects” (both inside and outside Iran) and the Ahmedinijad mediocre execution of the plans. For at first, Iran was successful in steering the debate away from the UN sanctions then by executing a grotesque masquerade Tehran was on the verge of causing a disaster to itself. This is when the advisors quickly suggested a remedy that is to move to “Plan B” abruptly. This leap salvaged Ahmedinijad from an imminent disaster. But the abrupt twist could be reinvested in shielding the regime from a potential campaign by the international community. If the Khomeinist elite are smart enough and less ideological, it may gain more time for its future plans. But as it was shown during the British hostages’ crisis, the “architects” could do miracles, but the rigidly thinking leaders can mess up the best of all successful plans
Now, Tehran has ended the first act of the Circus, cut its losses, and is on for the second act. An alternative theory, which deserves to be explored, says Iranian planners had the both options ready to go. A long haul, if the Coalition won’t accept the exchange, and a short version of it, if the swap is accepted. But no matter what the theory is, we’re on still for a continuous Ahmedinijad Circus.
Dr Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is author of the War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy. You can e-mail him at Phares@walidphares.com
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