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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: calgal who wrote (19359)4/19/2007 12:52:44 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Everybody loves that article. One link and posted twice today.

Thank you.



To: calgal who wrote (19359)4/19/2007 3:37:33 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
The Numbing Down of America
Blacksburg seen from an emotional distance.

BY DANIEL HENNINGER
Thursday, April 19, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT

The killing of 32 students and teachers across the campus of Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Va., is as awful in its particulars as virtually any of the stories of death on a large scale that have struck the national consciousness. And yet it seems somehow that the public's emotional response to this event has been more controlled than in times past.

This is in no way to suggest that the response was inappropriate, inadequate or lacking sympathy. Nothing of the sort. It just seemed that the emotional surge was discernibly less than with similar events in the past--such as Oklahoma City, the Beltway sniper, Columbine, the Branch Davidians. This was the sort of event that normally would have caused one's phone to ring off the hook or email inbox to fill with alerts from friends. But that didn't seem to happen this time. If one wasn't watching TV, the news arrived with an uncharacteristic delay.

While the grief death visits on individuals remains an emotionally devastating event, it may be that as a nation we've reached tilt with tragedy. "Tilt" is the famous metaphor drawn from the old pinball machines, which shut down if one banged on them too hard. Pinballs could survive plenty of random shocks to the system. But there were limits. Of late, we have been banged on hard.

This has nothing to do with not caring, or turning cold to tragedy. But one deals with what the world brings, and given the pace of such stuff now, the adjustments one has to make have come quickly. After September 11, after years with the Iraq war and after a lifetime of media coverage of tragedies large, small and phony, it would not be surprising if people began to resist drawdowns on their emotional reservoirs.

The media itself has become cooler and even clinical in its reporting of domestic tragedy, delivering bushels of data and detail, with many of the event's participants willing to do reporter-like stand-up interviews. This week, on any channel one watched and in most newspapers, the coverage of Blacksburg was almost literally forensic. The murderer was "the shooter," the first killing seemed to be a "domestic dispute," and we were all trying to "piece together the details." A police procedural is better than leering and false emotion. But if the way we absorb the complex strands of tragedy now is as the police do--the real ones and the ones on 45 TV police dramas--then we will learn to approach death as they do, at a remove.

This doesn't strike me as obviously terrible, but it is different. Our capacity for shock at genuine violence has been recalibrated.

There is no more powerful reason for this downward pressure on public sensibilities than the war in Iraq. The war in Iraq is the most persistently violent event of our time. More precisely, the suicide bombers are. The suicide bomber is the most emotionally corrosive phenomenon since World War II.

The bombings around Baghdad began about April 2003. At first the bombings were mainly directed at Iraqi military and police installations. Then in August, with the Canal Hotel bombing, they killed 22, including the popular U.N. human rights commissioner, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Ten days later, on Aug. 29, the suicide bombers arrived in the neighborhoods of the Shia to murder noncombatants, killing perhaps 125 people. It was just the beginning.

Attacks of this design against defenseless civilians are hardly new. Israelis live with them. Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers have committed similar barbarities for more than 30 years. But if you have followed the war in Iraq, you have had a remarkable encounter with the blood-drenched world of suicide bombers. The way the American people have absorbed these bombings in faraway Iraq is unique in the annals of war and in journalism.

A very great number of the suicide bombings--there have been more than 700 since 2003, occurring weekly and often several times a week--have been reported in detail to the American people. The stories routinely include body counts and vivid details and color photography of shattered bodies and street scenes. These suicide bombings are often the first news story one sees on such Web sites as Yahoo and MSN, and they have been displayed prominently in newspaper coverage. If one were at all interested in the U.S. role in Iraq, this has been one's primary experience of the war for three years.

As an extension of its determination to be even-handed, contemporary journalism has attempted to impart not only the politics of war but also its human cost. It will be interesting, years hence, when histories of this war's journalism are written, as with Vietnam, to discover the basis of the news judgment that placed the suicide bombers' work at the top of the news pyramid. Almost any normal reader who consumed these accounts as often as the suicide bombers staged them would eventually pull back emotionally from the bombings, and from the war itself.

This has had the expectable result of producing what one might call the numbing down of America. Setting aside support for or opposition to the war, the muting of the emotional pathways of the American people is a neutral event, a normal defense against the killings of the suicide bombers, or the crude murders of Cho Seung-Hui.

The effect of all this is disabling, perhaps for a long time. One example: Supporters of intervention in Darfur are upset that the international community hasn't responded. That hesitation may be morally unattractive, but one can hardly drain the limited wells of emotional and moral fortitude in Iraq and expect them to produce elsewhere. For the foreseeable future, Americans may decide they don't wish to expose themselves to similar drainings.

We are far from the events in Virginia. But we have been putting emotional distance, in stages, between ourselves and the Blacksburgs for some time. An event such as the mass murder in Blacksburg will always elicit sympathy and a coming together of what each speaker at its memorial service called "community." The pain of individual families closest to such death can never diminish or be diminished. Still, we may be passing through a period, as Europe did after World War I, when people became hollowed out by repetitive exposure to violence and death--real or manufactured. No one should be surprised if our shell-shocked population is reluctant any time soon to revisit the experience outside the realm of friends and family.

Mr. Henninger is deputy editor of The Wall Street Journal's editorial page. His column appears Thursdays in the Journal and on OpinionJournal.com.

opinionjournal.com



To: calgal who wrote (19359)4/23/2007 1:03:50 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
The Mass Shooting Puzzle
What can we do about psychopathic warning signs?

BY HOLMAN W. JENKINS JR.
Sunday, April 22, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT

There are dangerous, vicious people among us, a recognition that ought to be the starting point of any policy aftermath of the Virginia Tech shootings.

In the case of Mark Barton, the disgruntled investor who shot up an Atlanta day-trading shop in 1999, he had left a trail of police officers, insurance investigators, in-laws, neighbors and former employers, who knew he was a psychopath and suspected he was a killer, though police had never been able to make a case against him. In the case of Salvador Tapia, who shot up a Chicago warehouse in 2003, he had been the subject of numerous police calls for aggravated assault, domestic battery and threatening family members with a gun.

The same is true for other committers of mass shootings, even Columbine's Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. The information existed, but it did not produce effective action.

Psychologists make a professional habit of saying that violence can't be predicted, perhaps true in the clinical setting. In the workplace and the normal encounters of everyday life, however, others do get glimpses of the personality and external circumstances that sometimes combine to produce such mass shootings. One of our enduring frustrations is that--after we've waded through the predictable thickets of adjectives describing the killer as "quiet" and the killings as "senseless"--it turns out warning signs were present, that co-workers, neighbors or family members had seen the culprit clearly enough to be afraid.

Twice this column has visited the case of Britain's Michael Stone, who'd had a long history of run-ins with police and mental health officials. When he was later accused of killing a woman and her daughter, these records spilled into the press. The public was shocked to learn that "the system" had fingered him as a dangerous psychopath but had let him go on grounds that he was "untreatable."

All but ended now is an attempt by British Prime Minister Tony Blair's government to enact a new mental health law allowing the government, on the say-so of a panel of psychiatrists, to lock up indefinitely someone judged to be suffering from a dangerous, severe personality disorder. Civil libertarians and a fair segment of the medical profession went ape, pointing out (not unrealistically) the pitfalls involved in jailing people based on the mere professional judgment of MDs.

After one of our columns on the subject, the Journal published a partially sympathetic letter from a U.S. clinical psychologist who noted the difficulty of constructing a reliable net: "Many psychopaths can adapt to society in a non-violent fashion. For example, business executives and politicians are inordinately represented--relative to other occupations--by individuals with psychopathic personality traits."

We'll take that belatedly as a sign that our hope of the psychology department and police department getting together anytime soon to identify and stop would-be mass murderers before they go on their shooting sprees was premature. How else, then, to get the "warning signs" acted upon? Let's start by understanding how the trait and the triggering circumstance can come together in a concatenation termed "threat/control-override"--and how this might help private individuals and institutions do a better job of protecting themselves.

In short, something happens to prompt the person to act on impulses that otherwise would be stayed by fear of the consequences. This has already prompted businesses to practice heightened security and keep an eye on selected employees when conducting layoffs. A divorce, a bankruptcy, an investment loss--all have been triggering moments. And the pattern and details were usually known to somebody, perhaps many somebodies, who also had an insight into the personality involved and the dangers thereof.

This suggests an alternative to trying to lock up people based on their personalities. Voices are already pointing out with perfect validity that any law-abiding student or faculty member who was in fear of Mr. Cho might have had a hard time citing an actionable cause for authorities to intervene--and also have been hard-pressed under the law privately to protect himself adequately.

If a citizen accepts that there's no electoral majority in America for taking away people's guns, then the alternative is to consider how to make the law more conducive to better outcomes in cases like Cho Seung-Hui's. Dozens of states have acted to expand a citizen's right to carry a concealed weapon. The result has not been an entire populace going around armed and engaging in firefights over every fender bender. Just the opposite according to research by economists John Lott Jr. and William Landes--few shooters seem to be looking for an encounter with an armed opponent and such crimes are rarer in concealed-carry states.

After all, some people are prepared, at their own expense, to obtain a gun, training and a concealed-carry permit. This is likely to include people who wouldn't have thought of arming themselves except when daily activity throws them unavoidably into proximity to somebody who makes them rationally afraid. If society can't process and react to warning signs given off by such people collectively, an alternative is to expand the opportunity for individuals to process and react to them personally.

Mr. Jenkins is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His column appears in the Journal on Wednesdays.

opinionjournal.com