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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: LindyBill who wrote (204433)	4/27/2007 4:35:33 PM
From: unclewest	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 794146

We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress. If Congress does not act, our Jena awaits us. Congress has thus far been AWOL when it comes to exercising their responsibility especially the HASC. Yinglings idea of shifting promotion selection out of the conventional generals' hands, obviating and replacing the need for what are considered normal promotion procedures is a genius idea. The problem is Congress is one greasy and slippery duck. They avoid taking responsibility for anything at every turn. They won't go for this because their is no way to flip flop. If one of their selectees doesn't work out, the Congress will not be able to blame it on someone else.

To: LindyBill who wrote (204433)	5/1/2007 12:41:49 PM
From: LindyBill	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 794146

The son's criticism hurts THOMAS BARNETT ARTICLE: A failure in generalship, By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, Armed Forces Journal [ED: see previous post] The actual Yingling article online is well worth reading. Naturally, I find all the arguments about not adapting in the post-Cold war 1990s to the "lesser includeds" to be very much on-target. Yingling's anger makes me feel glad I stuck to such an aggressive tone in PNM and BFA. I knew the military would catch up in terms of its mid-level officers. The frustration simply had to build and the political moment arrive. No news to me. I get an earful of this from 04s and 05s after every talk, and I do over a hundred each year. Difference with this argument is--of course--Yingling's status and career and logical dissatisfaction with all the current gray beards parading their wisdom on cable news nets when they themselves are most responsible for the lack of adaptation across the 1990s. This is a very sore spot for the Bob Scales of this world. They legitimately believe they saved the military after Vietnam (true) and that their solution still holds after Cold War's end (not true). To say otherwise is to attack their sense of career accomplishment--their very definition of who they are. And when you do that on-stage, you get guys in their late 50s and early 60s standing up and yelling at you (something that happens to me more and more as the overall mood gets closer and closer to Yingling's level of angry outburst). Wonder if Scales will call Yingling "crazy" like he routinely refers to me. I say, God bless him for writing this piece and the journal for publishing it. And watch Scales more closely the next time he defends Future Combat System as an absolute must. And then switch him off and listen to Andy Krepenevich instead. It begins to hurt when the sons turn on the fathers. The civilian pukes can be laughed off for their inherent "cowardice" (i.e., lack of mil service), but how do you dismiss the Yinglings when they finally step up and make the very same arguments? Thanks to Mike Bowen for sending this. thomaspmbarnett.com

To: LindyBill who wrote (204433)	5/8/2007 8:16:37 PM
From: LindyBill	Respond to of 794146

Paul Yingling wrote the piece this one is connected to. He is now posting at "Small Wars Journal." Friends, I've recently joined Small Wars Journal and I want to express my thanks for the terrific debate on my recent 'generalship' piece. I thought I would share some common questions/comments about the piece, as well as my responses. Most of the response has been very positive, and some of it has been intensely personal. I've received some very disturbing emails from Soldiers and family members describing how bad leadership has impacted their lives. To be honest, I was not prepared for that response and I'm very troubled by what I've heard. The most common criticism of the piece is that I did not address the role of civilian authorities more explicitly. While I don't think a serving officer should publicly criticize civil authorities, there is a more substantive question here. Who does society hold responsible for the application of non-military instruments of power to achieve the aims of policy? That's a much larger question than the one I took on regarding the responsibilities of general officers. However, it's a fair question that I would like to take a stab at eventually. Any thoughts on this topic are very much appreciated. Many people have asked me what impact this piece will have on my career. I don't know the answer to that question, and I don't mean to be dismissive or overly stoic, but I don't think it's a very important issue. There are Soldiers and Marines and family members who have risked and sacrificed much more than promotion to full colonel over the last six years. What I hope will happen: increased Congressional oversight of the systems that produce our senior leaders. Also, that junior leaders believe that our system of governance is capable of self-correction on even the most important issues. What I fear might happen: inaction by political and senior military authorities, coupled with growing resentment and disillusionment by our junior leaders. I'm very worried about the communication gap between stars and bars, and I hope that my article does not make matters worse. As I said, I've been surprised by the emotional intensity of some of the responses I've received. An interesting observation. The Vietnam generation did not fully assimilate their experiences until after the war was over. In units and service schools, the captains, majors and lieutenant colonels discussed their experiences, drew conclusions and argued for reform. In the information age, this dialogue happens in real time. Junior leaders are able to compare what senior leaders say with what's happening on the ground in a matter of minutes. I don't think our organizational models and leadership theories have caught up with the impacts of the information age. That's probably a statement of the obvious to most, but came as a revelation to a Luddite like me. I welcome your questions and comments and am very honored to be part of SWJ. V/R Paul smallwarsjournal.com