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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Neeka who wrote (19848)5/9/2007 11:59:40 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Iran's Economic Crisis
Ahmadinejad isn't bringing the oil money "to every dinner table."

BY AMIR TAHERI
Wednesday, May 9, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT

For the past five weeks, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Islamic Moral Brigades have been clashing with groups of young Iranians on the streets of Tehran and other major cities over the government's crackdown on "immodest dress." The crackdown is seen by many Iranians as another step toward an even more suffocating social atmosphere in the crisis-stricken country. Both Mr. Ahmadinejad and his mentor, the "Supreme Leader" Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claim that the way young Iranians dress is the most immediate threat to their Islamist dystopia.

Television footage of young men and women engaged in scuffles with Moral Brigades may lead some in the West to assume that the opposition to the Khomeinist regime is mostly urban and middle class, and solely concerned with greater social freedoms. That, however, is only part of the story. While social issues continue to poison life in the Islamic Republic, it is economic issues that spell the most trouble for Mr. Ahmadinejad's struggling presidency.

Last week tens of thousands of angry workers, forming an illegal umbrella organization, flexed their muscles against President Ahmadinejad on International Labor Day in Tehran and a dozen provincial capitals. Marching through the capital's streets, the workers carried a coffin draped in black with the legend "Workers' Rights" inscribed on it. They shouted "No to slave labor! Yes, to freedom and dignity!"

Mr. Ahmadinejad centered his 2005 presidential campaign on a promise to "bring the country's oil money to every family's dinner table." After the election his position was boosted by a dramatic rise in oil prices, providing him with more than $100 million a day in state revenues. And, yet, all official statistics show that, with inflation running around 18% and unemployment jumping to more than 30%, the average Iranian is worse off than three years ago. Under the previous administration of President Mohammad Khatami, the Islamic Republic scored average annual economic growth rates of around 4%. In a nation that needs to create a million new jobs to cope with its exploding demography, that kind of growth was certainly not enough to point to any Eldorado anytime soon. But it was enough to prevent the economy from sinking. Under President Ahmadinejad, however, the growth rate has dropped to around 3%--and that despite rising oil revenues.

Because it controls the oil revenue, which comes in U.S. dollars, the Islamic state has a vested interest in a weak national currency. (It could get more rials for the same amount of dollars in the domestic market.) Mr. Ahmadinejad has tried to exploit that opportunity by printing an unprecedented quantity of rials. Economists in Tehran speak of "the torrent of worthless rials" that Mr. Ahmadinejad has used to finance his extravagant promises of poverty eradication. The result has been massive flights of capital, mostly into banks in Dubai, Malaysia and Austria. Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi, the Islamic Chief Justice, claims that as much as $300 billion may have left the country since President Ahmadinejad was sworn in.

According to Abbas Abdi, a Tehran researcher and loyal critic of the regime, Iran is experiencing its worst economic crisis since the late 1970s. The effects of this are seen in the slowdown in real-estate prices--the first since 1997, even in Tehran's prime districts. Printing money and spending on a no-tomorrow basis are not the only reasons for the crisis. President Ahmadinejad's entire economic philosophy seems to be designed to do more harm than good.

The president's favorite catchword is "khodkafa'I" or "self sufficiency." To the horror of most Iranians, especially the millions connected with the bazaars, who regard trade as the noblest of pursuits, Mr. Ahmadinejad insists that the only way Iran can preserve its "Islamic purity" is to reduce dependence on foreign commerce.

"Whatever we can produce we should do ourselves," the president likes to say. "Even if what we produce is not as good, and more costly." His rationale goes something like this: The global economic system is a Jewish-Crusader conspiracy to keep Muslim nations in a position of weakness and dependency. Thus, Muslims would do better by relying on their own resources even if that means lower living standards.

One of President Ahmadinejad's first moves was to freeze a six-year-old policy designed to help the Islamic Republic become a member of the World Trade Organization; in his book the WTO is just another "Jewish-Crusader" invention to cement the inferior position of Muslim economies. It was with reference to "khodkafa'i" that Mr. Ahmadinejad decided to harden the regime's position on the nuclear issue, even if that meant United Nations sanctions and war with the U.S. The Iranian president claims that the seven countries currently capable of producing nuclear fuel plan to set up a global cartel and control the world market for enriched uranium, once mankind, having exhausted fossil fuels, is forced to depend on nuclear energy.

Convinced that Islam is destined for a "clash of civilizations" against the "Infidel"--led by the U.S., of course--President Ahmadinejad is determined to preserve what he regards as the Islamic Republic's "independence." One of his favorite themes is the claim that, forced to choose between freedom and independence, good Muslims would prefer the latter.

Khodkafa'i has had catastrophic results on many sectors of the Iranian industry. Unable to reduce, let alone stop, imports of mass consumer goods (including almost half of the nation's food) controlled by powerful mullahs and Revolutionary Guard commanders, President Ahmadinejad has tightened import rules for a range of raw materials and spare parts needed by factories across the nation. The policy has already all but killed the once-buoyant textile industry, destroying tens of thousands of jobs. It has also affected hundreds of small and medium-size businesses that, in some cases, have been unable to pay their employees for months.

Mr. Ahmadinejad has also used khodkafa'i as an excuse to freeze a number of business deals aimed at preventing the collapse of Iran's aging and semi-derelict oil and gas fields. He has also vetoed foreign participation in building oil refineries, forcing the Islamic Republic to import more than 40% of the refined petroleum products consumed in Iran. The prospect of a prolonged duel with the U.N., and possible military clash with the U.S., has also hurt the Iranian economy in the past six months.

One result of the president's weird policy is the series of strikes that have continued in Tehran and at least 20 other major cities since last autumn. Last year, one major strike by transport workers in Tehran brought the city of 15 million to a standstill for several days. Right now tens of thousands of workers in industries as diverse as gas refining, paper and newsprint, automobile, and copper mining are on strike.

President Ahmadinejad, however, is determined to impose what looks like a North Korean model on the Iranian economy. He has already dissolved the Syndicate of Iranian Employers (SKI) as a capitalist cabal, and plans to replace it with a government-appointed body. He is also pushing a new Labor Code through the Islamic Majlis (parliament) to replace the existing one written with the help of the International Labor Organization in the 1960s and amended in 1991.

The proposed text abolishes most of the rights won by workers throughout the world as a result of decades of social struggle and political reform. President Ahmadinejad believes that Western-style trade unions and employers' associations have no place in a proper Islamic society where the state, representing the will of Allah, can keep the "community of the faithful" free of class struggle, a typical affliction of "Infidel" societies.

Mr. Ahmadinejad's next coup will likely be a major privatization scheme affecting more than 40 public corporations across the country. He has promised to help the employees buy up to 10% of the shares. The rest will go to rich mullahs and Revolutionary Guard officers and their business associates, using low interest loans from state-owned banks. By the time the scheme is ready, however, the Islamic Republic may be facing too deep an economic crisis for anyone--even greedy mullahs and corrupt Revolutionary Guardsmen--to want to invest even a borrowed rial there.

Mr. Taheri is author of "L'Irak: Le Dessous Des Cartes" (Editions Complexe, 2002).

opinionjournal.com



To: Neeka who wrote (19848)5/16/2007 12:09:25 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
So much for optimism. It was, after all, cautious because I was uncertain if the trends would continue, and in spite of a sunny outlook at the time of my last posting, the conditions deteriorated again about 10 days ago.

It all began just after dusk as I was walking back to our headquarters building where I live and work. A bright flash on the horizon from the direction of downtown Ramadi, a delay, and then the distant boom that we have all become familiar with. As the sound reached me, there was second flash from the same area. Things were getting serious down there, and for the next several hours, the intensity of the activity fluctuated, but it continued and spread out across the city. Optimism shattered. The mud was coming back with a vengeance! That electrical storm dropped 1 1/4 inches of rain before it dissipated, and we were plunged back into the mire of Ramuddi.

On the tactical front, the massive sweep of Iraqi Police (IP) through parts of Ramadi has turned out be a significant catalyst for the entire area. Shortly after the sweep, there were a few targeted operations into the known insurgent hiding areas, where several insurgents were killed or captured, and from that point 'til now, the entire city has gone quiet. That's 6 weeks of relative peace throughout the entire city. There are still occasional shootings or snipers, but heavier forms of combat have virtually ceased. The local residents nearly swarm patrols to tell them where munitions are cached or IEDs are planted.
It's been kind of bizarre. Even here on the FOB, we have not been mortared in several weeks. For about a week this winter, it seemed that every time I decided to go eat lunch, we'd get mortared. The food here isn't too bad, but let's face it, it's not THAT good. I guess you could say that the food isn't gruel and unusual punishment, but it certainly wears on you to see the same stuff day after day for 8 months.

The city of Fallujah is experiencing similar success to what we have seen here. However, for all of our success, the insurgents are not out of the fight yet, and this is still a hazardous place. We have been largely successful in securing and bringing some degree of peace to the major population centers of Al Anbar province. The strategy employed here is working, and our tactical optimism continues to grow. I don't suppose any of this has been in the news?

Speaking of the news, you've probably seen that there have been a series of car bombings here over the last 2 weeks. I can certainly understand the newsies desire to get the word out quickly on what has transpired, but I do take issue with their complete lack of accuracy. I can also see where things get distorted. Within 15-20 seconds of the truck bomb in Ramadi, our communications systems were alive with initial reports; direction, distance, personnel status, and shortly there after initial casualty estimates. Listening to the first reports, I hear that 25-30 people have been killed and more injured. Chaos and differing perspectives. Conflicting information. One of my credos to my Operations Center staff is to always assume that the initial information for any combat situation is wrong and that they need to aggressively pursue the facts and corroborate the details. In the final count, there were 2 people killed and 9 injured. The news reported 27 killed and a similar number injured, which is consistent with the first blush report, but grossly wrong. When's the last time you saw a news agency update a report with revised casualty figures on an attack here? From personal experience, I can tell you that the news is using the initial figures and not the actual (lower) figures. We've had 3 vehicle bombs here lately, and every one of them were reported with overstated casualties.

A number of you have asked what I do here, so I thought I'd try to relate the anatomy of a combat mission. In general, my job is to plan, organize and oversee the execution of every mission this Task Force (TF) does, both combat and non-combat missions. Because my primary role is to move the TF forward as a whole, the majority of my work is done in an office with sandbagged windows. However, in order to understand the environment and insure that missions are executed to the plan, I periodically have to (get to) go on missions with our soldiers. On average, I do about 2-3 missions a month, and this is how most of them play out:

The day of the mission, I check in with the Company's operation center to get the final timeline to make sure I'm in the right place at the right time. Two and a half hours prior to departure, I attend the patrol mission brief where they talk through what route we're taking, the objectives, which vehicles are going, and what order they will be in. The kid to my left is identified as being in the lead vehicle, and passing a glance over him I can see he hasn't shaved. Ever. The sun highlights a faint facial fuzz, but today he's on the very pointy end of the spear. Alone and unafraid, hunting IEDs. The first one into harms way.

The next link up is one hour prior to mission to load vehicles, conduct the final situation brief, check equipment, and move out. The short lull in activity allows me time to do the final checks on my equipment.
Everything that requires batteries gets turned on and checked and the presence of spare batteries is verified. After one recent mission, curiosity got the better of me, and I weighed my combat gear that I take on missions. By nature, I am a minimalist when it comes to hauling gear around. I'd rather suffer through something than haul a lot of extras on contingency. My combat load came in at 81 lbs with body armor, helmet, weapons, ammo, gas mask, night vision equipment, water, and the ever required empty Gatorade bottle. Yep, that wide mouth bottle is essential equipment when the pressure is on, you've got several hours left on the mission, and the tactical situation says you can't leave the vehicle. Of course it really helps to cut off water consumption a couple hours prior to departure, but simple biology and Murphy's Law are always in cahoots. Dignity really is over rated!

At the final load out, all the pieces come together. Weapons are mounted, provisions stashed, and the Platoon Sergeant in his infinite wisdom (and experience) has dispatched a couple soldiers to the dining facility to bring back "to-go" plates for everyone on the patrol since
the mission will run over the meal hours. Once the vehicles and
equipment are ready, the soldiers are given an opportunity to eat. Time is running short, so the food is inhaled quickly with little conversation. The patrol gathers for the final brief and review of the rules of engagement (ROE) procedures. ROE is a set of strict guidelines that dictate what we can and should shoot at, and what/when we should hold fire. It is vital that everyone understand and abide by these to avoid friendly fire incidents and civilian casualties. As the briefing wraps up, the patrol leader invites all who are interested to stay for a prayer. No one leaves the circle.

As the patrol mounts up, I wrestle into my body armor, helmet, ballistic eye wear, ear plugs, and nomex gloves. I settle into my seat and slip on the radio/intercom headset. One of the ingenious crew members has figured out how pipe his iPod into the intercom system, so we roll out to the staging area listening to the muted strains of George Thoroughgood's "Bad to the Bone".

Our security escort hit the staging area just ahead of us, so the patrol leader dismounts to consummate the link up, exchange frequencies and call signs, and verify that security knows the route and what we need them to do. Radio checks are done with the security element and our headquarters, and upon success, the patrol leader orders the patrol to move out. We hit the line of departure one minute ahead of schedule.
As we roll out of the secured area, the radio comes to life with the cascading reports from each vehicle that weapons have gone "hot" and designated sectors are covered. From here, the patrol will spend the next 8-12 hours "licking the windows".

I'm not sure who coined that phrase exactly, but it is quite descriptive of our IED hunting patrols. To find IEDs, you have to visually scrutinize every inch of the road and it's shoulders looking for signs that something is amiss. That scrutiny comes through pressing your head against the ballistic glass and looking at the ground around the vehicle. It really is akin to licking the windows...

The patrol turns out to be a quiet ride from start to finish. No IEDs.
March was a record month for us with our patrols reducing 200 IEDs.
That level of activity was also higher than any single month for the unit before us as well. Pretty remarkable. Now we're anxious to see how the changes in Ramadi will impact our patrols and their activities.

My conundrum for this month: what rocket scientist decided it was a good idea to put the Combat Stress clinic in the same building with the Explosive Ordnance Disposal guys that are always blowing things up?

Now that I've rambled for 3 pages, I think it's time to wrap this one up. Hopefully, you've found this view of our anatomy illuminating.

Dave

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED



To: Neeka who wrote (19848)5/23/2007 12:12:19 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
North Korea violates another deal. Where's the outrage?

BY JOHN R. BOLTON
Sunday, May 20, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT

Over a month has passed since sweetness and light were due to break out on the Korean Peninsula. On Feb. 13, the Six-Party Talks in Beijing ratified a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, providing for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear programs. The first step, 60 days after ratification, was to be that North Korea "will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment" the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and readmit inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Other steps were to follow, but the first move was unequivocally to be made by Pyongyang. The 60 days came and went, and indeed, another 37 days have come and gone. No IAEA inspectors have been readmitted, and not even Pyongyang claims that it has "shut down" Yongbyon.

Instead, observers--especially Iran and other nuclear weapons aspirants--have witnessed embarrassing U.S. weakness on a supposedly unrelated issue, unmentioned in the Feb. 13 agreement. That issue involves North Korea's widely publicized demand that approximately $25 million frozen in Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) accounts be released and transferred to Pyongyang. The funds came from North Korean counterfeiting of U.S. currency, money laundering and other fraudulent activities uncovered by a U.S. Treasury investigation begun in 2003. The accounts were frozen in 2005 and the BDA was promptly put on Treasury's blacklist for illicit activity.

While the Bush administration denies a direct link, the North Koreans have said publicly that they will not comply with the bilateral agreement until the BDA funds are safely under their control. This obvious quid pro quo is not only embarrassing, it sets a dangerous precedent for other regimes that would blackmail the U.S. What are the consequences of the BDA meltdown?

First, the timetable of the Feb. 13 agreement is already shredded. President Bush said at the time of the deal: "Those who say that the North Koreans have got to prove themselves by actually following through on the deal are right, and I'm one." Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill, the deal's U.S. architect and chief negotiator, said: "We need to avoid above all missing deadlines. It's like a broken-window theory: one window is unrepaired, and before you know it you'll have a lot of broken windows and nobody cares."

Those statements were correct when made, and they are correct today. Sadly, however, they no longer seem to be "operative."

Second, by making secret side deals with North Korea, the State Department has left itself vulnerable to future renegotiation efforts. This is the North's classic style: Negotiate hard to reach an agreement, sign it, and then start renegotiating, not to mention violating the deal at will. America's serial concessions on BDA simply confirm to Pyongyang that State is well into the "save the deal" mode, which bodes well for future North Korean efforts to recast it. Consider the sequence of administration positions on BDA: Initially, the criminal investigation and the nuclear issue were not supposed to be connected, but the North insisted and the U.S. gave in.

Then, North Korea moved the renegotiation into high gear, demanding the return of the funds as a precondition to complying with its own commitments. Unwilling to "just say no," the Bush administration tried to distinguish between "licit" and "illicit" funds, returning only those that were legitimate. (This, of course begs the question whether anything that the criminal conspiracy running North Korea does is "licit.") Even the "licit" funds returned, however, were to be used only for "humanitarian" projects in North Korea rather than returned to Kim Jong Il's grasp--although how in an age of the U.N.'s "Cash for Kim" program the State Department thought this was to be verified remains a mystery.

Nevertheless, North Korea was not satisfied, insisting that all the funds had to be returned to the actual account holders, with no restrictions on their use, even though all agree that at least some were acting illicitly. This, too, State accepted.

Third, we now face the nagging question whether there are other secret side deals beyond BDA. Of course, the BDA agreement was not so secret that Kim Jong Il was barred from knowing about it, by definition. Most troubling, however, is that State apparently thought it too sensitive to share with the American people until the February deal broke down in an unavoidably public way. But even this was not enough for North Korea, which, sensing U.S. weakness, continues to press for more. Although conflicting stories abound, North Korea may be seeking not just the return of the BDA funds, but something much more significant: guaranteed access to international financial markets, even through an American bank. Indeed, last week Wachovia Corp. confirmed that it had been approached by the State Department to assist in the transfer of funds.

Here, the issue is inescapably related to North Korea's nuclear program. The North's access to international financial markets to launder its ill-gotten revenues is critical both to continued financing of its nuclear regime and to keeping Kim Jong Il in power. If this is even close to what the State Department is prepared to do, who will ever again take us seriously when we threaten financial strangulation of rogue states and terrorist groups? Granting this North Korean demand would make U.S. concessions on BDA look paltry by comparison.

Fourth, the BDA affair calls the remainder of the Feb. 13 agreement into question. Just to remind, 2007 is the 13th anniversary of the Agreed Framework, a predecessor U.S.-North Korean agreement, and the 15th anniversary of the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In all likelihood, it is also the 13th and 15th anniversaries, respectively, of North Korea's first violations of those agreements. No serious observer contends there is any sign of a strategic decision by North Korea to give up its nuclear program, which means, therefore, there is no more reason to believe the North will comply with the Feb. 13 deal than it has complied with its predecessors.

It is not even clear if North Korea actually gave up anything significant in the Feb. 13 deal. It is entirely possible, for example, that Yongbyon is now a hulk, well past its useful life span, and that the North agreed, in effect, to shut down a wreck. Even if Yongbyon is not in such parlous condition, it may be that the North has extracted all the plutonium possible from the fuel rods it has, and that Yongbyon therefore offers it nothing more. Here, the omissions in the Feb. 13 agreement become significant. The deal says nothing about the plutonium, perhaps weaponized perhaps not, that North Korea has already reprocessed.

How these issues play out will have ramifications far beyond North Korea, particularly for Iran. Some say the Bush administration entered the Feb. 13 deal because it desperately needed a success. One thing is for certain: It does not need a failure. The president can easily extricate himself from the deal, just based on North Korea's actions to date. He should take the first opportunity to do so.

Mr. Bolton is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the U.N. and Abroad," forthcoming this fall from Simon & Schuster.

opinionjournal.com



To: Neeka who wrote (19848)5/23/2007 1:25:13 PM
From: Geoff Altman  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Sarkozy: Tighten sanctions on Teheran
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jpost.com staff and AP, THE JERUSALEM POST May. 23, 2007
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
French President Nicholas Sarkozy called Wednesday for sanctions on Iran to be tightened if the country does not adhere to the West's demands to cease its nuclear agenda, Israel Radio reported.

If Iran attains nuclear weapons, Sarkozy warned, a road to an arms race will be paved that could endanger Israel and southeast Europe, he said during an interview with a German magazine.

Sarkozy announced that France will join the official US-led struggle against head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei, who recommended that Iran be allowed to enrich uranium in some of its nuclear plants.

On Tuesday, American officials urged allies to back a formal protest against ElBaradei, saying his comments could hurt UN Security Council efforts to pressure Teheran over its enrichment program.

"We were indeed surprised by several comments from Mr. ElBaradei over the weekend," said French Foreign Ministry spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei. "We share the gist of concerns expressed by our American partners - along with several other partners, for that matter."

Over the past two weeks, ElBaradei has publicly said he believes it is too late to force Teheran to scrap its enrichment program as demanded by the Security Council, and argued instead for implementing inspection safeguards to prevent an expansion of the program.

"I can confirm that our permanent representative in Vienna will take part in the American initiative," Mattei said, referring to the Austrian capital where the International Atomic Energy Agency is based.

Mattei also took issue with ElBaradei's recent reference to French intelligence about the speed of Iran's nuclear program, without providing details.

"In addition, the IAEA director-general referred, in one of his public statements, to analyses from French intelligence services over the time that it would take Iran to have access to a nuclear weapon," Mattei said. "We aren't in the habit of releasing national intelligence analyses publicly - much less through an international organization."
jpost.com