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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Peter Dierks who wrote (20847)6/25/2007 4:05:15 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Unifying Iraq
Partition is the path to more war--multiple wars, in fact.

BY DONALD L. HOROWITZ
Tuesday, June 19, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT

Many people seem to think that if the Iraq war was a mistake, it follows that we should undo the mistake and withdraw our forces--a questionable syllogism at best. Meanwhile, popular sentiment against the war has been so strong that Congress has been following, rather than leading, public opinion.

It is time for a much more nuanced debate. Whether the war was a mistake doesn't answer the critical questions: What are the likely consequences of continuing it? What are the likely consequences of withdrawal?

In favor of withdrawal, it is said that one consequence of our remaining in Iraq is that we're prevented from finishing the war in Afghanistan. Perhaps, although there are hazards to flooding Afghanistan with foreign troops, as the Soviet Union discovered. While we are vulnerable in Iraq, we are also prevented from taking a much more threatening line against Iran's nuclear program, and while we are tied down there, the credibility of our military power elsewhere in the world is weaker than it should be. But what about the consequences of withdrawal from Iraq?

In the south, where Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim's party has pushed the creation of a nine-province Shia region, the region would be wide open to Iranian influence. Mr. Hakim is receptive to that influence, though many other Shia and the parties that represent them are hostile to Iran. Iraq's Shia are Arabs, not Persians, and they fought loyally on Saddam's side in the Iran-Iraq war. A single southern region would be a serious setback for them and for us. Without American pressure, Mr. Hakim is likely to win.

And in the north? The 2005 Iraq constitution was close to a Kurdish dream come true, and the 2006 constitution of the Kurdistan region edges right up to the brink of independence, in defiance of some of the few remaining strictures of the Iraq constitution. American withdrawal would leave the Kurds determined to defend their autonomy and assert their de facto independence. But Turkey resents support by Iraqi Kurds for the Kurdish rebellion in southeastern Turkey. The Turks could not, under any conditions, tolerate an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, which would be a beacon for its own Kurds. Tens of thousands of Turkish troops have already been moved toward the Iraq border. As of now, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds have flourishing commercial relations, which would be undone in a flash by the conflict that would probably ensue upon an American departure. We would be faced with a likely war between two allies.

In central Iraq, there are signs that Sunni opinion is turning against Islamist insurgents. If there is a successful revision of the de-Baathification law, the Baathist part of the insurgency, militarily more sophisticated, might decline. But if the U.S. withdrew, the Sunni heartland would become, in unpredictable proportions, a mix of Baathist and radical Islamist forces. Both would have an irredentist agenda, seeking to recapture the Shia south and the Kurdish north for an Iraq to be governed by the worst principles that Baathists and radical Islamists would like Iraq to live by. Eventually these two would come to blows, as they also would with Sadrists and the Madhi Army. They would surely agree on the desirability of revenge against the U.S. War among the regions and a surge in terrorism should be anticipated.

With a territorial base, radical Islamist and Baathist forces would find ways to damage our interests here and abroad. Worse, our withdrawal would tacitly establish the principle, which we forcibly rejected in Afghanistan and more recently in Somalia, that we are prepared to live with a regime dedicated to our destruction even when we might be in a position to do otherwise.

Finally, a sundered Iraq would assuredly become a tempting target for external forces. Iran, already influential in the south, might aid the Madhi Army in the center. Arab Sunni regimes worried by the growth of Iranian power would likely move into parts of the vacuum we left behind. In these rivalries, played out in Iraq, there is considerable potential for wider war, with unpredictable consequences for regional stability and the fortunes of our various allies and antagonists.

Some in Congress and elsewhere believe the solution in Iraq is a three-way partition. They have not done their homework. Partition is the way to more war--multiple wars, in fact--not the way to peace, and it is the way to increased Iranian influence.

It is of course still possible to argue that withdrawal is preferable to an open-ended involvement, on the grounds that the high costs to us of involvement exceed the high costs of withdrawal. But the opposite position--which happens to be mine--is also tenable: The consequences of withdrawal are worse than the costs of continuing involvement. That is where the debate should be joined, based on a careful assessment of the comparative advantages of each course and of middle courses, such as partial withdrawal. That would be a serious debate, rather than the vacuous one that Congress has so far engaged in. Is it too much to ask that Congress rise to the occasion, as it did during the Cold War, and get serious about assessing the interests of our country?

Mr. Horowitz is a professor of law and political science at Duke University and author of "Ethnic Groups in Conflict" (California, 2000).

opinionjournal.com



To: Peter Dierks who wrote (20847)7/20/2007 11:25:42 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
North Korea Tech Transfer
Why was the U.N. helping Pyongyang obtain militarily useful computers and GPS systems?

BY MELANIE KIRKPATRICK
Friday, July 20, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT

Of all the evidence turned up by the U.S. concerning irregularities in the United Nations Development Program's operations in North Korea, some of the most disturbing concerns the transfer of dual-use technology.

As reported last month, the U.S. has uncovered documents showing the UNDP procured and delivered to North Korea in May 2006 technology that could be used for military purposes: global positioning system (GPS) equipment, a portable high-end spectrometer and a large quantity of high-specification computer hardware. According to packing lists and confirmation receipts, the items were intended for a "GIS"--geographic information system--project.

The equipment "is the type of technology subject to (U.S.) export controls," says a spokesman for the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, which is responsible for issuing export licenses. So how did it end up in Pyongyang? It would seem more than passing strange that Commerce would have issued the requisite export licenses. The answer is: It didn't.

U.S. officials, led by Ambassador Mark Wallace at the U.S. mission to the U.N., have spent a year looking into the UNDP's operations in North Korea. Now, at the request of the State Department, Commerce searched its archives and found no record of any application for export licenses for the GPS, spectrometer or other equipment for the GIS project in North Korea.

Over the past 10 years, Commerce has received more than 200 license applications to export U.S. technology for U.N. projects in North Korea. Of those applications, the UNDP was named in a grand total of two, including one for software for the same GIS project that was equipped last year. That application was rejected.

Previously undisclosed documents show that the UNDP had been trying to equip the GIS project since at least 1999, when the application for an export license for mapping software was denied. Commerce cited concerns over the lack of safeguards in the project that could result in the software being diverted to the North Korean government and used for military purposes.

Yet seven years later, the UNDP procured and transferred sensitive technology to the same, unsafeguarded project--this time without bothering to apply for a license. And while there's no evidence the UNDP went ahead and purchased the software for which it had been denied a license, that possibility must be considered, since GPS equipment is useless in such a project without mapping software.

The denial notice for "Case Number: Z177037" is dated Sept. 18, 1999. The "consignee in country of ultimate destination" is listed as the UNDP in Pyongyang. The one-page notice is written in prose that is clear and unambiguous: "The Department of Commerce has concluded that this export would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests."

The 14 items on the UNDP's wish list were all classified "EAR99," which means they are subject to Commerce jurisdiction but didn't specifically appear on the Commerce Control List of items restricted for export. In discussions over the past several weeks with State Department officials, Commerce officials who examined the archives explained their agency's decision to deny the export license. During the interagency review of the UNDP request, they say, questions were raised about whether the software would stay in North Korea after the UNDP international staff left and whether North Koreans would have access to the software.

Supporting documents show that the answer to both questions was yes. A letter dated April 5, 1999, from the software manufacturer that was seeking the export license on behalf of the UNDP, explains: "The project is supposed to be completed in three (3) years and the software will be left with the state agencies."

Emails from the UNDP to Commerce offer further information about the UNDP's security controls--or lack thereof. An Aug. 3, 1999 email from the UNDP's Shankar Manandhar, in response to a Commerce query, says, "We would like to inform you that the North Korean nationals will have access to the computer in the project office in [the] presence of UNDP staff." In another email, Mr. Manandhar notes that the software will be "utilized in the project office."

The Defense Department recommended to Commerce that the application be denied. In a memo dated July 20, 1999, Defense explains that "These items could pose both national security and proliferation issues for the US and allies if diverted to the North Korean military." Among the list of potential military applications cited are "planning a nuclear weapons infrastructure or missile launch sites." And, "it could also be used for targeting." In the end, as one Commerce official explained, since this type of mapping software can be used for military purposes, it was deemed to be "too great a risk of diversion."

The Commerce official also says the case notes for the denial specify that several earlier licenses granted to the UNDP in North Korea had been conditioned in such a way that no North Korean nationals were to have access to the licensed items. Oh, really? Based on the UNDP's replies to Commerce's questions regarding the 1999 application, the official says that the licensing officer at the time believed it was "highly likely" that the UNDP was violating the terms of its previous licenses by allowing North Koreans access to licensed items. We now know--as confirmed by the U.N.'s preliminary audit of the UNDP's North Korea operations--that the agency's local staff were Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees assigned to the UNDP by the government.

It's also worth noting the year these events took place: 1999. That is, the denial notice originated in Bill Clinton's Commerce Department, part of an administration that was "conducting a one-sided love affair with North Korea," in the felicitous phrase of Christopher Cox, then a Republican congressman closely monitoring Asian issues. On Sept. 17, 1999, the day before the issuance of the denial notice, the administration announced it would ease economic sanctions on North Korea. But approving the sale of sophisticated mapping software was a bridge too far even for the Clinton administration.

Since the U.S. went public in January with evidence of the UNDP's lack of oversight of its programs in North Korea, the agency hasn't exactly been forthcoming. At first, the UNDP denied that it had purchased dual-use equipment for North Korea, referring instead to "rice husk removers" and "plotters to help the [Korean] authorities more accurately produce maps for environmental monitoring."

Next it look the line that the GPS equipment, portable spectrometer and computers delivered in May 2006 "do not represent state-of-the-art technology," as Ad Melkert, the No. 2 UNDP official, put it in a June 28 letter to Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. An annex to Mr. Melkert's letter describes the technology as "not high-end or sophisticated"--an assessment at odds with the representations of the manufacturers. Trimble, for example, maker of the GPS GeoXT Handheld sent to North Korea, describes its product as having "a powerful 416 MHz processor running the most-advanced operating system available." Mr. Melkert says in the annex that the UNDP is investigating "whether the vendors [in the Netherlands and Singapore] were required to obtain export permits for these items"--which sure sounds like an effort to shift responsibility.

Since January, when the U.S. concerns were made public, the UNDP has pulled out of North Korea and the U.N. audit has confirmed extensive violations of U.N. rules regarding hiring practices, the use of foreign currency and site inspections. The latest U.S. revelations raise far more serious questions about the UNDP's oversight. Under the most generous interpretation, the agency was negligent of its legal responsibilities to keep dual-use technology out of a country that is on the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states. At worst, it deliberately transferred the technology, knowing it was breaking U.S. law and helping to strengthen Kim Jong Il's military dictatorship.

These questions--and many more concerning the UNDP's record in North Korea--highlight the need for an independent, external inquiry of the UNDP's programs world-wide. The U.S. first went public with its concerns in January, after months of pressing the UNDP for more transparency. If anything, as the latest U.S. evidence shows, things are worse than anyone thought.

Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of The Wall Street Journal's editorial page.

opinionjournal.com