To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (234785 ) 7/1/2007 2:24:23 AM From: c.hinton Respond to of 281500 Goals and results of the TET ofensive...wikipedia According to General Vo Nguyen Giap, the communist north's goals were not purely military but political and diplomatic as well, to take advantage of public opposition to the war in the United States and the weakness of the Saigon Government. Giap sought to accomplish the following: Create a general uprising among the South Vietnamese against the Saigon government, leading to the formation of a coalition government and the departure of the United States. Demonstrate that American claims regarding progress in the war were wrong and to apply pressure upon the U.S. government. Bring the war to the cities of South Vietnam to relieve military pressure on the countryside. (Schmitz 90) The first and most ambitious goal, to produce a general uprising, was a failure for the communists. While there was little support for the Saigon government, there was no general uprising and the communists, most with no plans for retreat or withdrawal, took heavy losses. While fighting in Hue and Saigon continued for some time, in most cites the communists were driven back in just days. The effort to regain control of the countryside was more successful. According to the U.S. State Department the Viet Cong "expanded their control in urban areas and have made pacification virtually inoperative. In the Mekong Delta the NLF was stronger now then ever and in other regions the countryside belongs to the VC" (Schmitz 106), The attacks created a crisis in the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, which was unable to convince the American people that the Tet Offensive was a major defeat for the communists. According to Colonel Thomas Hammes, the U.S. government "had squandered its credibility with the press and, through them, with the U.S. public." According to a March 25 Harris poll, 60 percent of Americans “regarded the Tet Offensive as a defeat for U.S. objectives in Vietnam (Henkin) The offensive had profound psychological impact on the Johnson administration, elite decision makers, and the media. According to Peter Braestrup, Tet “affected political Washington far more than it did the general public. At the end of March, in the wake of Tet, the Johnson administration began a reevaluation of its war policy. On the advice of the so-called Wise men the Johnson Administration made major changes to its Vietnam War policy. These changes included limiting the bombing campaign in North Vietnam and reversing the escalation of American troops, capping levels at 550,000. The Johnson administration also began to turn over responsibility of the fighting to the South Vietnamese and sought negotiations with Hanoi. [edit]Strategic context