On January 23, 2004, the head of the ISG, David Kay, resigned his position, stating that he believed WMD stockpiles would not be found in Iraq. "I don't think they existed," commented Kay. "What everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last Gulf War and I don't think there was a large-scale production program in the nineties." In a briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Kay criticized the pre-war WMD intelligence and the agencies that produced it, saying "It turns out that we were all wrong, probably in my judgment, and that is most disturbing." [2]
Kay told the SASC during his oral report the following, though: "Based on the intelligence that existed, I think it was reasonable to reach the conclusion that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Now that you know reality on the ground as opposed to what you estimated before, you may reach a different conclusion-—although I must say I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war."
Kay's team has established that the Iraqi regime had the production capacity and know-how to produce a great deal more chemical and biological weaponry when international economic sanctions were lifted, a policy change which was actively being sought by many United Nations member states. Kay also believed some components of the former Iraqi regime's WMD program had been moved to Syria shortly before the 2003 invasion [3], though the Duelfer Report Addenda (see below) later reported there was no evidence of this.
On February 6, 2004, Bush convened the Iraq Intelligence Commission, an independent inquiry into the intelligence used to justify the Iraq war and the failure to find WMD. This was shortly followed by the conclusion of a similar inquiry in the United Kingdom, the Butler Review, which was boycotted by the two main opposition parties due to disagreements on its scope and independence [4]. In 2003, The U.S.-sponsored search for WMD had been budgeted for $400 million, with an additional $600 million added in 2004.
Kay's successor, named by CIA director George Tenet, was the former U.N. weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, who stated at the time that the chances of finding any WMD stockpiles in Iraq were "close to nil."
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In March 2005 Duelfer added an addenda to the original report, covering five topics:
Prewar Movement of WMD Material Out of Iraq, stating "ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place" but also acknowledging that "ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war."
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Other details surfaced after the Duelfer Report, which help fill in the blanks left by the incomplete ISG investigation. Duelfer also concluded that Saddam planned to resume weapons of mass destruction production once the United Nations lifted economic sanctions.
The following news articles cite the weapons of mass destruction which were uncovered as early as 2004:
1) 1.77 metric tons of enriched uranium In a joint Energy and Defense Department operation, 1.77 metric tons of low-enriched uranium and approximately 1000 highly radioactive sources were secured from Iraq's former nuclear research facility, packaged and then airlifted on June 23, the press statement said. "This operation was a major achievement for the Bush Administration's goal to keep potentially dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists," Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in the statement. "It also puts this material out of reach for countries that may seek to develop their own nuclear weapons." Source:[7]
2) 1,500 gallons of chemical weapons agents U.S. troops raiding a warehouse in the northern city of Mosul uncovered a suspected chemical weapons factory containing 1,500 gallons of chemicals believed destined for attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces and civilians, military officials said Saturday. Source: [8]
3) 17 chemical warheads containing cyclosarin (a nerve agent five times more deadly than sarin gas) "Laboratory tests showed the presence in them of cyclosarin, a very toxic gas, five times stronger than sarin and five times more durable," Bieniek told Poland's TVN24 at the force's Camp Babylon headquarters. "If these warheads, which were still usable, were used on a military base like Camp Babylon, they would have caused unforeseeable damage." Source: [9]
4) Over 1,000 radioactive materials in powdered form meant for dispersal over populated areas "Along with 1.77 tons of enriched uranium, about 1,000 "highly radioactive sources" were also removed. The material was taken from a former nuclear research facility on 23 June, after being packaged by 20 experts from the US Energy Department's secret laboratories." Source: [10]
5) Roadside bombs loaded with mustard and "conventional" sarin gas, assembled in binary chemical projectiles for maximum potency Source: [11] |
