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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: one_less who wrote (238013)	7/27/2007 2:05:07 AM
From: Nadine Carroll	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Well, okay, but prolonged musing on the nature of what it means "to believe" seem a little tangential from the original point that AP believes a narrative that decouples AQ from AQI, and damn all evidence to the contrary. Speaking of the AP's beliefs, Jule Crittendon disects another of AP's belief-driven articles. This one is amusing, in a mordant sort of way, as the AQ unit cited in the lead graf to evoke the image of AQ's "resilience" winds up 100% (or near it) dead or captured by the Americans - that is, if you bother to read to paragraph 12. _________________________ Big win for good guys in Iraq. It’s depicted in AP’s effort to grasp the resilience of elusive al-Qaeda in Iraq, Down but Not Out. Valiant effort leaves some key details for last, omits others that might aid to understanding: BAGHDAD — Darkness had fallen across the desert when U.S. soldiers in Humvees noticed two tractor-trailer rigs stopped on a roadway. A closer look revealed 40 to 50 men dressed in white robes and new white running shoes huddled beside the trucks. Startled by the nine Americans, the men opened fire with AK-47 rifles, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, kicking off a 23-hour gunbattle that killed two Americans. The fight was a dramatic reminder, U.S. commanders told The Associated Press, of the resilience of al-Qaida in Iraq. The shadowy organization has been run out of some parts of the country yet still has the will, financing and fighters for significant attacks — and not only in Baghdad. Twelve paragraphs on the remarkable resilience of al-Qaeda later, we learn that this poster-child resilient AQ unit will not fight another day: When the guns fell silent on the evening of July 1, the American casualties totaled two killed and 15 wounded. They had killed 35 of the enemy and captured seven, according to Lt. Col. Miciotta Johnson, commander of Task Force 1-77, who oversaw the battle. Sounds like a dramatic reminder that al-Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgent groups have always lost in direct confrontations with U.S. troops, confrontations which are increasingly being forced. Also, a dramatic reminder that AQI and the insurgents have always died at a far higher rate than Americans. We learn later that this no-longer remarkably resilient AQ unit was unable to execute its plan to undermine U.S. successes in Anbar by murdering pro-government Sunni leaders in now largely quiet Ramadi: In a telephone interview this week, Johnson said all of the white-clad fighters were armed to the teeth and aiming to attack U.S.-backed Iraqi leaders in nearby Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province. They had masked their approach by hiding inside the tractor-trailers, where they used hay to conceal a false bottom that contained improvised bombs, homemade grenades and other arms. The article cites support among Iraq’s Sunnis for AQI as a line of defense against Shiite militias, in what appears to be a somewhat dated assessment that fails to note that support has been collapsing wholesale as tribal leaders, Sunni insurgent leaders and emboldened ordinary Iraqis throw in their lot with the government and turn on AQI: One Sunni adviser to Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zubaie, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear of retribution, said most Sunnis do not support al-Qaida. His explanation for why Sunnis nonetheless have largely tolerated — and in many cases helped — the group tells a lot about the depth of sectarian divisions in this country and how that split helps al-Qaida. The adviser said ordinary Sunnis are convinced that the group is their only hope for protection against rival Shiite militias. Here’s Burns’ quick assessment of what AQI is: The homegrown Sunni extremist group, comprised mainly of Iraqis but in some cases led and financed by foreigners, has been forced to retreat from many of its former strongholds. Last year it lost its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian. Yet it fights on. It’s a quick take that overlooks a great deal of intelligence cited by the president and reported by the AP the other day, as well as the predominance of evidence reported over recent years: That al-Qaeda in Iraq is in whole an al-Qaeda subsidiary, its top leadership exclusively foreign, al-Qaeda led, receiving direction and seeking guidance from AQ mission control in Waziristan. Never mind the frequent reports in recent years of foreign jihadis coming in from Syria, discovery of Saudi, Chechen and other foreigners among the AQ dead, and last week’s entertaining news that AQI leader “al-Baghdadi” was a fiction designed to convince Iraqis that AQI is an Iraqi organization. julescrittenden.com