You are lying to yourself … again. Your denials and dishonorable defense of the indefensible noted… again.
”Do you have a link to this screed of lies?”
1. the facts: a judge found Clinton guilty of willfully lying in his testimony
”Link to the facts: No lie except the false allegation you provided.”
No doubt to a person who would never defend Clinton (such as you have declared your self to be <sarcasm>) it depends as much on the meaning of the word ‘is’ as on the meaning of the word ‘perjury’. However, no fair minded person on the planet goes by such codified obfuscation for meaningful terms. Perjury means lying under oath to all meaningful and fair minded persons. The American people have witnessed the legalistic whining and maneuverings to defend politicians long enough to see that congress is not capable of standing on issues or events as a body of justice. Partisan extremist lab dogs like you are a great step down from that low bar of ethics.
The link to this list of factual comments by Fitz was provided by you some time back as you were putting people down for not being informed about Fitzgerald. Apparently you didn’t read his information to well.
Fitzgerald, your source of authority, clearly holds false testimony as a crime, superordinate to all other proceedings related to courts, as do I. He doesn't create loopholes for someone under the umbrella of your partisan extremism in his statements, as you attempt to do.
Fitzgerald’s words that you referenced:
... anyone who would go into a grand jury and lie, obstruct and impede the investigation has committed a serious crime.
...We need to know the truth. And anyone who would go into a grand jury and lie, obstruct and impede the investigation has committed a serious crime.
… the truth is the engine of our judicial system. And if you compromise the truth, the whole process is lost.
…our jobs, the criminal justice system, is to make sure people tell us the truth. And when it's a high-level official and a very sensitive investigation, it is a very, very serious matter that no one should take lightly.
… telling false testimony and obstructing the investigation, that, to me, defines a serious breach of the public trust.
Message 23677760
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washingtonpost.com
Clinton never plea bargained you say …. Hmmm: Then what’s this all about?
President Clinton's final plea bargain with Independent Counsel Robert Ray, admitting that his testimony under oath was not the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth: Mr. Blumenthal eschews this document's title, "Agreed Order of Discipline." But he says it "tied up loose ends from myriad legal matters." He continues, "There would be no prosecution of him on any matter whatsoever. Clinton had committed no crimes. However, he had to acknowledge . . . that in his deposition in the Jones case, though he had tried to speak lawfully, 'certain of my responses to questions about Ms. Lewinsky were false.' He also accepted a five-year suspension of his law license in Arkansas and a $25,000 fine in exchange for dismissal of a pending disbarment suit, initiated by the Southeastern Legal Foundation, a [Richard Mellon] Scaife-funded right-wing group. (Starr helped the group raise funds by giving a speech for it in 2000.)"
opinionjournal.com
4. On April 12,1999, Judge Susan Webber Wright, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, issued a 32 page Memorandum Opinion and Order (the "Order") in Jones v. Clinton, et al., Case No. LR-C-94-290, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
5. In the Order, Judge Wright held Mr. Clinton in contempt of her December 11, 1997 Discovery Orders (the "Discovery Orders"). The Order served as the basis of a judicial referral to the Committee, and serves as the basis for this Complaint for Disbarment.
6. In the Order, Judge Wright found, inter alia, the following:
(a) That Mr. Clinton gave false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process to Ms. Jones' attorneys during Mr. Clinton's January 17, 1998 deposition;
(b) That Mr. Clinton gave intentionally false deposition testimony regarding whether he had ever been alone or ever engaged -in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky;
(c) That Mr. Clinton, in a televised Address to the Nation on August 17, 1998, acknowledged that he "misled people" with regard to the questions posed to him by Ms. Jones' attorneys.
(d) That Mr. Clinton's contumacious conduct in the Jones v. Clinton case, coming as it did from a member of the bar and chief law enforcement officer of this Nation, was without justification and undermined the integrity of the judicial system.
7. As a result of these findings, Judge Wright sanctioned Mr. Clinton, ordering him to pay Ms. Jones' attorneys any reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, caused by his willful failure to obey the Court's Discovery Orders, and to pay the sum of $1,202.00 in expenses incurred by the Court in traveling to Washington, D.C. to preside over Mr. Clinton's deposition.
8. In the Order, Judge Wright offered Mr. Clinton the opportunity to demonstrate why he was not in civil contempt and why sanctions should not be imposed, or, alternatively, why the Court was otherwise in error in the manner it was proceeding.
9. Additionally, Judge Wright stayed enforcement of the Order for thirty (30) days to give Mr. Clinton an opportunity to request a hearing or to file an appeal.
10. In the Order, Judge Wright stated that the Court would entertain any legitimate and reasonable requests from Mr. Clinton for extensions of time in which to address the matter.
11. Mr. Clinton neither requested a hearing, nor did he appeal the Order.
12. On or about September 28, 1998, Mr. Clinton paid $89,484.05 in attorneys' fees to satisfy the Order, along with the $1,202.00 in costs incurred by the Court.
13. The conduct of Mr. Clinton, found and adjudged by Judge Wright in the Order, was motivated by a desire to protect himself from the embarrassment of his own conduct.
14. The conduct of Mr. Clinton found and adjudged by Judge Wright in the Order, collectively and singularly, violated the Arkansas Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(c),(d).
15 Mr. Clinton's conduct found and adjudged by Judge Wright in the Order, constitutes "Serious Misconduct" as defined by Section 7B(3) of the Procedures, which defines "serious misconduct" as conduct involving "dishonesty, deceit, fraud and misrepresentation by the lawyer."
16. Mr. Clinton's conduct found and adjudged by Judge Wright in the Order, damages the legal profession and demonstrates a lack of overall fitness to hold a license to practice law.
freerepublic.com
”Webber-Wright's finding of contempt against Clinton was based on the fact that he deliberately lied under oath, ie. committed perjury, in an effort to thwart justice, and that he did so repeatedly, both in his deposition and in his written response to an interrogatory. He was sworn on both of these. This is a serious crime, as defined under the rules of professional conduct to which the state of Arkansas subscribes. In section 1.E.8 is the following:
"SERIOUS CRIME" means any felony or any lesser crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or any crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of the crime, involves interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft or an attempt, conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a "serious crime."
Under federal law, which is what Clinton violated when he lied under oath in Webber-Wright's court, perjury is a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison. We've recently seen this fact in operation in Judge Lamberth's court. He sentenced Robert Blackley (former chief of staff to secretary of agriculture) to 3 years imprisonment for false statements under oath. Not surprisingly, the federal sentencing guidelines (2J1.3) are exactly the same for perjury as they are for bribery, since both crimes constitute obstruction and subversion of the rule of law.”
freerepublic.com
<iIn section 7.B of the Arkansas rules for professional conduct, the following factors are set forth in considering whether "serious misconduct" warrants disbarment:
(1) The misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds;
(2) The misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or other person; [...such as denial of due process to Paula Jones?]
(3) The misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the lawyer; [...such as serial perjury before Judge Webber-Wright?]
(4) The misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct; [...such as lying to a grand jury?]
(5) The lawyer's prior record of public sanctions demonstrates a substantial disregard of the lawyer's professional duties and responsibilities; [...most of us would probably consider impeachment by the U.S. Congress to fall under this category.]
(6) The misconduct constitutes a "Serious Crime" as defined in these Procedures. [Well, Judge Lamberth thinks perjury is a serious crime, Judge Webber-Wright thinks so, the federal criminal code thinks so, and the Arkansas state criminal code and code of professional conduct think so, too. The only voice of dissent here seems to be coming from Jimmy Neal, who failed to include 8.4(b) in his petition.]
Of the 6 criteria for determining serious misconduct in a disbarment proceeding, Clinton's transgressions satisfy 5 of them. He did everything but misappropriate a client's funds.
freerepublic.com
Under federal law, which is what Clinton violated when he lied under oath in Webber-Wright's court, perjury is a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison.
Yes, and Judge Wright made reference to that in her contempt ruling:
freerepublic.com
”Although Judge Wright decided to find Clinton in civil contempt, she seemed to be saying that Clinton should be prosecuted for criminal contempt. Her language would have justified the ASCCPC citing Rule 8.4(b) in the disbarment petition.
freerepublic.com
Judge Write states:
”For the reasons that follow, the Court hereby adjudges the President to be in contempt of court for his willful failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders.
…Notwithstanding these Orders, the record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiff s questions by giving false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process. The President acknowledged as much in his public admission that he "misled people" because, among other things, the questions posed to him "were being asked in a politically inspired lawsuit, which has since been dismissed." Although there are a number of aspects of the President's conduct in this case that might be characterized as contemptuous, the Court addresses at this time only those matters which no reasonable person would seriously dispute were in violation of this Court's discovery Orders and which do not require a hearing, namely the President's sworn statements concerning whether he and Ms. Lewinsky had ever been alone together and whether he had ever engaged in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky….
…At his August 17th grand jury appearance, the President directly contradicted his deposition testimony…
…a willful refusal to obey this Court's discovery Orders. Given the President's admission that he was misleading with regard to the questions being posed to him and the clarity with which his falsehoods are revealed by the record, there is no need to engage in an extended analysis of the President's sworn statements in this lawsuit. Simply put, the President's deposition testimony regarding whether he had ever been alone with Ms. Lewinsky was intentionally false, and his statements regarding whether he had ever engaged in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky likewise were intentionally false, notwithstanding tortured definitions and interpretations of the term "sexual relations."….
…it simply is not acceptable to employ deceptions and falsehoods in an attempt to obstruct the judicial process, understandable as his aggravation with plaintiff's lawsuit may have been. "A lawsuit is not a contest in concealment, and the discovery process was established so that 'either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
-------------------------------------------
Regarding your presumptions about what qualifies as ‘material’, you are simply stating a falsehood.
Although this civil action has been terminated, "[a] court may make an adjudication of contempt and impose a contempt sanction even after the action in which the contempt arose has been terminated." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990). In addition, a court generally may act sua sponte in imposing sanctions. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 42 n.8."
ardemgaz.com
Criminal contempt: Under 18 U.S.C. ¤ 401, federal courts possess the power to impose sanctions for criminal contempt committed in or near the presence of the court. When invoking this power, courts must follow one of two procedures set forth in Fed.R.Crim.P. 42. Pursuant to Rule 42(a), a court may punish direct contempt, i.e., that contempt which occurs within the "actual presence" of the court, in a summary fashion. For conduct beyond the scope of Rule 42(a), such as indirect contempts that occur out of court, Rule 42(b) requires such other criminal contempts to be prosecuted upon notice and a hearing. See Schleper v. Ford Motor Co., 585 F.2d 1367, 1372 (8th Cir. 1978). the Court also avoids any constitutional issues that might arise from addressing the matter in a criminal context. As noted in Section II of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Supreme Court essentially resolved the question of whether a President can be cited for civil contempt by holding, in a civil proceeding, that the Constitution does not place the President's unofficial conduct beyond judicial scrutiny. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 705. Criminal contempt, however, "is a crime in the ordinary sense," see Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826 (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)) (emphasis added), and the question of whether a President can be held in criminal contempt of court and subjected to criminal penalties raises constitutional issues not addressed by the Supreme Court in the Jones case. Such issues could engender protracted litigation, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 692. and consume the resources of both the President and this Court. the summary adjudication procedures delineated in Rule 42(a) are most likely inapplicable in this case since the power summarily to convict and punish for contempt of court under that rule generally "rests on the proposition that a hearing to determine guilt of contempt is not necessary when contumacious conduct occurs in the actual presence of a judge who observes it, and when immediate action is required to preserve order in the proceedings and appropriate respect for the tribunal." Smith v. Smith, 145 F.3d 335, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Chaplain, 621 F.2d 1272, 1275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980)). Here, the Court was not aware of any of the instances of the President's possible misconduct until well after this case had been dismissed on summary judgment, and immediate action was not required to preserve order in the proceedings. See International Union, United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1994) (noting that "[s]ummary adjudication becomes less justifiable once a court leaves the realm of immediately sanctioned, petty direct contempts," and that "[if] a court delays punishing a direct contempt until the completion of trial, for example, due process requires that the contemnor's rights to notice and a hearing be respected").
Second, resolving the matter expeditiously and without hearings pursuant to Rule 42(b) is in the best interests of both the President and this Court. Were the Court to delve into conduct which arguably was contumacious but which is not fully apparent from the record, this Court, as previously noted, would be required to hold hearings and take evidence, including, if necessary, testimony from witnesses. Such hearings could possibly last several weeks and might require referral of the matter to a prosecutor. See United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 997-98 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that when contumacious conduct occurs out of the presence of the court or does not interfere with ongoing proceedings immediately before the court, contempt power does not permit a judge to dispense with a prosecutor altogether and fill the role himself). Because much of the President's conduct has been or is being investigated by OIC, and in order to prevent any potential double jeopardy issues from arising, see, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (noting that protection of the double jeopardy clause applies to nonsummary criminal contempt prosecutions), this Court will forego proceeding under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 and address the President's contempt by focusing on those undisputed matters that are capable of being summarily addressed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833 (noting that certain indirect contempts are appropriate for imposition through civil procedings, including contempts impeding the courts ability to adjudicate the proceedings before it and those contempts involving discrete, readily ascertainable acts). (22)
Nevertheless, the Court will convene a hearing at the request of the President should he desire an opportunity in which to demonstrate why he is not in civil contempt of court, why sanctions should not be imposed, or why the Court is otherwise in error in proceeding in the manner in which it has. In that regard, the Court will stay enforcement of this Memorandum Opinion and Order for thirty (30) days from the date of its entry in which to give the President an opportunity to request a hearing or file a notice of appeal. In addition, the Court will entertain any legitimate and reasonable requests from the President for extensions of time in which to address the matter. Should the President fail to request a hearing or file a notice of appeal within the time allowed, the Court will enter an Order setting forth the time and manner by which the President is to comply with the sanctions herein imposed. Should the President succeed in obtaining a hearing, however, whether at his request or by way of appeal, any interests in an expeditious resolution of this matter and in sparing the President and this Court the turmoil of evidentiary hearings will no longer be a consideration. Accordingly, the President is hereby put on notice that this Court will take evidence at any future hearings -- including, if necessary, testimony from witnesses -- on all matters concerning the President's conduct in this lawsuit which may warrant a finding of civil contempt.
ardemgaz.com |
