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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: LindyBill who wrote (217045)8/26/2007 7:21:18 AM
From: unclewest  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793914
 
AQ and the Taliban should include US Army JAG officers in their bedtime prayers.

This is an important story! Some of us have previously discussed the potential intended and unintended consequences of something like this happening.

This looks like Bob Morasco's story reincarnate.

If a court-martial for finding, fixing, killing and destroying the enemy is the JSOC and USASOC version of "UW at the graduate level", my team would have flunked the course and would still be attending remedial rock breaking classes in Kansas. And I bet we would have lots of company.

UW

"The Army investigated the shooting twice.

An internal investigation was completed first, followed by a probe by the Army Criminal Investigations Command, still known as CID.

Waple was told that the CID investigation cleared both Special Forces soldiers.

But in June, the overall command over special operations in the region recommended charges of premeditated murder against Staffel and Anderson."

Much More at - fayobserver.com



To: LindyBill who wrote (217045)8/26/2007 1:18:31 PM
From: KLP  Respond to of 793914
 
Re Changing the Generals Did anyone notice the parallel to this statement: The problem, he said,[Lt Col Allen Gill] is that it’s hard for officers — hard for people in any profession — to switch their basic approach to life so abruptly. As Yingling put it in his article, “It is unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late 40s

And yet, isn't this EXACTLY what we are trying to get the Iraqi people to do....Just insert "Iraqi" in place of "officer" and you will see....

So is the Army any harder to change than the Iraqi mentality??



To: LindyBill who wrote (217045)8/26/2007 7:28:57 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793914
 
A good summary of where things stand on bottom-up change in the U.S. Army
THOMAS BARNETT
ARTICLE: "Challenging the Generals," by Fred Kaplan, New York Times Magazine, 26 August 2007, found online with email push from reader Tom Wade.

I get asked a lot of questions about how long it will take the U.S. government in general and the U.S. military in particular to adapt itself to the changes that lie ahead in this Long War, and I always reply that it's a generational thing.

In politics, it's getting past the 60s-soaked Boomers.

In business, we arrived about 12 years ago.

In military affairs, it's fair to say that there's a lot of guys who get it on top (like my "monks of war" Mattis and Petraeus), but the reality is, they're stuck with a presidential administration still operating with a neocon mindset that defines war solely within the context of war and largely ignores the everything else until it's forced upon them. Absent these political limitations, I know full well we have the talent on top of the military to run this Long War well. I've interacted with many of them for years, some across almost two decades. They are high quality and they're serious lifetime learners, as Wass de Czege implies in this article. The Cold War dinosaur flags I ran into in the early 1990s simply no longer exist, although way too many of them still opine on TV.

The real change generation (as it always is in the military) stands ready and willing and able at the 04-05-06 levels, with the big thing being, do the 06s (colonels/navy captains) make it into the flag ranks, or are they all crapped out by the system for their inconvenient truths?

Most important line in the piece says much to the same effect:

"Guys like Yingling, Nagl and McMaster are the canaries in the coal mine of Army reform," the retired two-star general I spoke with told me. "Will they get promoted to general? If they do, that's a sign that real change is happening. If they don't, that's a sign that the traditional culture still rules."

Now, of course, it's a bit more complicated than that. The right champion high up can push a lot of much needed new thinking into the flag ranks, so it's not just a matter of this popular handful getting through. What happens to the iconoclasts and thinkers up topside can be crucial as well. I'd like to see the right people shoved into the Joint Chiefs over the next few years, because without them, even if the Yinglings and Nagls and McMasters move up, the going will remain too tough for their innovative thinking to penetrate the system as far as it needs to go.

Right now we're at a potentially profound tipping point.

As the operational experience builds up, the training, the tactics, the doctrine all change. Soon that infiltrates the planning and the scenarios and they in turn start making things uncomfortable for the force structure efforts, because far too much in the pipeline is still built for another age. As those iffy programs lose connectivity to training, tactics, doctrine, planning, scenarios and the schoolhouses, their champions can no longer cite such logical bonds as validating their purchase.

And that's when things can really shift.

Why?

Once you become a flag, the most important thing you do is protect your service's cherished force structure plans from all comers. That's how you get the next star the vast majority of the time.

The radicals of the next generation won't be prone to this mindset. If they emerge, with some top cover from similar visionaries above, and hit the ranks just as the still, relatively united front of the Leviathan force structure mafia starts crumbling, then we're into a serious paradigm shift.

I believe that discomfort zone rapidly approaches, based more on my industry contacts than on my Pentagon ties (thus the basis of my optimism). The industry is moving off a future view of the world that says "what's good for the Leviathan is what keeps my company where it is or moving up." The "everything else" simply beckons far too strongly.

Once that industrial edifice begins to crumble, the capacity for the Nagls and Yiinglings and McMasters to foster system-wide change as flags really takes off.

But no, I don't base my thinking on any sacred, small collection of officers. I've known too many good ones over the years to fall into that trap.

But yeah, this group is special. The visionaries above them are just as special. And given the right correlation of forces, this ball will get moved very far, very fast.

thomaspmbarnett.com