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The Signs of Success in China's Taiwan Policy
September 27, 2007 16 33 GMT
Summary
The chairman of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Yu Shyi-kun, resigned his post following a disagreement with party leadership over the "normal country" resolution that will underlie the party's presidential platform for the 2008 elections. Yu was disappointed that the DPP softened the wording and left ambiguous whether the party will seek to change the name and constitution of Taiwan -- something that would pave the way to formal independence. The moderation of the DPP stance reflects the trend in Taiwan, but also signifies another success in mainland China's Taiwan strategy.
Analysis
Yu Shyi-kun, chairman of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), resigned Sept. 27 after the DPP leadership adopted a softer-line "normal country" resolution for its platform for the 2008 elections. Yu, who was expected to resign at the end of the month anyway because of a financial scandal, had supported a resolution that explicitly called for a name change from "Republic of China" to "Taiwan," and a new constitution. The DPP, however, backed off of such phrasing since it seeks to present a more moderate image in the elections.
The resignation emphasizes the difficulties facing the pro-independence movement in Taiwan, despite the continued rhetoric of President Chen Shui-bian and other DPP members. It also could reflect China's Taiwan policies, which have combined strong incentives for cooperation with even stronger threats of decisive action should Taiwan take one step too many -- a large portion of which are directed less at Taiwan than at the United States.
Chen has spent his two terms in office vociferously calling for constitutional reform and promoting "Taiwan identity" as well as national referendums on Taiwan's name and international status. In other words, he has promoted moves toward formal independence from mainland China. Despite the talk, however, Chen has been rather restrained in his action, taking steps that seem more designed to play up domestic politics and give Beijing heartburn than break the status quo and potentially incite a military response from China.
It is popular in Taiwan to support Taiwan's right to membership in international forums and declare that Taiwan should forge its own path, but risking either a cutoff of trade and business relations or a military strike from Beijing is not. And Chen has shown himself to be much more of a politician than a revolutionary. The DPP, Taiwan's pro-independence party, is proffering Frank Hsieh as its candidate for president in the 2008 elections, and he has made it a point to emphasize that he will not seek to strain relations with Beijing or incite Chinese military actions.
The moderation in the DPP line comes not only from domestic pressure (including the rise in the popularity of the opposition Nationalist Party, KMT), but also from increased diplomatic pressure from the United States. Washington has made it no secret that it is less than satisfied with Chen's more provocative statements and moves, emphasizing this by recently granting the traveling president stopover rights only in Alaska, rather than California or elsewhere in the lower 48 states.
The U.S. concern continues Washington's long-standing policy of keeping the Taiwan issue ambiguous -- encouraging the strengthening of Taiwan economically and militarily while discouraging a severing of the current status quo of "one China." In case Washington was not already planning to continue this line, Beijing has emphasized the risk of war even more intensely.
There was plenty of concern heading into 2007 that Taiwan would use China's preoccupation with the 2008 Olympics -- and its obsession with portraying a positive international image -- to declare independence, hoping that China would fail to act in order to preserve its international standing.
In response, Beijing has ramped up its own rhetoric against Taiwan. But whereas the past was marked by a steady drumbeat of war from China's top leadership, Beijing has played a more subtle game. It has acted as if it seriously wants to avoid war (not too far of a stretch, as Beijing knows that it cannot effectively take control of Taiwan militarily) and instead is publicly meeting with top Taiwanese opposition leaders and offering additional trade and travel privileges to the Taiwanese.
Privately, to U.S. politicians, military officials, bureaucrats and scholars, China is sending a well-coordinated message: Although the Chinese government does not want war or instability in its relations with Taiwan and would prefer regional and even international cooperation with the United States, Beijing is at the mercy of the hard-line factions in the military that will not hesitate to attack Taiwan.
The Chinese have let it be known that they have moved up their missile forces opposite Taiwan, have held war planning meetings with the military and high government officials, and have a clear plan to strike Taiwan with all of China's missile, aviation and naval assets -- even at the risk of having the Olympics taken away and suffering international condemnation and isolation. And since China knows the United States would get involved, Beijing effectively is saying it is prepared to go to war with the United States, even if it does not really want to.
This quiet resolve, echoed across the board by Chinese scholars and officials in casual meetings with foreign officials and researchers, has become the pervasive understanding of Chinese intent -- and further clarifies U.S. moves to stifle Taiwanese independence steps. It also comes back to the Taiwanese themselves, accounting for the move by both the DPP and the KMT toward a more centrist position regarding China.
But the longer Beijing promotes this policy, the fewer options it has should the unexpected occur. As long as Taiwan is not secure enough to challenge China and the United States seems inclined to avoid the possibility of an East Asian war, China can say whatever it wants.
Should a shift occur in the regional situation or an unexpected evolution in Taiwan or the United States take place, however, Beijing would be left with few viable options, despite decades of bluster. China can punish Taiwan, but it cannot conquer or integrate Taiwan -- and yet neither can a Chinese government allow Taiwan to simply separate officially. Thus, Beijing is working with the KMT as closely as it can to reach a new understanding, hoping the KMT will come to power either through elections or other means and restore the status quo. But one risk remains: As the main opposition party, the KMT currently has a very different set of goals than it would as Taiwan's ruling party.
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