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Strategies & Market Trends : The Epic American Credit and Bond Bubble Laboratory -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/29/2007 3:24:58 PM
From: Crimson Ghost  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
The Great Inflation FraudWhy does the government pretend prices aren't rising?
By Daniel Gross
Posted Saturday, Sept. 29, 2007, at 7:49 AM ET
Increased gas prices cause inflation, even if the Fed won't say so
Imagine that a cardiologist told you that aside from the irregular heartbeat, the stratospheric cholesterol count, and a little blockage in your aorta, your core heart functions are just fine. That's precisely what the government's cardiologist—Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve—has just done. The central bank is supposed to make sure the economy grows fast enough to create jobs and make everybody richer, but not so fast that it produces inflation, which makes everybody poorer. "Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year," the Federal Open Market Committee said in justifying its 50-basis-point interest-rate cut last month, while conceding that "some inflation risks remain."
Catch that bit about "core inflation"? That's Fedspeak for: Inflation is under control, unless you look at the costs of things that are going up. The core rate excludes the prices of food and energy, which can be volatile from month to month. Factor them in, and inflation is about as moderate as Newt Gingrich. In the first eight months of 2007, the consumer price index—the main gauge of inflation—rose at a 3.7 percent annual rate. That's more than 50 percent higher than the mild 2.3 percent core rate. The prices of energy and food are soaring, at 12.7 percent and 5.6 percent annual rates, respectively, and have been doing so for years. As a result, the CPI—including food and energy—has risen 12.6 percent since July 2003, for a compound rate of about 3 percent.
Signs of inflation are evident throughout the economy. When investors fear a rising inflationary tide, they latch onto the driftwood of gold. The day Bernanke cut rates, the price of the precious metal soared to heights not seen since 1980, when inflation ran at nearly 12 percent! I read about this in The Wall Street Journal (whose newsstand price rose 50 percent in July), which I picked up in the lobby of a New York hotel (where the average nightly rate soared 12.5 percent in the first seven months of 2007 from 2006, according to PKF Consulting), while sipping on a Starbucks Frappuccino (whose price has risen twice since last October).

There are sound macroeconomic reasons to believe higher inflation may be a fact of economic life, according to former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who discusses the topic in his new memoir, The Age of Turbulence. (Apparently, the editors killed the original title: The Dotcom Bubble Wasn't My Fault. Nor Was the Housing Bubble.) Greenspan notes that vast anti-inflationary forces in the 1990s—especially China's emergence as a low-cost producer of goods—helped tamp down prices. But China's rampant growth and rising living standards could encourage inflation. "China's wage-rate growth should mount, as should its rate of inflation," he writes.
Indeed. China's CPI leapt forward 6.5 percent between August 2006 and August 2007, the highest rate in 11 years. One of the main culprits? An 18.2 percent year-over-year increase in the price of food. In still-poor China, food expenditures account for 37 percent of the CPI, compared with 14 percent in the United States. In a recent paper, Albert Keidel of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace warns of China's "gathering inflation storm," powered in part by "explosive price increases in key consumer categories" like noodles and pork.
China is bound to export its inflation—it exports everything else, after all—either in the form of higher prices for toys or in higher global prices for the commodities it consumes in increasingly huge gulps. The Wall Street Journal noted that iron-ore producers are about to ask for a 50 percent price increase for 2008, thanks to rising demand from Chinese steelmakers. Chinese car sales are up 25 percent through August, which helps support oil prices.
In the United States, companies are passing along higher commodity and fuel costs by boosting prices, slashing portions, and tacking fuel surcharges onto things ranging from deliveries to lawn service. And because food and energy prices are so visible—the prices are posted in public, and consumers buy these goods frequently—price increases have a disproportionate impact on perceptions of inflation. Each month, the Conference Board asks consumers what they expect the rate of inflation will be for the next 12 months. The figure has been above 5 percent since April.
China's government is trying to deal with its inflation in predictably Orwellian fashion. "Beijing has instructed local provincial and urban statistical bureaus in a subtle form of denial—they are not to use the word 'inflation' to describe what is happening," notes Albert Keidel. It's easy to mock Beijing's clumsy bureaucrats. But by focusing on core inflation, the Federal Reserve—along with the legions of investors who reacted ecstatically to the interest-rate cut—is practicing its own subtle form of denial.



To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/29/2007 3:45:09 PM
From: pogohere  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 110194
 
My take: very interesting stuff: what he's getting at is that while credit theoretically may be expanded (and was with CDOs and other derivatives), if the underlying collateral is suspect, no one will extend the credit. They will insist on good collateral, which the author insists has to be Federal Reserve notes collateralized by T-bills, federal agency securities or gold. Since the T-bills and notes are in short supply, their prices will go up--even to the point of creating a negative interest rate on the T-bill, i.e., you pay to hold them, rather than receiving interest (this happened in Japan for a spell--people paid the gummint to hold their money). And so, in August '07, the T-bill yield began falling as there was a rush to less risky "money," as he says, down the pyramid of risk. He's arguing that the Fed has already lost the battle against deflation.

therefore, he says: "Regardless of statistical figures showing that the global money supply is increasing at an unprecedented rate, the hand-to-hand money supply may well be shrinking as hoarding demand for FR notes becomes voracious. The economy will be starved of hand-to-hand money. Depression follows deflation as night follows day."

Unsaid, but as sure as night follows day, if he's right, we will see gold treated as money at a time when the supply of money is deflating--and the gold price could well go beyond imagination.



To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/29/2007 4:49:30 PM
From: Elroy Jetson  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 110194
 
The Safe Haven piece which describes a growing preference for T Bills and currency over other types of "money supply" aka credit/debt raises interesting ideas . . .

. . . but I would describe it differently.

Credit is merely a mechanism to circulate existing money more quickly. Credit has greatly increased while money has not.

The remarkable rise in asset prices in recent years has been a result of an increase in debt, not money. You can increase asset prices by increasing debt levels, but neither of these actions increase the actual supply of real money. Repay, or fail to reissue, the debt and the asset prices decline.

This is why Ben Bernanke's fatuous hypothesis about the "worldwide savings glut" are so divorced from the underlying facts. I find it hard to believe he actually believes his own comments, and I have always wondered what motivated him to float this idea - or the more frightening idea that he actually does believe this concept straight from the mouth of the original "currency crank", John Law.

Its somewhat analogous to this Fed study.

Meet the typical American family.

It has about $3,800 in the bank. No one has a retirement account, and the neighbors who do only have about $35,000 in theirs. Mutual funds? Stocks? Bonds? Nope. The house is worth $160,000, but the family owes $95,000 on it to the bank. The breadwinners make more than $43,000 a year but can't manage to pay off a $2,200 credit card balance.
Very little money, and in the event of a contraction of debt - negative net worth.

washingtonpost.com

The situation of this typical American family is compounded by the shrinking capital reserves of the banking system coupled with the constrained growth of what the Fed calls "Permanent Reserves". Although some Monetarists will claim that all money is now debt, this is not actually how the banking system works, even today.

Perhaps these excerpts from "History of Monetary and Credit Theory from John Law to the Present Day" by Charles Rist [1938] can help some think about the difference between credit and money. While credit and money may seem nearly identical in most situations, during a period where there is a loss of confidence - they are not the same at all.

* * * * * * * * * * *
Confusion between Credit and Money

The use of the bank-note, as later that of the cheque, increases the credit capacity of banks by weaning the public from the habit of using coin. Thanks to this ingenious social device a large part of the sums deposited with the banker is used by him to grant credits to borrowers, while at the same time it remains at the disposal of its owners for making payments to each other. That is the entire "mystery" of credit.

But in all this there is no increase in money, there is merely a more rapid circulation of existing money. Henry Thornton, whose perceptions were very sharp, saw this quite clearly: "If at any given moment an inventory were made of the wealth of a society, the notes issued by the bank, included among the bearer's assets, are counterbalanced by commercial drafts among the liabilities of the signatory; credit and debit equal each other and cancel each other out." "The case of gold, on the other hand, differs from that of paper inasmuch as the possessor of gold takes credit for that which no man debits himself." 1

1 Henry Thornton: An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802) p.21.

But this velocity is not constant. It can increase or diminish, an that in two ways: either the minimum to which I have referred is raised, as the practice of resorting to credit becomes more widespread; here it is the velocity of circulation of the cash deposited with banks that increases - or, the velocity of circulation remaining the same for each unit of money delivered to the banks, the number of these units is increased, as the public resort more and more to the practice of concentrating their monetary resources at the banks. Here there is an increase in the velocity of circulation, not of the money placed in the banks, but of the total stock of money within the country.

The two phenomena may occur simultaneously, may strengthen each other, cancel each other out, or act in different directions. But they do not arise from the same causes. The second phenomenon is slow and steady in its working, the first displays rapid alternations of growth and decline, corresponding to phases of boom and slump, or to a prolonged rise or fall in prices. It is by far the more important. The second is of interest because, up to a certain point, it can compensate for an inadequate supply of precious metals. { More or less what the Fed today calls "Permanent Reserves" - Elroy }

The expression velocity of circulation, a favourite term among English writers, is, it is evident, full of ambiguities in its application to banking phenomena. It would be better to restrict its use to the movement of monetary units deposited at the banks, and to use the expression "concentration of coin in the banks" for what has been called the velocity of circulation of the total stock of money within the country.

It is possible to go still further, and to call the changes in the velocity given by the banks to the cash deposited with them simply an increase or decrease of banking credit.

The failure of John Law's unfortunate attempt to establish a bank of issue in France dominated the ideas of the eighteenth century about credit. His contention that to create money is to create wealth was vigorously rejected by all of his contemporaries. The efforts made in the course of the century by so many writers, including Smith, Hume, and Turgot, to reduce the role of money in the national economy to nothing or to insignificance, were directed against Law rather than against mercantilist ideas about money, which had already worn thin. Had not Law announced that an increase in the quantity of money was the only way of stimulating the national economy?

In the "Wealth of Nations" Adam Smith calls John Law's System "the most extravagant project both of banking and stock jobbing that, perhaps the world ever saw." (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk, II, Chapter II. Cannan edition, Vol. I, p. 301) The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have at times been less critical of Law. Certain passages written in restrained and reasonable manner are quoted as expressing the real essence of Law's thought. Actually, they are tactical concessions to the necessities of the moment.

It has also been said that he was an unrecognized forerunner, because certain bankers today have taken up some of his most debatable formulas. It would be more correct to regard these belated disciples as backsliders. The eighteenth century was not mistaken in its attitude. It saw through the fundamental confusion between credit and money that Law deliberately and persistently maintained throughout all of the vicissitudes of his tormented career. I would go further: credit had no interest for him except as a means of making the public familiar with paper money.

He was, it is true, influenced by banking experiences which are today completely forgotten, but to which he constantly refers, and which were bound to maintain that confusion. This has not been sufficiently stressed; but unless these experiences are borne in mind, there is a danger of not understanding his real thoughts.

The idea of a more economic use of the precious metals as the chief effect of the introduction of the bank-note ended by entirely dominating Adam Smith’s thought, and it did so because, in fact, he shared John Law's ideas as to the nature of money, and he believed that money is only "a voucher to purchase": "A guinea may be considered as a bill for a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniences upon all the tradesmen in the neighborhood" (Smith, Vol. I, p. 274) Is this not the equivalent of the quotation from Law given below?

"Money is not the value for which goods are exchanged, but the value by which they are exchanged. The use of money is to buy goods and precious metals while money is of no other use." --

"I consider an écu itself merely as a note drawn up in these terms: Any seller whatsoever will give to the bearer the goods or merchandise which he needs up to the value of three livres, as for other goods or merchandise, and bearing as signature the portrait of the prince or another public mark."

John Law "Lettre sur le Nouveau Système des Finances, 1720"

The identity of thought between John Law and Adam Smith has not been sufficiently noted. It is however, fundamental, and explains many of the errors in English currency theory in the following century.

Like Law, Smith does not regard money as a durable good whose chief function is to store up for the future the value of goods and services sold; he completely forgets its function of saving, as Walras was to call it (which becomes more important as commercial activity increases); he ignores its function of providing a bridge between the present and the future, which is the part it plays at all times, and the most important part; he can see in it only a voucher to purchase in the present, an instrument for distributing goods, not a means of conservation. Hence that long and tedious chapter (Smith, Vol. I, p. 275) in which he tries painfully to explain that money is part of the capital and not the income of society, and which ends in the characteristic passage:

"Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part and a very valuable part of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the society to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is composed, in the course of their annual circulation, distributes to every man the revenue which properly belongs to him, they make themselves no part of that revenue." (Smith, Vol. I, p.275)

If, indeed, metallic money is not income, if it is only a costly "instrument," then obviously any economy in its use is of advantage. But it is precisely here where the mistake lies.

Nevertheless, this idea was seized upon by with extraordinary alacrity and found high favour. Taken up by Ricardo and adopted by Count Mollien and J.-B. Say, it dominated the thought of English writers in the nineteenth century. The belief that the use of metallic money is a retrograde and costly system, to be discouraged by all possible means, is firmly fixed in British thought on currency and banking.

This is in harmony with the remarkable qualities displayed by the English as bankers. The art if utilising to the maximum the coin deposited with them, and of developing all methods of credit, has nowhere been carried so far as at London. But, in admitting their ability in this, the application of Smith's idea, held by so many after him, led the English to under-estimate the importance of a large stock of money to support a vast edifice of credit. The same conception was responsible for serious mistakes in English monetary policy, mistakes which were pointed out by such far-sighted writers Thornton and Tooke, and later Hartley Withers.
* * * * * * * * * * *

Unfortunately these same flawed concepts inform much of our banking system today, and we are beginning to experience the inevitable problems these concepts create.
.



To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/29/2007 8:07:38 PM
From: skinowski  Respond to of 110194
 
I cannot understand what he says. What it comes down to, it seems, is that it is possible to have a severe inflation in prices as measured in a certain currency -- while, at the same time, having prices significantly deflate - when measured against a certain "safer" incarnation of the very same currency.

Not sure whether such a thing ever occurred in the real world. This article in Wiki lists numerous examples when national paper currencies went kaput... and there appears to be not a single case when it made any difference whether one was in possession of the "foldable" physical form of the unraveling currency, or its "electronic" equivalent. If they went down, they both went down.

en.wikipedia.org

Unless, of course, as I said, I don't understand.... :)



To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/30/2007 1:26:52 PM
From: ggersh  Respond to of 110194
 
IMHO....basically money in the pocket is good...non inflationary....all electronic money i.e. LDO,.. CDO....and money created with all the leverage is Hyper -inflation....



To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/30/2007 5:16:36 PM
From: Haim R. Branisteanu  Respond to of 110194
 
Well it is quite simple and true and something including AG warned long time ago.

1. it is the velocity of money in the system v. the settlement of transactions which is few days but the credit / debit is issued electronically instantly. (running stocks on a intraday basis would be a great example)

2. the other part is the leveraged transaction of a variety of financial instruments which is based on the "faith" that the counter party will honor it's obligation and there will always a buyer in case of forced liquidation (which was proven untrue in the recent subprime debacle)

Best example are currencies or treasuries which can be leveraged 20 to 50 times without problems even by a small investor

in the two examples above the actual "paper money" stays the same but the pyramids and the inherent risk when ignored results in a phantom wealth until marked to market or settlement which is inflationary.

If financial institution were not the intermediaries and all transaction would be cash based I could not buy with $10,000 - 500,000 AUD on the assumption that I will return the 500,000 AUD upon demand

(I tried to be very simplistic to get the message trough – so the explanation has many remarks to be added to)



To: orkrious who wrote (87081)9/30/2007 5:19:30 PM
From: Haim R. Branisteanu  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
Related - UBS To Announce 3Q Loss Projection Monday -Sources

By Jason Singer, Carrick Mollenkamp and Randall Smith
Of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Swiss banking giant UBS AG (UBS) is expected to report a large loss from its fixed income division for the third quarter Monday, according to people familiar with the situation.

UBS, in total, is projecting a third-quarter loss of CHF600 million to CHF700 million based on a writedown of CHF3 billion to CHF4 billion for fixed income assets, other people familiar with the matter said.

(This story and related background material will be available on The Wall Street Journal Web site, WSJ.com.)

The bank is reporting the fixed income loss ahead of its third-quarter results, which are due Oct. 30. The bank in August told investors that the third quarter would be difficult if credit markets continued to struggle.

Its losses resulted from applying sharply lower market values to asset-backed bonds, after it took a conservative view of where these securities will be trading for the near term, according to people close to the matter. Many banks had serious troubles with securities tied to mortgages when liquidity dried up in the last quarter.

The bank came up with the loss report for its fixed-income division, which includes asset-backed bonds, including those underpinned by U.S. mortgages. A spokesman at UBS headquarters in Zurich declined to comment.

UBS in July ousted its chief executive after shuttering an in-house hedge fund Dillon Read Capital Management that experienced losses on many of the same fixed-income products. The newly appointed CEO, Marcel Rohner, said shortly after taking control that he would pursue a more conservative strategy, limiting growth of UBS's investment bank.

In August, when UBS reported second-quarter profit, the bank flagged that more problems loomed when it said that if difficult market conditions continued through the third quarter, profit from trading stocks and bonds would be weak and lead to lower second-half profit.

On Friday, UBS shares rose 0.72% to CHF62.60. UBS shares have fallen 15.5% this year.

The latest losses are in part a result of continued costs of writing off Dillon Read Capital Management's soured mortgage bets, but they are also a result of other securities held by the fixed-income division. The release coincides with the first day of the fourth quarter.


By Jason Singer, Carrick Mollenkamp, Randall Smith and Edward Taylor, The Wall Street Journal