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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: TimF who wrote (357447)11/7/2007 4:45:32 PM
From: TimF  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574854
 
Living Space per household and per person. US average and average for US considered poor (below the poverty line) compared to European averages.

heritage.org



To: TimF who wrote (357447)11/7/2007 9:40:13 PM
From: Taro  Respond to of 1574854
 
As far as I recall, the 1% highest earners in the US (340k$ and up) pay 40% of the total taxes.

Worthwhile mentioning here I guess.

Taro



To: TimF who wrote (357447)11/8/2007 1:33:07 AM
From: tejek  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1574854
 
I've had enough.....its time to put your nonsense to bed:

The Question of European Growth and the Myth of Stagnant Europe

Before addressing the challenges facing Europe, and the necessity of a strong, transformed EU to realize its potential role in the world, the vision of the liberals must be examined more closely. The issue of a growing economic divergence between the US and Europe is the centrepiece of the liberal/US demand for economic reform in Europe. Nevertheless, the claim that the US economy is leaving Europe behind is typically exaggerated and even distorted. The myth of the US as a dynamic powerhouse and Europe as a stagnant ‘sick man’ stems from long-standing ideological positions that continue to rely unreflectively on superficial headline data. While an exhaustive treatment of this issue lies beyond the possibilities of this short analysis, we will focus on some of the key points. Much of this debate fixates on recent economic and productivity growth. GDP growth in the US for the year ending in March came in at 5% compared with only 1.3% in the euro zone, fueling the short-term media emphasis on US dynamism and European paralysis. In the three years to the end of 2004, the US will have experienced growth of 2.2% (2002), 3.1% (2003) and 4.1% (2004), while the euro zone will have lagged significantly behind (0.9%, 0.4%, and 1.7%, respectively). In the ten years to 2003, the US averaged annual growth of 3.3% compared with a more modest 2.1% in euro zone. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that headline GDP figures exaggerate the US’s relative performance. A recent report in The Economist (‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall’ June
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Área: Europe - ARI Nº 117/2004 Fecha 07/05/2004 19, 2004) demonstrates that, in per capita terms, the divergence is not nearly as large: per capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2.1% in the US during the ten years to 2003, and at 1.8% in the euro zone.
Furthermore, all of this adjusted underperformance can be explained by Germany. Stripping Germany from the numbers yields an average annual per capita GDP growth for the other two-thirds of the euro zone of 2.1% –exactly in line with the US–. If the UK were a member of EMU, The Economist argues, the picture would look even more positive for the euro zone. Moreover, during the last three years, at least, much of this growth difference can be accounted for by the diverging macroeconomic policy stances in the US and the euro zone. According to OECD data cited by Martin Wolf in a recent analysis in the Financial Times (‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’, June 15, 2004), since 2000 the US’s structural budget deficit has increased by nearly six percentage points of GDP. Meanwhile, the euro zone has experienced no net fiscal stimulus, with its structural deficit remaining below 2% of GDP, compared with a structural deficit of nearly 5% in the US. Monetary policy has also been relaxed much more rapidly and significantly in the US than in Europe during the last three years.

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To: TimF who wrote (357447)11/8/2007 1:38:55 AM
From: tejek  Respond to of 1574854
 
Europe -potential output growth.

This is where the critique of Europe has recently been the most severe. The most frequent claim in this regard has been that US labour productivity growth, after having lagged behind Europe during the 1980s, has rocketed ahead of Europe in the last ten years, as the US economy has experienced a more profound IT revolution, presumably due to the US economy’s superior flexibility. This story, which finds fertile ground in US and liberal circles, at least appears to be supported by the numbers. The OECD forecasts US potential output per employee to grow 2.1% a year from 1997 to 2005, compared with only 1.3% in the euro zone, and 2.5% annually in 2006-09 (versus 1.5% in the euro zone). Much criticism of European productivity performance focuses on this measure of output per worker. A more accurate reflection of labour productivity, however, is to be found in the measure of output per hour worked. In the US, this measure is only published for the non-farm business sector; during the last ten years, this has grown by an average annual 2.6% in the US. Applying the European measure of GDP per hour worked across the entire economy (including the public sector), one finds that US productivity has risen at an average annual rate of only 2.0%, only modestly faster than the euro zone’s 1.7% annual average over the last ten years. According to a study by Kevin Daly of Goldman Sachs (also cited in the above mentioned Economist analysis), adjusting still further for differences in the two zone’s economic cycles, trend productivity growth in the euro zone has even been slightly higher (1.8%) than in US over the last ten years (1.7%). Indeed, over the last 20-plus years, the euro zone’s productivity level, measured in terms of output per hour worked, has increased from less than 80% of the US level to just over 95%.

The claims of such critics of Europe only become credible at all if we concentrate on the most recent period since the early days of the US boom (which, incidentally, corresponded to an unprecedented period of macroeconomic stabilization and other challenges for the euro zone, including the final push to meet the Maastricht fiscal and inflation criteria, the launch of the euro and the creation of the ECB). Only taking 1997 as the base year does US trend productivity growth come in faster than that of the euro zone. It is quite telling that most of the major US macroeconomic imbalances more or less date from this period, and have not been corrected for even despite the recession and the rapid appearance of yet another major imbalance: the large US budget deficit. In essence, US economic managers used their accumulated macroeconomic flexibility to engineer a relatively shallow and short recession, but only at the price of further magnifying their economy’s macroeconomic disequilibria, thus making the international economy far more imbalanced than at any time since the mid-1980s.

Again, this is not to say that Europe has been absolved of any responsibility; indeed, this situation has created a European imperative –that of faster growth (more on this in Part II, The Necessity of Europe)–. Conclusions: Despite these reasonable adjustments to the headline figures, however, it is still impossible to deny that the average person in the euro zone remains about 30% poorer than the average person in US (measured in terms of GDP per capita on a PPP basis). Moreover, this gap has hardly changed in the last three decades. Therefore, even if it can be shown that there has been very little real divergence –if any– between the US and the euro zone, it cannot be denied that even the maintenance of similar per capita growth rates implies that euro zone inhabitants will remain with lower living standards than Americans. However, it should be stressed that this fact is not new –thus relieving the recent Timbro report of much of its intended drama of demonstrating that Germany is no richer than Arkansas, the US’s fourth poorest state–. Perhaps more drama would be provided by the data on Arkansas’s Gini coefficient, its poverty and crime rates –or for that matter, by the same data from the other 46 richer US states–.

Paul Isbell 5Senior Analyst, Real Instituto Elcano

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