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To: SARMAN who wrote (247781)11/8/2007 2:14:06 PM
From: Ruffian  Respond to of 281500
 
Wahhabism..................? U are ashamed Pharo?



To: SARMAN who wrote (247781)11/8/2007 2:18:12 PM
From: Ruffian  Respond to of 281500
 
FBI Hoped to Follow Falafel Trail to Iranian Terrorists Here
By Jeff Stein, CQ National Security Editor

Like Hansel and Gretel hoping to follow their bread crumbs out of the forest, the FBI sifted through customer data collected by San Francisco-area grocery stores in 2005 and 2006, hoping that sales records of Middle Eastern food would lead to Iranian terrorists.

The idea was that a spike in, say, falafel sales, combined with other data, would lead to Iranian secret agents in the south San Francisco-San Jose area.

The brainchild of top FBI counterterrorism officials Phil Mudd and Willie T. Hulon, according to well-informed sources, the project didn’t last long. It was torpedoed by the head of the FBI’s criminal investigations division, Michael A. Mason, who argued that putting somebody on a terrorist list for what they ate was ridiculous — and possibly illegal.

A check of federal court records in California did not reveal any prosecutions developed from falafel trails.

FBI spokesman Paul Bresson would neither confirm nor deny that the bureau ran such data mining, or forward-leaning “domain management,” experiments, but said he would continue to investigate. “It sounds pretty sensational to me,” he said, upon his initial review of the allegation. The techniques were briefly mentioned last year in a PBS Frontline special, “The Enemy Within”.

Mason, who is leaving the FBI to become security chief for Verizon, could not be reached for comment.

The FBI denies that sifting through consumer spending habits amounted to the kind of data mining that caused an uproar when the Pentagon was exposed doing it in 2002.

“Domain management has been portrayed by the bureau as a broad analytic approach, not specific data mining activities,” says Amy Zegart, author of the much-praised recent book, “Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11.” “It is a methodology to determine what is known about a problem, develop indices to measure it, and take steps to close knowledge gaps.”

Zegart said her recent interviews with FBI officials “suggest that domain management has been implemented in a spotty fashion; L.A. and New York appear to be ahead of the curve, but some other field offices are not using it and at least one had never heard of it.”

As ridiculous as it sounds, the groceries counting scheme is a measure of how desperate the FBI is to disrupt domestic terrorism plots.

The possibility of Iranian-sponsored terrorism in the United States has drawn major attention from the FBI because of rising tensions between Washington and Tehran over Iran’s nuclear program.

“Because of the heightened difficulties surrounding U.S.-Iranian relations, the FBI has increased its focus on Hezbollah,” Bresson said 16 months ago. “Those investigations relate particularly to the potential presence of Hezbollah members on U.S. soil.”

Just this week, analyst Matthew Levitt wrote that “according to FBI officials here, some 50-100 Hamas and Hezbollah members with military training are present in the United States.” An FBI spokesman would not confirm that figure.

But others are far more circumspect, including U.S. intelligence.

Last July’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on terrorism trends addressed the potential for Iranian subversion here in such cautionary terms that it was rendered useless.

“We assess [Iran-backed] Lebanese Hezbollah, which has conducted anti-U.S. attacks outside the United States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran,” the [NIE] said. (Italics added.)

In other words, who knows?

Nobody.
Calling Cassandra

A veteran CIA operative with vast Middle East experience chuckled about the wobbly NIE over a sandwich a few weeks ago.

Nobody knows what Iranian capabilities are outside of its base in Lebanon, he said, crumpling a thick white napkin.

On the other hand, he said, “There are a million Iranians living in California, and not all of them are royalists.”

Thousands of Iranians fled to the United States when the U.S.-backed shah of Iran was overthrown in the radical Islamic revolution in 1979. In the immediate years after, the regime’s agents followed, assassinating a handful of former officials in exile.

Today it seems logical that in the flood of Iranian refugees here, there would be at least a few, and perhaps many more, terrorists or spies.

But less than a handful have been arrested over the past 25 years.

Hezbollah and Hamas (also backed by Syria) have kept mostly to their own backyards, with the notable exception of a 1994 bombing of a Buenos Aires synagogue, which was traced to Tehran. While fiery calls for launching attacks inside the United States remains a guaranteed applause line in Iran’s mosques, so far cooler heads have prevailed.

In the face of that reality, however, one camp of terrorism analysts has been predicting attacks here for years, even decades, with nothing to show for it.

As far back as June 1985, the late terrorism analyst Robert Kupperman was quoted by Time as saying, “If we hit Iran, there is certain to be terrorism in the U.S.”

According to Israeli-born Youssef Bodansky, director of the conservative-backed Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Iran already had a terrorist network in place here in the early 1980s.

It “included safe houses in major cities, weapons, ammunition, money, systems to provide medical and legal aid, false identity papers, and intelligence for the operatives,” Bodansky said in a widely circulated 1993 Associated Press report. It was “large and spanned the United States.”

The FBI was unable to find any of it.

Two years later, in February 1995, Bodansky’s Task Force was back with another warning widely circulated by the news media.

“Iranian sources confirmed Tehran’s desire and determination to strike inside the U.S. against objects symbolizing the American government in the near future,” it said,

But again there were no FBI round-ups.

Only about a dozen Iranians in the United States have been arrested over the years, mostly in connection with small-time fund raising scams on behalf of Hamas, which included drug peddling, scalping cheap North Carolina cigarettes in New York and counterfeiting Viagra.

But that doesn’t mean serious subversives aren’t here, says Walid Phares, director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington.

“The threat coming from the Iranian regime is not only through its agents inserted in the Iranian exiled community, but also from infiltration of other communities, such as the Syrian and Lebanese as well,” he said.

“The penetration of the Iranian community by . . . Iranian agencies targets the older Iranian-American groups,” he added, “that is, immigrants, as well as those who consider themselves political exiles.”

Traditionally, he continued, all totalitarian states make sure to penetrate exile communities, including “let alone the Iranian one.”

Perhaps the most influential Cassandra on Iran’s alleged subversion here is Steven Emerson, the Washington-based author of several terrorism-related books, the founder of the Investigative Project on Terrorism and MSNBC’s security analyst.

“As far as the existing Hezbollah threat,” Emerson told me by e-mail last week, “it is being taken very seriously by the FBI. I agree that there is a major threat here, if a green light is given [in Tehran]. Hezbollah and their supporters have been collecting intel on possible targets for years here.”

One of Hezbollah’s major supporters, Emerson said, is the Muslim Student Association-Persian Speaking Group, centered at Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton. In 1999 then-FBI Director Louis Freeh said it was “comprised almost exclusively of fanatical, anti-American, Iranian Shi’ite Muslims.”

An e-mailed request for comment from the MSA-PSG went unanswered.
Pitching to Iranians

“L.A. Is a Den of Iranian Intrigue and Ambition,” a Los Angeles Times headline trumpeted in 2005. “U.S. agents tap an incongruous mix of exiles for intelligence on Tehran.”

Federal and California law enforcement officials haven’t been able to find the right mix of pitches to the state’s large number of Iranians, estimated at somewhere between 159,016 (the latest U.S. Census) and more than 500,000 (the unofficial Iranian diplomatic mission in Washington).

Community leaders have frequently complained that, since 9/11, any Muslim is considered a terrorist suspect. Some Iranians have complained of heavy-handed efforts by the FBI to turn them into informants. They say they constantly have to “prove” their loyalty to their adopted country to authorities and their neighbors.

Michael P. Downing, commander of the Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau of the Los Angeles Police Department, reflected law enforcement’s dilemma in testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee last week.

“In contrast to much of Europe, which has suffered from [homegrown terrorism], the problem we face in the U.S is mainly political,” Downing said in his Oct. 30 statement.

“There are those among us, I call them political jihadists, who are attempting to create division, alienation, and a sense of persecution in Muslim communities in order to create a cause,” he said. “They are the nemesis of community engagement. Their purpose is to create the conditions that facilitate the radicalization process for international political causes.

“Law enforcement`s ultimate goal,” Downing continued, “is to engender the continued loyalty and good citizenship of American-Muslims — not merely disrupt terrorist activities.

“Let me be clear. I am not saying that law enforcement should relax its effort to hunt down and neutralize small numbers of ‘clusters’ on the criminal side of the radicalization trajectory. That task remains, and must be done with precision and must also be carried out in the context of what is ultimately valuable,” Downing said.

And then he posited the question that domestic counterterrorism agencies have yet to answer.

”What good is it to disrupt a group planning a mall bombing,” Downing said, “if the enforcement method is so unreasonable that it is widely criticized and encourages many more to enter the radicalization process?”

The falafel flap was just such a ploy.

Jeff Stein can be reached at jstein@cq.com.

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To: SARMAN who wrote (247781)11/8/2007 2:22:48 PM
From: Ruffian  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
The Good & the Bad
Stephen Schwartz on Islam and Wahhabism.

A Q&A by Kathryn Jean Lopez

tephen Schwartz, an author and journalist, is author of The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror. A vociferous critic of Wahhabism, Schwartz is a frequent contributor to National Review, The Weekly Standard, and other publications.

Kathryn Jean Lopez: What is Wahhabism?

Stephen Schwartz: Wahhabism is an extremist, puritanical, and violent movement that emerged, with the pretension of "reforming" Islam, in the central area of Arabia in the 18th century.



It was founded by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who formed an alliance with the house of Saud, in which religious authority is maintained by the descendants of al-Wahhab and political power is held by the descendants of al-Saud: This is the Wahhabi-Saudi axis, which continues to rule today. From its beginning, Wahhabism declared the entirety of existing Islam to be unbelief, and traditional Muslims to be unbelievers subject to robbery, murder, and sexual violation. Wahhabism has always viewed Shia Muslims genocidally, as non-Muslims worthy of annihilation. Wahhabism has always attacked the traditional, spiritual Islam or Sufism that dominates Islam in the Balkans, Turkey, Central Asia, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Wahhabism and neo-Wahhabism (the latter being the doctrines of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Pakistani Islamists) are the main source of Islamic extremist violence in the world today. Wahhabism represents a distinct, ultraradical form of Islamism. Wahhabism is completely subsidized by the Saudi regime, using oil income.

Wahhabism has always maintained a two-faced policy regarding the West. It has always depended on the armed forces of the Christian nations — Britain, the U.S., and France — to secure its domination in the Arabian peninsula, while it violently attacks Jews, Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists, as well as traditional Sunnis, Sufis, and Shias, throughout the rest of the world. Thus, the presence of U.S. troops guarding the Saudis did not begin with the Gulf War in 1991. From 1946 to 1962 the U.S. maintained an airbase in Saudi Arabia, and before that the British assisted the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance against the Ottomans. When the Saudis needed to clear the Grand Mosque in Mecca of protestors in 1979, they employed French paratroops to kill Muslims within the walls of the mosque.

Lopez: How widespread is it?

Schwartz: Wahhabism is official in Saudi Arabia. It is influential in Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. It has a substantial following in Yemen, which also has many Shia Muslims. It is unpopular in Bahrain and irrelevant in Oman.

Outside the Peninsula, Wahhabism is generally unpopular. But where trouble is found, Wahhabism may thrive. Hamas in Israel represents pure Wahhabism. Forms of neo-Wahhabi or Wahhabized ideology have been powerful in Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood) and in Pakistan — in both countries neo-Wahhabis lead attacks on other Muslims and other faiths. But in both countries mainstream Muslim scholars continue to struggle against Wahhabism. Wahhabi aggression was defeated in Algeria and Tajikistan.

Wahhabi infiltration continues in Chechnya, to the detriment of the just struggle of the Chechens against Russian imperialism, and in Kashmir, where it is an obstacle to resolution of the conflict. Wahhabi extremism and terrorism continue to plague Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, although its real supporters in these countries are few in number.

But Wahhabi infiltration failed in Bosnia-Hercegovina and suffered a smashing repudiation in Kosovo. Albanian Muslims in Macedonia and Albania dislike Wahhabism, more intensely in the former than in the latter. Wahhabism and its surrogate, the Deobandi ideology of the Taliban, has been defeated in Afghanistan. Wahhabism has no real following in among the Muslim masses in Francophone West Africa, Morocco, Libya, the rest of Central Asia, India, or Malaysia.

As to other Middle Eastern regions and states: Saddam Hussein has used Wahhabism to give his regime an Islamic cover, but Wahhabism is deeply unpopular in Iraq.

Kurdistan is mainly Sufi in its Islam and aside from a handful of mercenary extremists, Kurds reject Wahhabism.

Syria, although a radical Arab state, is Islamically pluralist and rejects Wahhabism completely.

Jordan is ruled by Hashemites, who are traditional enemies of Wahhabism.

Turkish Muslims loathe Wahhabism because of its role in subverting the Ottoman caliphate.

Iran loathes Wahhabism as much or more, because of its massacres of Shias and wholesale destruction of Islamic holy sites, among other issues.

And other trouble spots: Sudan is a case unto itself, although Wahhabi influence has been present in the Khartoum regime.

Wahhabi infiltration is a serious problem in East Africa.

In the Western European immigrant Muslim communities, Wahhabism has a presence in France but has been weakened by the atrocities in Algeria. Britain has a loud Wahhabi, neo-Wahhabi, and Wahhabi-wannabe element but little real support for it among local Muslims. Wahhabism and Islamic extremism in general are weak in Germany, where most Muslims are Turkish and Kurdish.

Lopez: How much of a threat is it within our borders?

Schwartz: Unfortunately, the U.S. is the only country outside Saudi Arabia where the Islamic establishment is under Wahhabi control. Eighty percent of American mosques are Wahhabi-influenced, although this does not mean that 80 percent of the people who attend them are Wahhabis. Mosque attendance is different from church or synagogue membership in that prayer in the mosque does not imply acceptance of the particular dispensation in the mosque. However, Wahhabi agents have sought to impose their ideology on all attendees in mosques they control.

The entire gamut of "official" Islamic organizations in the U.S., particularly the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) are Wahhabi fronts. In other such groups, like the American Muslim Council (AMC) and the Muslim Students Association (MSA) Wahhabism is in crisis, because of the devastating effect of 9/11. In addition, the Wahhabis are deeply compromised by the exposure of individuals like John Walker Lindh, Richard Reid, José Padilla, and John Muhammad.

Lopez: Why were 15 of the 19 9/11 terrorists from Saudi Arabia?

Schwartz: For three reasons.

First, although no more than 40 percent of Saudi subjects, at the most, consider themselves Wahhabis, the Wahhabi clergy has controlled education in the kingdom, so that all subjects have been raised in an atmosphere of violent hatred for other Islamic traditions and for the other faiths.

Second, the Saudi regime is undergoing a deep social crisis and movements of protest have been diverted by the ultra-Wahhabi faction of the royal family, toward support of Bin Laden and his gangsters.

Third, the main object of protest in the kingdom is the flagrant hypocrisy between Wahhabi Puritanism and Saudi royal decadence. Although the majority of young people want to be free of Wahhabism altogether, there remains a section of the populace that reacts — as it always has — to Saudi hypocrisy by a flight into ultraradicalism.

The involvement of 15 Saudis out of 19 hijackers reflects an inevitable outcome of Wahhabi ideology, not a special tactic by Osama bin Laden.

Lopez: Why does Saudi Arabia seem to not have to answer for its citizens' roles in the 9/11 attack. Why is it not subject to closer scrutiny?

Schwartz: Cheap gas, a.k.a. "big oil."

Lopez: If Wahhabism is not Islam, why aren't more Muslims vocally renouncing the Wahhabists?

Schwartz: Nobody can say that Wahhabism or any other form of Muslim religious radicalism, is "not Islam," anymore than one can say that one or another extreme element in Judaism or Christianity do not belong to those faiths. Islam includes many strains. Over 1,000 years, pluralism within the faith was the norm, and traditional Muslims shied away from arguing that what they disliked was "not Islam," or that Muslims they opposed were "unbelievers." But with the rise of Wahhabism and, particularly, the benefits of petrodollars, the Wahhabi-Saudis have arrogated to themselves a position of leadership in the world Islamic community or umma. Their claim of preeminence is not Islamically sound, in the opinion of many scholars.

Leading Muslims outside the U.S. denounce Wahhabism, and many denounced the atrocity of 9/11. Unfortunately, however, most of U.S. media is completely incompetent in finding, listening to, or understanding these voices. U.S. media does not interview anti-Wahhabi sheikhs or imams or muftis in the Islamic world. U.S. media paid no attention when the head of Bosnian Islamic scholars, Mustafa efendija Ceric, preached eloquently against terrorism. U.S. media did not notice when an Albanian daily — in a country with a Muslim majority — hailed the U.S. action in Afghanistan last year with the headline "Nobody Veils the Statue of Liberty's Face." Nobody in the U.S. media has followed up on reports by myself and others showing that Kosovar Albanian Muslims would like to fight for the West in Iraq. Worse, U.S. media has reported very little of the mobilization of 70 million Indonesian Muslims against extremism in the aftermath of the Bali horror.

U.S. media listens to the so-called "Arab street," which is essentially irrelevant, filled as it is with yelling loiterers, or engages in polling exercises asking loaded questions. This, of course, reinforces the view of Muslims as unanimous haters of the West and America. To understand the struggle of the world's traditional Muslims against Wahhabism, you have to get away from the "Arab street" and meaningless people wandering around. You have to sit down with serious Islamic clerics and thinkers and dialogue with them in a way they understand and respect. I did this in the Balkans. This is one of several reasons I never tire of pointing out that, just as Orwell went to Spain, not Russia, to understand Stalinism, I went to Sarajevo, not Riyadh, to learn about Wahhabism.

I have never seen a single serious interview with an Islamic religious figure on Western television. This is in itself a shocking fact. Of course, first an interviewer would have to know who to interview and what questions to ask. But if you don't know who or what to ask you have no business proclaiming how much of the Islamic world hates us and supports terror. Proper media coverage of Islam, meaning the views of serious clerics and intellectuals, seems unlikely to happen in a media industry where Barbara Walters remains transfixed by Saudi princes handing out charity and Bill O'Reilly preens himself by referring to Islam as "the enemy's religion." In the wars with Japan and Vietnam, Buddhism was the religion of much of the enemy, but we never saw wholesale smears against Buddhists in the U.S. public square.

Of course, for much of the media, the primitive and simplistic image of Muslims as uniformly extremist and terrorist is easier to report, more popular, and "better TV" than that of a complex conflict inside a world religion. It also supports the left-wing claim that it's all our fault, or Israel's. It's so much easier to say they all hate us because of our hegemony and Zionism than to say, as I do, that they don't all hate us, and that the real issue is the battle for the soul of Islam.

As for the situation in the U.S., condemnation of Wahhabism and even of terrorism have been sparse for the following reasons:

Wahhabis (CAIR, etc.) are granted status by U.S. media as the main Islamic spokespeople. They issue ameliorative statements intended to end discussion of the problem, and they closely watch the community and prevent traditional Muslims from expressing themselves openly about Wahhabism and its involvement with terrorism. The U.S. media let them get away with this.

Most immigrant Muslims in the U.S. came to this country to get away from extremism and are horrified to see that their faith is in extremist hands here. They believed, before coming here, that the U.S. government would never permit such a thing to happen. However, their children are often indoctrinated and radicalized by extremists operating through Muslim schools, Islamic Sunday schools, and radical campus groups. That the U.S. government turned a blind idea to the Wahhabization of American Islam is deeply shocking and disturbing for them. They feel intimidated and defeated. The fact that the U.S. political and media elite have done almost nothing to enable traditional Muslims in this country to oppose Wahhabism makes the situation that much worse.

Traditional Islam rejected involvement in politics, especially radical politics. For this reason also, traditional Muslims in this country have been slow to rally against Wahhabi influence.

Finally, traditional Muslims in this country and around the world were devastated by 9/11. Their reaction was one of shock, horror, and deep depression. Even many of those who tried to deny Muslim involvement in 9/11 did so because the alternative, admitting the role of terrorism in Islam today, was almost inconceivable. This is not because of agreement with the terrorists, but because of revulsion from them. Islam may not appear as "the religion of peace" to others, but most ordinary Muslims believe it is such. The evidence of 9/11 was so overwhelmingly negative many of them can best be described as profoundly demoralized.

Lopez: How would you like to see the U.S. deal with Saudi Arabia?

Schwartz: First, we have to demand, and obtain, from the Saudi authorities, a thorough and transparent accounting of Wahhabi-Saudi involvement in 9/11 — the ideological background, funding, recruitment — everything. This is indispensable for our own moral health.

Second, we have to demand that the Saudi state cut off all support for the international export of Wahhabi extremism.

Third, we have to support traditional Muslims in their efforts to oppose Wahhabi influence and restore theological pluralism within Islam.

Lopez: How can the U.S. deal with the Wahhabism within its borders?

Schwartz: First, the Saudi embassy must be informed that all support for Wahhabi extremist activity, including mosques and schools, in the U.S. must end. Wahhabi hatemongering institutions like the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America (IIASA), in Fairfax, Va. and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Alexandria, Va., as well as the U.S. office of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), should be shut down completely. Their assets should be seized and their facilities padlocked.

Second, the U.S. government has no alternative but to monitor extremist discourse among Muslims in this country, including in mosques and in prison missions. Nobody would object, on grounds of protection for religious advocacy, to federal investigation of terrorist incitement among Christian antiabortion activists or ultraextremist Jews. No such exemption can be granted Muslims.

Third, U.S. non-Muslims of good will must assist and support traditional Muslims in creating an Islamic establishment in this country that is loyal to our government and to our traditions of interreligious respect. There is no obstacle to this in traditional Islam. But this also requires opposition to Islamophobia — the incitement of hatred against Islam as a faith — among non-Muslims.

Lopez: You are identified with Sufism. What attracted you to Islam? When and why did you make the plunge?

Schwartz: This is a personal matter and a long, involved story, but I will say this: I am a Sufi, and a disciple of the great 13th century Spanish Muslim mystic Ibn Arabi. I believe with him in the unity of the monotheistic faiths. Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship one God — the same God — Creator of the universe. We should therefore see one another as, ultimately, members of a single religion, not three distinct and hostile faiths. As I have put it: from the Jews, we receive the Sacred Law; from the Christians, the message of love and solidarity in the world; from the Muslims, intensity of belief.

I was attracted to Islam because of my origins in California. California is a place with immense Spanish influence. Spanish culture is a blend of Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. I had a long and close relationship with Catholics, and Spanish Catholic thought shows a deep Islamic impress. As I traveled and wrote in California, Latin America, and Spain, I became increasingly interested in Islamic civilization. I was also interested in the considerable connections between Islamic spirituality and the Jewish tradition of mysticism, or Kabbalah.

Further, I was intrigued, beginning 35 years ago, by the connection between Islamic spirituality and such non-Islamic traditions as Central Asian shamanism and Buddhism. Long ago and far away, I once thought seriously of becoming an academic in this area.

But my real knowledge of Sufism and of Islam emerged from my literary, historical, journalistic, and humanitarian engagement with the Bosnian Muslims and Albanian Catholics and Muslims, during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s.

My authentic education in these issues came during many years of work with the Daniel Dajani, S.J., Albanian Catholic Institute, in San Francisco. Albanian Catholics are remarkable in that although they resisted Turkish rule, and defended their faith at great risk, they never developed an Islamophobic mentality. They viewed the Turks as oppressors but the Muslims as believers. While working with the Albanian Catholics I also began to study Albanian Sufism, which is the only example of a really vigorous indigenous Sufism present in Europe today. I later studied the Sufi influence in Bosnian Islam, as well.

I went to live and work in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Albanian lands, and the rest fell into place. But that story must wait for another time, and much more elaboration, except to note the essential lesson: no Muslims in the world have suffered more than the Bosnians in recent times. Yet neither the Bosnians nor the Albanian Muslims ever turned to Wahhabism or Islamic extremism. They remain Europeans, and their Islam is European. Indeed, I believe Balkan Islam represents a powerful Islamic force for interfaith reconciliation in the West and the world.