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Technology Stocks : Qualcomm Moderated Thread - please read rules before posting -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: slacker711 who wrote (75695)3/21/2008 8:23:58 AM
From: JeffreyHF  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 197214
 
In order to be discoverable, a looser standard of relevancy is employed. While relevancy at trial means that the evidence has "a tendency, in reason, to prove or disprove a material fact", discovery is allowed if it could lead to relevant evidence.Far more latitude is given during "discovery" than at trial.
At the outset, there is circumstantial evidence of collusion, in that all EC complainants announced their actions at a common press conference, using a common PR firm, and filed common allegations, contemporaneously. (The facts that the CEO of Broadcom went to Finland and met with Nokia during the Santa Ana trial, and subsequently was awarded substantial business by Nokia, will be interesting to explore, as well.)Fishing expeditions at trial are counterproductive, discouraged,and curtailed, but they often (unwittingly) occur to some extent during "discovery". If the trail leads nowhere, it will never be attempted to be introduced at trial.If supported by good evidence and permissible inferences, Nokia will have at least a major problem with "unclean hands". As the Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity, "unclean hands" constitutes a valid defense.



To: slacker711 who wrote (75695)3/21/2008 11:52:15 AM
From: Jim Mullens  Respond to of 197214
 
Slacker / all , re: Re: QCOM says “Competitors Conspiring” – follow-up>>

Am I wrong in thinking that judges dont look kindly on fishing expeditions that end up not finding anything?

I would also expect judges don’t like bogus law suits initiated by dominant industry leaders (NOK/ POS), i.e.

..+ NOK original Delaware filing of Aug 8, 2006(& Oct ’05 EC action) – snips from prior post >>>

It seems NOKs newly revised complaint has little if any resemblance to their original ( which we have proven to be bogus ) complaint filed Aug 8, 2006 which basically alleged non-compliance with FRAND due to the proportionality argument ( Less QCOM IPR in WCDMA than CDMA--- thus royalty rate must be lower).

NOKs prior litigation efforts (Strasik Report) totally contradict their argument (rate for each patent) in this new QCOM complaint. One would think (hope) the good judge-

1. Sees thru the absurdity of a separate rate for each and every one of the hundreds of essential patents.

2. Recognize QCOM’s realistic bundling approach / reasonable offer”


>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Another question for the legal brainpower>>>

..+ Would not the judge look unfavorably on NOK’s actions- ?????????????
……+ After originally filing a claim later to be revealed-
………+ totally bogus ,
………+ without merit
………+ full of lies

… + Then file a revised complaint-
………+ totally omitting the “essence” of its original complaint (proportionality)
………….. + a lie which was continuously publicly repeated in the media
………+ with the absurdity of requiring a patent by patent license / royalty rate rather than an all inclusive license including every essential patent-
…………..+ agreed to by NOK in their original 1992 license and then again in the 2001 extension
…………..+ further agreed to and accepted by ~150 other companies
…………..+ a business model accepted by the industry for over 20 years

TIA- jim

>>>>

A BIG p.s.>>>>

In searching on Mauris Dolmans (Moderator / NOK rep in EC action) I came across this interesting link of Dolmans' "Standards for Standards" paper which I don’t believe was revealed before which deals with a lot of interesting issues, including-

+ Open and objective selection of technology (read MediaFLO exclusion)
+ Market dominance at 40%
+ What are FRAND terms, and how to resolve royalty disputes

…….Snips>>>

……..+ “Level of royalties. There is little case law relevant for the question what level of
royalties would be appropriate. The EC Commission has carefully avoided this issue in its
compulsory license cases, requiring the parties to negotiate to reach agreement. guidance is found in the case-law relating to Article 82(a) EC, which prohibits “unfair” pricing, i.e., a royalty so excessive that it bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of the licensed IPR.

The Court in United Brands explained that this must be determined objectively. There are several methods (some briefly described below), most of which are not particularly useful in the IPR context. An added complication is that standards often require access to large packages of essential patents, and compliance with a standard could become prohibitively expensive if a full royalty were charged for each of them.


……..+ Same firm price comparison. A second method would be to compare the royalties to those charged for other IPRs by the same firm in a competitive environment, and if the differences are appreciable, impose on the IPR owner the burden to justify the difference. The comparison must be done on a
consistent basis, i.e., involving the same quality and volumes, .

……+ Market based pricing. …” Some experts suggest that “rules of thumb” can be derived from industry
practice, suggesting that royalties for packages of essential patents should be no more than, say, 1% per patent with a maximum of 5% of the sales price of a standard-compliant product. Others value packages of essential patents at 15% to 25% of the net revenues or net profit derived from the sale of implementations. The results may differ in different industry sectors. Royalties should probably be less if the IP is not essential from the consumer’s perspective, if substantial value is added, or if the technology is integrated in a system providing a range of services or functions not covered by the IPR.”
>>>>>

May 22, 2002. STANDARDS FOR STANDARDS. 1. Maurits Dolmans, ... standards for standards appear at the end. 1. Sources of standards in Europe ...

www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522dolmans.pdf - 589k - View as html

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Seems Dolmans found no French law requirement for patent by patent licensing / royalty rate in this extensive paper of his!!! Further, Dolmans' (NOK rep) appears to suggest there is legal precedent for QCOM's business model.


Hopefully, the legal brainpower can also delve into the above.