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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: KLP who wrote (27217)3/31/2008 3:23:20 AM
From: DuckTapeSunroof  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
What 'success' are you talking about there, KLP?

(Most media are reporting that it looks like Maliki is the one who's position seems to have weakened the most in this inter-Shia factional jostling....)

Message 24453635

Remember though... the word on Basra probably won't be clear to 'Western' eyes until the results from this Fall's elections there are known....



To: KLP who wrote (27217)3/31/2008 11:34:45 PM
From: DuckTapeSunroof  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Anger follows the fight with Sadr's militia

Residents of Sadr City, Moqtada al-Sadr's Baghdad stronghold, said they felt 'caught in the middle' of the battle between Sadr's Mahdi Army and US and Iraqi forces.

By Sam Dagher
Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

from the April 1, 2008 edition

Baghdad - "The Charge of the Sadrs" is spray painted in black all over the numerous Iraqi Army and police checkpoints now abandoned in eastern Baghdad's Shiite neighborhoods.

The graffiti mocks Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's security operation – "The Charge of the Knights" – launched in Basra, the southern Iraqi oil city, last week that put Iraqi and US forces in direct confrontation with Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in the capital and across the south.

On Monday, one day after the Shiite cleric's call for a truce following the battle that killed hundreds of people and wounded scores of others, several conclusions are clear.

Mr. Sadr has demonstrated his power, despite the blows dealt to his movement over the past few years. The government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, thanked him profusely on Monday for his decision, but vowed that the fight would continue in Basra, where militiamen have now largely melted away from the streets, but remain very much in control of their strongholds.

"It's the same old ending," says Juliana Dawood, a Basra resident, referring to previous battles with Sadr's Mahdi Army in 2004 that have finished with similar truces.

In August 2004, US and Iraqi forces battled Sadr's militias in Najaf, Iraq. It was billed as a crucial test of then-Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's ability to extend authority over a key city in Iraq that was controlled by armed militias. The Najaf showdown ended in much the same way this one did: a Sadr negotiated truce.

But this time, analysts say, the widespread instances of surrender among the Iraqi forces and the seizure of their equipment and vehicles by the Mahdi Army shows that despite all the funding and training from the US, Iraq's soldiers remain greatly swayed by their sectarian and party loyalties and are incapable of standing up in a fight without US backing.

The fighting has also firmly wedged the US in an intra-Shiite struggle that has been bubbling for some time and will probably only intensify
. The battle has also spawned more popular anger and frustration, especially in places like eastern Baghdad, toward both US forces and Mr. Maliki's government, which already had been teetering on the verge of collapse.

This popular anger is like an adrenaline rush for the Sadrist movement, which, in contrast to other Shiite parties, particularly the one led by rival Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, is seen as being on the side of the young, poor, and downtrodden.

Already Sadr is gearing up to capitalize on this comeback with a huge anti-American rally planned in Baghdad on April 9, the day Saddam Hussein's statue was brought down in the capital five years ago.

In Baghdad, the government lifted a three-day curfew but US and Iraqi forces maintained a siege of sorts on Mahdi strongholds in eastern Baghdad, such as Sadr City and Shaab and Shuala on the northwest side. All vehicles were banned from going in and out except for authorized food and medicine deliveries.

Everyone going in was searched by Iraqi forces. US troops kept a close eye from a distance. A US Abrams tank, a Bradley fighting vehicle, and an armored truck stood guard at Mudhafar Square on the edge of Sadr City. US soldiers have also moved into the main municipal building off the square.

"They killed him here, look," recounts Salem Dhiab, pointing to the bullet-riddled gate where he says his neighbor, Ahmed Bayrouzi, was shot by a US sniper after venturing out Sunday in violation of the curfew to check on his sister who lives close by.

Nearby, two lone policemen sat outside and simply smiled when asked how they fared in the fight. The street was charred from the remains of burning tires that militiamen set ablaze.

Down Khairallah Street, US Stryker combat vehicles have taken up positions.

On this reporter's visit Monday, an explosion went off, sending smoke and dust in the air. Men and women carrying bags of food scurried for cover. Someone said it was one of the roadside bombs planted by the Mahdi Army.

Just one street down, on Alwat Jamila, deeper into Sadr City, the scene changed completely. No police or Army were seen anywhere. A police station looked abandoned and a section of the Jamila food market was completely destroyed in the violence. Stall owners used shovels to scoop up oranges and smashed bottles of soda.

A man who gave his name as Abu Mustafa described how he ferried the dead and wounded civilians and militiamen on his blue tricycle that he has christened the "The Sadrist Tricycle."

"We voted for a government to help us, not to do this to us," says an angry woman, who gave her name as Umm Jasem. She sold fresh eggs at the market. Her stall was reduced to a heap of charred metal. "Enough! Tell America enough."

Another stall owner, Balasem Mahdi, was busy cleaning up and repainting his shop. "We just want to get on with our lives," he said.

One side of the street was riddled with roadside bombs planted by the militia and covered up with heaps of garbage and barrels.

A trail of wires led to detonation boxes inside the alleyways manned by Mahdi Army foot soldiers.

One of those boxes was at the front gate of Amir Rahim's home. Some of the rockets aimed at the Green Zone over the past week were also fired from outside his home. "They will not be able to finish off the Mahdi Army," he says. "But it's us, the civilians, who are caught in the middle and just keep paying the price."

He asked how he can be expected to confront these foot soldiers if hundreds of policemen and soldiers in Sadr City simply abandoned their posts or handed their weapons to the militia over the past week. He says that most of those in the police and Army have great sympathy for Sadr.

Militiamen also paraded in newly issued Humvees, which were taken from the Army in several neighborhoods, according to witnesses.

In Basra, the situation was relatively calm Monday, although sporadic gunfire could still be heard in the streets and Associated Press Television showed Iraqi troops searching house to house, apparently targeting militants.

Some supermarkets and stores were open but residents said few people were venturing out.

• Material from the Associated Press was used in this report.

Find this article at:
csmonitor.com



To: KLP who wrote (27217)4/1/2008 12:39:55 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 71588
 
In Iraq, the Symphony Orchestra Plays On
By MELIK KAYLAN
March 27, 2008; Page D6

Baghdad

Karim Wasfi, age 36, arrives driving a white Range Rover and dressed in a blazer, vest and ascot. Sporting aviator shades, his ample form topped by lush black hair, he could be one of the Three Tenors -- or a staunchly civilized orchestra director, which is, in fact, what he is. When orchestra directors go around the streets of Baghdad looking exactly as they should, you know that things are bucking up. Except that Mr. Wasfi has held that post at the Iraq National Symphony Orchestra since 2004, through the darkest of times, and he has always looked like this. We set off at speed out of Mansour toward downtown Baghdad listening to Wagner. "The Ride of the Valkyries" to be precise.


Among the challenges the members of the Iraq National Symphony Orchestra face is that on any given night, they don't know who won't show up.
"In the car, I also listen to the Saint-Saëns requiem and the Mozart requiem -- that's usually the right mood for Baghdad," says Mr. Wasfi, in his cultivated English, as the checkpoint militias gape incredulously and wave us on. He has lost count of the times he has just missed being caught in a bomb blast or a firefight. "I vary my route to work -- which I think may be more dangerous. In '06 I had to leave town and disappear for six months for my safety, but we still kept going -- I organized two concerts from afar. . . . At one point, I had to tactfully get a formal religious proclamation from a top cleric that music was not profane. That took care of one group only. Still, these days, it's certainly better than it was -- I'm trying to up the concerts to twice a month, but that includes a lot of chamber performances which I initiated some months ago," he says.

"At the very least, the audience must know for sure that somewhere in the city there will be a concert on the last Saturday of every month," says Mr. Wasfi, who is also co-conductor with Mohammed Amin Ezzat. "Then we give out the location in the last moment, for security. We do it by email, word-of-mouth, phone calls -- I tell everyone I know. Even then, many hundreds turn up, depending on the place. That's our problem: We don't have a regular home. Well . . . one of our problems."

Mr. Wasfi launches into a bewildering tale. The symphony performed at the Al Rashid theater downtown for years, but soon after the invasion the place was looted and burned. So the orchestra moved to Al Ribat Hall, which was merely vandalized. But it was officially given Al Shaab Hall, which was attacked in '06 and has been ineffectively repaired twice, while the Convention Center popped open briefly before that deal was rescinded.

So now the symphony performs regularly at the Hunting Club in Mansour, a kind of haute-suburban country club with a large ballroom, and anywhere else they can. It uses Al Shaab Hall for rehearsals. For many orchestra members, that requires driving down Haifa Street: Its once-elegant bullet-pocked apartment blocks saw some of Baghdad's most intense sectarian firefights before the Surge and pro-government Sunni militias had an effect. As in much of the city, open streetfighting has abated. Suicide and car bombs are the new threat. During one trip I took with friends to the auditorium, an Iraqi soldier shot a car behind us.

That the symphony has kept playing appears nothing less than heroic to the outsider. Aside from location, Mr. Wasfi has to worry about the audience, orchestra members, instruments and sheet music, funding, punctuality, electricity, bathrooms, air supply -- every aspect of the job. He is also the orchestra's solo cellist. Many essential professionals have fled the country, from musicians to technicians.

"Any of us could find a job abroad," Mr. Wasfi says. "In fact, I moved my sisters to Sweden -- they think I'm crazy to stay. So why stay? To fight back against the malevolent and the ignorant. I like to think that we inspire people -- they see us and they see the barbarism everywhere. It gives them a choice: It could be like this, or like this."

Ultimately, though, Mr. Wasfi is disdainful of the heroic; every day he faces a highly complicated and distracting logistical challenge that gets in the way of the music and its quality. He has also launched a nationwide composition contest and his wife, who lives with him in Baghdad, has just had a baby.

"Of the 70-something orchestra members, we have some 50 left in town. Of those, on any given occasion, you can't tell how many won't show up, especially for rehearsals -- most do, thank God. We adapt. We play pieces that favor the orchestra we still have . . . a lot of Mozart and Haydn. Instead of a harp we use the piano and so on. Also our library was badly looted so we choose pieces from what sheet music we can muster. I've developed a number of new young players and others have had to become proficient in second instruments -- finding music teachers is another problem.

"We need new instruments, cases, maintenance tools. Things wear out here quickly what with Baghdad's weather, the absence of heating or air conditioning, the dust storms, and the like. At one point, carrying around a musical instrument was such an invitation to disaster -- to kidnapping, robbery or attack from a religious fanatic -- that we all had to keep one at work and one at home."

At Al Shaab Hall, Mr. Wasfi calls the orchestra to attention. Of the almost 40 members who turn up, three are girls in their teens -- the mingling of the sexes is a recurrent provocation to some religious circles. Mr. Wasfi tap-tap-taps his baton and the strains of Mozart's Clarinet Concerto in A waft incredibly onto the air, a fragile and defiant idyll from another world. He tells the musicians that it all sounds too "asabee" (anxious, intemperate). "Try to leave your stresses outside," he says.

Later, when they rehearse Stravinsky's "Firebird," it all comes together. "Could you tell?" he asks. "It's simply because the 'Firebird' is full of eruptions and noise. It came more naturally to them. But you can never tell. Sometimes they prefer the Mozart."

As a boy, Karim Wasfi lived for many years in Cairo, where his father, a renowned actor in Arabic films, moved after the first Gulf War. His mother, a Cairene by birth, had fallen ill and needed treatment outside an Iraq hit by sanctions. By then, Karim had embarked on the cello under the disciplined watch of Soviet tutors. Saddam had strong cultural ties with the Iron Curtain countries and, in that tradition, Karim was picked out to apprentice on the cello at age 6 owing to his build and strength. He studied at the School of Music and Ballet where he now teaches. At age 13 he became a cellist in the National Symphony, and later he became assistant principal cellist at the Cairo Opera House. In 1997, at age 23, he won a place at Indiana University, Bloomington, to study under the great Hungarian cellist Janos Starker. (He also studied political science at Boston University.)

As the invasion loomed, he headed back and waited in Jordan, driving into Iraq two months after Saddam was toppled. Soon after, he began to play cello in the symphony, ending a decade of absence. "I didn't care about the politics. With or without Saddam, I wanted to bring back for Iraqis what I'd learned in the wider world, and I wanted to show the world that Iraq has a civilization."

In the Middle East, an orchestra is not merely a Western institution, and Mr. Wasfi commissions and plays many Iraqi pieces. In addition, Iraq has a long post-Ottoman tradition of Western classical culture that Saddam redoubled as part of his program of imposed secularism. Hence, there is strong demand among the middle classes for Mr. Wasfi's endeavors. A good deal of his audience fled the country, but enough remained behind -- and others are trickling back, having used up their funds abroad. Who are they? "Friends, bohemians, artists, professionals, bureaucrats -- they're out there," he says. "They love the music, but they also want us to succeed as a symbol for them."

The symphony gets a bare minimum of funding. Its parent body is the Culture Ministry, which pays the salaries and little else. Hence the orchestra often survives on single concerts funded by the U.N. or the foreign community.

These days, Mr. Wasfi struggles not merely to keep going but to make gains against adversity. He has organized a quartet to perform all around the city, and he plays the cello wherever he can, sometimes solo, as he did at the Ibn Rushd mental asylum. "I had one chair, and everyone sat on the floor. I played Bach suites, and I improvised. You can imagine what it was like. They were intensely delighted, absolutely grateful. They asked for an extra hour. Of course I sometimes wonder why I do this, until something like that comes along. Then you know that you have to. Most of the time, that's how I feel about Baghdad."

Mr. Kaylan writes about culture for the Journal.

online.wsj.com



To: KLP who wrote (27217)4/11/2008 8:28:56 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 71588
 
Let's 'Surge' Some More
By MICHAEL YON
April 11, 2008

It is said that generals always fight the last war. But when David Petraeus came to town it was senators – on both sides of the aisle – who battled over the Iraq war of 2004-2006. That war has little in common with the war we are fighting today.

I may well have spent more time embedded with combat units in Iraq than any other journalist alive. I have seen this war – and our part in it – at its brutal worst. And I say the transformation over the last 14 months is little short of miraculous.

The change goes far beyond the statistical decline in casualties or incidents of violence. A young Iraqi translator, wounded in battle and fearing death, asked an American commander to bury his heart in America. Iraqi special forces units took to the streets to track down terrorists who killed American soldiers. The U.S. military is the most respected institution in Iraq, and many Iraqi boys dream of becoming American soldiers. Yes, young Iraqi boys know about "GoArmy.com."

As the outrages of Abu Ghraib faded in memory – and paled in comparison to al Qaeda's brutalities – and our soldiers under the Petraeus strategy got off their big bases and out of their tanks and deeper into the neighborhoods, American values began to win the war.

Iraqis came to respect American soldiers as warriors who would protect them from terror gangs. But Iraqis also discovered that these great warriors are even happier helping rebuild a clinic, school or a neighborhood. They learned that the American soldier is not only the most dangerous enemy in the world, but one of the best friends a neighborhood can have.

Some people charge that we have merely "rented" the Sunni tribesmen, the former insurgents who now fight by our side. This implies that because we pay these people, their loyalty must be for sale to the highest bidder. But as Gen. Petraeus demonstrated in Nineveh province in 2003 to 2004, many of the Iraqis who filled the ranks of the Sunni insurgency from 2003 into 2007 could have been working with us all along, had we treated them intelligently and respectfully. In Nineveh in 2003, under then Maj. Gen. Petraeus's leadership, these men – many of them veterans of the Iraqi army – played a crucial role in restoring civil order. Yet due to excessive de-Baathification and the administration's attempt to marginalize powerful tribal sheiks in Anbar and other provinces – including men even Saddam dared not ignore – we transformed potential partners into dreaded enemies in less than a year.

Then al Qaeda in Iraq, which helped fund and tried to control the Sunni insurgency for its own ends, raped too many women and boys, cut off too many heads, and brought drugs into too many neighborhoods. By outraging the tribes, it gave birth to the Sunni "awakening." We – and Iraq – got a second chance. Powerful tribes in Anbar province cooperate with us now because they came to see al Qaeda for what it is – and to see Americans for what we truly are.

Soldiers everywhere are paid, and good generals know it is dangerous to mess with a soldier's money. The shoeless heroes who froze at Valley Forge were paid, and when their pay did not come they threatened to leave – and some did. Soldiers have families and will not fight for a nation that allows their families to starve. But to say that the tribes who fight with us are "rented" is perhaps as vile a slander as to say that George Washington's men would have left him if the British offered a better deal.

Equally misguided were some senators' attempts to use Gen. Petraeus's statement, that there could be no purely military solution in Iraq, to dismiss our soldiers' achievements as "merely" military. In a successful counterinsurgency it is impossible to separate military and political success. The Sunni "awakening" was not primarily a military event any more than it was "bribery." It was a political event with enormous military benefits.

The huge drop in roadside bombings is also a political success – because the bombings were political events. It is not possible to bury a tank-busting 1,500-pound bomb in a neighborhood street without the neighbors noticing. Since the military cannot watch every road during every hour of the day (that would be a purely military solution), whether the bomb kills soldiers depends on whether the neighbors warn the soldiers or cover for the terrorists. Once they mostly stood silent; today they tend to pick up their cell phones and call the Americans. Even in big "kinetic" military operations like the taking of Baqubah in June 2007, politics was crucial. Casualties were a fraction of what we expected because, block-by-block, the citizens told our guys where to find the bad guys. I was there; I saw it.

The Iraqi central government is unsatisfactory at best. But the grass-roots political progress of the past year has been extraordinary – and is directly measurable in the drop in casualties.

This leads us to the most out-of-date aspect of the Senate debate: the argument about the pace of troop withdrawals. Precisely because we have made so much political progress in the past year, rather than talking about force reduction, Congress should be figuring ways and means to increase troop levels. For all our successes, we still do not have enough troops. This makes the fight longer and more lethal for the troops who are fighting. To give one example, I just returned this week from Nineveh province, where I have spent probably eight months between 2005 to 2008, and it is clear that we remain stretched very thin from the Syrian border and through Mosul. Vast swaths of Nineveh are patrolled mostly by occasional overflights.

We know now that we can pull off a successful counterinsurgency in Iraq. We know that we are working with an increasingly willing citizenry. But counterinsurgency, like community policing, requires lots of boots on the ground. You can't do it from inside a jet or a tank.

Over the past 15 months, we have proved that we can win this war. We stand now at the moment of truth. Victory – and a democracy in the Arab world – is within our grasp. But it could yet slip away if our leaders remain transfixed by the war we almost lost, rather than focusing on the war we are winning today.

Mr. Yon is author of the just-published "Moment of Truth in Iraq" (Richard Vigilante Books). He has been reporting from Iraq and Afghanistan since December 2004.

online.wsj.com