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Technology Stocks : Blank Check IPOs (SPACS) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: jrhana who wrote (1729)4/16/2008 8:09:41 AM
From: Glenn Petersen  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3862
 
The shares of APP have fallen 18.3% over the last two days. I am not a big fan of companies that are resistant to good corporate governance policies. Also, hot fashion trends can go cold. If APP needs to tap the capital markets, Charney is going to be pressured to bring in some adult supervision.

Retailing Chains Caught in a Wave of Bankruptcies

April 15, 2008

By MICHAEL BARBARO

The consumer spending slump and tightening credit markets are unleashing a widening wave of bankruptcies in American retailing, prompting thousands of store closings that are expected to remake suburban malls and downtown shopping districts across the country.

Since last fall, eight mostly midsize chains — as diverse as the furniture store Levitz and the electronics seller Sharper Image — have filed for bankruptcy protection as they staggered under mounting debt and declining sales.

But the troubles are quickly spreading to bigger national companies, like Linens ‘n Things, the bedding and furniture retailer with 500 stores in 47 states. It may file for bankruptcy as early as this week, according to people briefed on the matter.

Even retailers that can avoid bankruptcy are shutting down stores to preserve cash through what could be a long economic downturn. Over the next year, Foot Locker said it would close 140 stores, Ann Taylor will start to shutter 117, and the jeweler Zales will close 100.

The surging cost of necessities has led to a national belt-tightening among consumers. Figures released on Monday showed that spending on food and gasoline is crowding out other purchases, leaving people with less to spend on furniture, clothing and electronics. Consequently, chains specializing in those goods are proving vulnerable.

Retailing is a business with big ups and downs during the year, and retailers rely heavily on borrowed money to finance their purchases of merchandise and even to meet payrolls during slow periods. Yet the nation’s banks, struggling with the growing mortgage crisis, have started to balk at extending new loans, effectively cutting up the retail industry’s collective credit cards.

“You have the makings of a wave of significant bankruptcies,” said Al Koch, who helped bring Kmart out of bankruptcy in 2003 as the company’s interim chief financial officer and works at a corporate turnaround firm called AlixPartners.

“For years, no deal was too ugly to finance,” he said. “But now, nobody will throw money at these companies.”

Because retailers rely on a broad network of suppliers, their bankruptcies are rippling across the economy. The cash-short chains are leaving behind tens of millions of dollars in unpaid bills to shipping companies, furniture manufacturers, mall owners and advertising agencies. Many are unlikely to be paid in full, spreading the economic pain.

When it filed for bankruptcy, Sharper Image owed $6.6 million to United Parcel Service. The furniture chain Levitz owed Sealy $1.4 million.

And it is not just large companies that are absorbing the losses. When Domain, the furniture retailer, filed for bankruptcy, it owed On Time Express, a 90-employee transportation and logistics company in Tempe, Ariz., about $30,000.

“We’ll be lucky to see pennies on the dollar, if we see anything,” said Ross Musil, the chief financial officer of On Time Express. “It’s a big loss.”

Most of the ailing companies have filed for reorganization, not liquidation, under the bankruptcy laws, including the furniture chain Wickes, the housewares seller Fortunoff, Harvey Electronics and the catalog retailer Lillian Vernon. But, in a contrast with previous recessions, many are unlikely to emerge from bankruptcy, lawyers and industry experts said.

Changes in the federal bankruptcy code in 2005 significantly tightened deadlines for ailing companies to restructure their businesses, offering them less leeway.

And the changes may force companies to pay suppliers before paying wages or honoring obligations to customers, like redeeming gift cards, said Sally Henry, a partner in the bankruptcy law practice at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and the author of several books on bankruptcy.

As a result, she said, “it’s no longer reorganization or even liquidation for these companies. In many cases, it’s evaporation.”

Several of the retailers that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection over the last eight months, like the furniture sellers Bombay, Levitz and Domain, have begun to wind down — closing stores, laying off workers and liquidating merchandise.

In most cases, the collapses stemmed from a combination of factors: flawed business strategies, a souring economy and banks’ unwillingness to issue cheap loans.

Bombay, a chain with 360 stores, was considered a success in the furniture world, after its sales surged from $393 million in 1999 to $596 million in 2003.

Then the chain decided to move most of its stores out of enclosed malls into open-air shopping centers. It started a children’s furniture business, called BombayKids. And it started carrying bigger items, like beds and upholstered couches, with higher prices than its regular furniture.

Consumers balked at the changes, hurting Bombay’s sales and profits at the same time that its expenses for the ambitious new strategies began to grow. The timing was unenviable: By early 2007, the housing market began to falter, so purchases of furniture slowed to a trickle.

The company was running out of money, but banks refused to lend more. “They did not want to take the chance that we might not repay the loans,” Elaine D. Crowley, the chief financial officer, said in an interview.

In September 2007, Bombay filed for bankruptcy protection. The highest bid for the company came from liquidation firms, who quickly dismembered the 33-year-old chain. Bombay, which once employed 3,608, now has 20 employees left. “It is very difficult and sad,” Ms. Crowley said.

The bankruptcies are putting a spotlight on a little-discussed facet of retailing: heavy debt.

Stores may appear to mint money by paying $2 for a T-shirt and charging $10 for it. But because shopping is based on weather patterns and fashion trends, retailers must pay for merchandise that may sit, unsold, on shelves for long periods.

So chains regularly borrow large sums to cover routine expenses, like wages and electricity bills. When sales are strong, as they typically are during the holiday season, the debts are repaid.

Fortunoff, a jewelry and home furnishing chain in the Northeast, relied on $90 million in loans to help operate its 23 stores, using merchandise as collateral.

But by early 2008, as the housing market struggled, the chain’s profits dropped, meaning its collateral was losing value and the amount it could borrow fell.

In better economic times, the banks might have granted Fortunoff a reprieve. But with a recession looming, they refused, forcing it to file for bankruptcy in February. In filings, the chain said it was “facing a liquidity crisis.” (Fortunoff was later sold to the owner of Lord & Taylor.)

Plenty of retailers remain on strong footing. Arnold H. Aronson, the former chief executive of Saks Fifth Avenue and a managing director at Kurt Salmon Associates, a retail consulting firm, said the credit tightness and consumer spending slowdown have only wiped out the “bottom tier” companies in retailing.

“This recession dealt the final blow to these chains,” he said. But several big-name chains are looking vulnerable. Linens ’n Things, which is owned by Apollo Management, a private equity firm, is considering a bankruptcy filing after years of poor performance and mounting debts, though it has additional options, people involved in the discussions said Monday.

Whether more chains file for bankruptcy or not, it will be hard to miss the impact of the industry’s troubles in the nation’s malls.

J. C. Penney, Lowe’s and Office Depot are scaling back or delaying expansion. Office Depot had planned to open 150 stores this year; now it will open 75.

The International Council of Shopping Centers, a trade group, estimates there will be 5,770 store closings in 2008, up 25 percent from 2007, when there were 4,603.

Charming Shoppes, which owns the women’s clothing retailers Lane Bryant and Fashion Bug, is closing at least 150 stores. Wilsons the Leather Experts will close 158. And Pacific Sunwear is shutting a 153-store chain called Demo.

Those decisions were made months ago, when it was unclear how long the downturn in consumer spending might last. If March was any indication, it is nowhere near over. Sales at stores open at least a year fell 0.5 percent, the worst performance in 13 years, according to the shopping council.

Copyright 2008 The New York Times Company

nytimes.com



To: jrhana who wrote (1729)4/22/2008 8:31:06 PM
From: Glenn Petersen  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3862
 
More APP:

Why Isn't American Apparel Beset By Activists?

Posted by Equity Private, Apr 22, 2008, 2:15pm

In July of 2005, "Endeavor Acquisition Corporation (A Development Stage Enterprise) was formed in Delaware. Just before Christmas 2005, the company raised around $130 million in a "blank check" IPO, as a "Special Purpose Acquisition Company," effectively a promise to go buy something worth owning, eventually.

The thing about SPACs is that they don't generally start with an investment in mind, and they have particular restrictions on how long they can spend looking. In some cases, management must pay the fees paid out by the SPAC if it liquidates. This can get pricey. Think $1 million and above. In this case, Endeavor had 18 months from the "consummation" of the IPO to sign a letter of intent. After that, it was required to liquidate.

Said the firms filings:

Our efforts in identifying a prospective target business will not be limited to a particular industry, although we intend to focus on service businesses in one of the following segments: • business services; • marketing services; • consumer services; • health care services; and • distribution services.

They had about 6 months left when they filed an 8-K announcing their intention to acquire American Apparel, "a leading provider of cotton leisure wear geared toward contemporary metropolitan adults and sold through company-owned retail locations and online," which I suppose might have been termed a "distribution service company," after a long night in Tijuana.

Some signs of things to come lurked early in the 8-K:

American Apparel’s products are designed to be more tapered and tighter fitting and with bolder colors than similar offerings in the market and are promoted using provocative marketing and branding. Another important aspect of American Apparel’s marketing and branding is its adherence to environmental and employee friendly operating policies. (Emphasis mine).

Endeavor wasn't the first firm interested in American Apparel. In early 2006, Plainfield Asset Management considered a bite at AA, and, as buyers are likely to do, requested an outside audit. Having apparently never conducted an audit before (in fact, the Wall Street Journal reports that the interim CEO [GP: that should read CFO], hired to replace the late Mark Schlein in 2005 quit after a week, leaving junior bookkeepers at the financial reins) AA wisely elected to conduct their own before opening the books to outsiders. This revealed what was reportedly a 30% inflation in 2005 earnings. Shockingly, Plainfield demurred to pursue a transaction.

And how do we address these other issues... better, I think, to let the Wall Street Journal do that:

Mr. Charney grew increasingly public about his lifestyle, making himself the brand's mascot and provocateur. He entered into relationships with employees and on occasions walked through the factory in his underwear to model new designs, he says. Billboards springing up across the country quickly gained attention for their racy layouts. In one ad, a woman spreads her legs for the camera in company stockings and underwear on a white bed -- Mr. Charney's bed.

Mr. Charney found himself at the center of four lawsuits from former employees, all alleging sexual harassment. One was dismissed and two others were settled out of court.

The fourth, filed in 2005 by former employee Mary Nelson in Los Angeles County Superior Court, persisted. She asserted that Mr. Charney had referred to women as "whores" and "sluts" and solicited sex acts from her. Mr. Charney says Ms. Nelson was simply a disgruntled employee, but his defense did little to contain the damaging reports circulating in the media.


By the time Endeavor got involved, AA had seen another significant financial restatement, the acceleration of debt by lenders, the collapse of a refinancing deal and then of a deal which would have brought in a private investment firm. Doubtless, an IPO would have floundered.

The Endeavor was pretty good for AA. Designed to leave Charney with majority control, inject about $125 million and, after a brief spat, it was agreed that Charney would also retain the CEO slot. The proposed investment sailed through Endeavor's shareholder vote. And how could it fail with this cover sheet?:



A CFO, CIO and COO would be brought in from outside. And here, a particular nuance of negotiating with SPACs emerges. Signing a letter of intent extended the time before liquidation for Endeavor to 24 months from the IPO, or around December 2007. Charney resisted the addition of the "suits" around this time and Endeavor, against the wall, had little choice but to give in.

In the months that followed, the image of a firm without much adult supervision is hard to shake. Insurers are apparently balking at paying AA's sexual harassment liabilities, insisting AA hadn't fully disclosed prior sexual harassment issues, Woody Allen is suing for $10 million over the unauthorized use of his image on billboards, it seems that at one point all four Chicago stores were shut down for failure to have ever even applied for local business licenses, and U.S. immigration officials have asked AA to submit I-9 forms for its employees in its Los Angeles facility, prompting AA to file with the SEC materials to the effect that the company "could experience very substantial turnover of employees on short or no notice, which could result in manufacturing and other delays."

This is before we even talk about their loan arrangements.

As of December 31, 2007, American Apparel failed to meet the provisions of certain covenants as set forth in its credit facility and loan agreement. On February 29, 2008 American Apparel obtained waivers from its bank and private investment firm for violations of these covenants. If American Apparel is determined not to be in compliance with covenants or other terms of its credit and loan facilities in the future and/or is unable to receive any necessary waivers or consents, this may result in additional fees being assessed against American Apparel or acceleration of the outstanding debt in its entirety and may adversely affect the ability of American Apparel to continue operations. American Apparel has reviewed the terms of its current credit and loan facilities and believes that another default is likely to occur during 2008 unless the terms of its credit and loan facilities are re-negotiated.

But most of this is noise.

The reality is that the clothing line is immensely popular, controversy only propels its success in its anti-establishment (in so far as the under-thirty today are motivated enough to be anti-establishment) demographic, and despite the distractions, the firm has fairly strong financial results. International sales are a huge part of revenue and the weak dollar is likely to make that segment an equally huge part of earnings in the next reporting period.

The company is addicted to around $115 million in expensive debt at the moment, given its ravenous need to finance its unchecked growth, and, in this connection, probably shouldn't even really a public company. The entire focus of the Endeavor transaction was to cope with the debt issues AA had accumulated prior to 2007. They are headed back in that direction quickly.

While their "no sweatshop" line and their dedication to the social benefits of manufacturing in one of the most expensive states in the Union is a nice marketing piece, it is also very expensive. Expect it to get more so if immigration officials continue to sniff around.

Steve Cohen owned almost 9% of Endeavor as early as December 19, 2006, pretty much the day Endeavor filed the 8-K announcing the acquisition, he continues to hold a position today, though he does so under a SC 13G, so if he plans to be irritating he will have to wait until he amends to a SC 13D.

Still, even at $7 a share the company looks sort of expensive- unless you factor in some pretty aggressive growth assumptions. But, AA seems to enjoy meeting those kinds of expectations.

It is also a pretty small play. Something like $25 million will get you 5% of shares outstanding at today's prices and its a long slog to see returns. You'd have to be a smaller activist to want to play.

Then of course there is the fact that Charney holds a majority of common. Ousting him outright is unlikely to be particularly effective (he looks like a scorched earth kind of CEO to me). But the company doesn't need him removed, just the addition of some adult supervision and a better balance sheet. Not enough to stifle it, but to keep matters at least mostly in hand. After all, breaking covenants is very, very naughty- and its not the kind of rebellion that sells hot pants.

UPDATE: American Apparel responds:

Hi.

I saw your story called "Why Isn't American Apparel Beset By Activists." In it you reiterate a number of mischaracterizations that appeared in a Wall Street Journal article on April 12. I'm an executive at the company and also a member of the company's board of directors. Our lawyers are currently pursuing this matter with News Corporation, so we have not yet issued a public statement.

1. Please note that American Apparel, even prior to exploring a loan transaction with Plainfield Asset Management, had its financials audited annually by Moss Adams LLP, a large public accounting firm. After Moss Adams completed its audit for 2005 and uncovered misstatements in American Apparel's unaudited interim numbers, Plainfield brought in external auditors to verify the work of Moss Adams. They came to virtually the same results as Moss Adams. Plainfield did not scuttle the deal at this point.

2. "...on occasions walked through the factory in his underwear to model new designs": Outside of a singular incident in 2004, which was shot for the purposes of a promotional video, Mr. Charney has never walked around the workplace in his underwear.

3. "Billboards springing up across the country": American Apparel only has three billboards in the United States -- one in New York, one in Los Angeles, and one in Chicago.

4. US Bank never accelerated their debt. The financing by a private investment firm referred to as "collapsed" in the article actually closed in January 2007. Plainfield tried to get a deal done with American Apparel up through October 2006, at which point American Apparel approached the private investment firm through which it closed a $41 million secured second lien loan.

5. It is incorrect that Mr. Charney "resisted the addition of the 'suits.'" As I was involved in the renegotiation of the merger agreement in October and November of 2007, I can tell you that this provision was dropped from the amended merger agreement because Endeavor had not identified any executives for these positions, and it did not make sense that the hiring of these individuals be a condition of closing to the merger which was a month away at that point. Endeavor agreed to an amended deal and set aside an additional 10 million shares as transaction consideration in November as American Apparel's business began to significantly outperform the rest of the retail sector, having finally gotten financing earlier in the year in January.

6. One Chicago store was shut down for licensing reasons. During this time, we installed a new floor at the location, which had been planned for some time.

7. "The company is addicted to around $115 million in expensive debt at the moment" -- note that the compay has $65 million of fresh cash on its balance sheet from a recently completed warrant redemption. So the net debt is much lower. Leverage is on the order of 2.0x debt to EBITDA, and about 1.0x on a pro forma basis for the warrants.

8. "The entire focus of the Endeavor transaction was to cope with the debt issues AA had accumulated prior to 2007." This is not true. The company was properly financed before the Endeavor transaction closed, due to the aforementioned financing by a private investment firm in January 2007. The point of the Endeavor transaction was to fund the buyout of Mr. Charney's 50% partner in American Apparel.

9. The bank defaults you point out are for the most part violations of maximum capex covenants and fixed charge ratios, which relate to the company's rapid expansion. The company has gotten waivers of these covenants from its banks.

The Wall Street Journal doesn't mention, though they were aware, that American Apparel had been in discussions with a number of large, prestigious private equity firms in 2006 about taking a minority stake in the company. Those discussions fell apart over disagreements on valuation, not concerns abot the company's business prospects.

Given that our lawyers are currently working on this Wall Street Journal matter, you may want to think about whether you want this article on your blog. We were very disappointed by the slapdash job on the part of the young, 23-year old Wall Street Journal reporter who wrote the article. Everyone who had played a role in American Apparel's financing to this point, whether at the company, at our former or current lenders, or other service providers, was disappointed over how inaccurate a portrayal the WSJ story was.

Feel free to call me on this.

Adrian Kowalewski
Director, Corporate Finance & Development
American Apparel


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