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Politics : View from the Center and Left -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Dale Baker who wrote (70609)6/4/2008 8:46:38 AM
From: Dale Baker  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 542838
 
Washington Post "The Fix" On Hillary's campaing:

* The Passion Gap: For much of the first year of the campaign, Clinton focused almost exclusively on her competence and readiness to serve as commander in chief. She built her entire campaign around the idea that in a time of historic challenges, both domestically and abroad, voters wanted a steady hand on the wheel. Go back and read stories written six or eight months about her campaign events. They were all efficiency and experience: Clinton was the calming presence seeking to reassure voters that she was ready and willing to steer the ship of state.

Contrast that with the sort of stories that were coming out of the Obama campaign: Massive crowds, young people everywhere -- the intensity and passion at his rallies and surrounding his campaign practically jumped through the television screen (or off the printed page) and slapped you in the face. The passion gap was apparent to anyone watching the race. Clinton was the steady politician; Obama was a rock star.

That narrative took hold and never let off as the campaign continued, despite the fact that Clinton, too, had legions of committed supporters who would arrive at rallies early just to catch a glimpse of her and who revered her in the same way Obama was idolized by some of his backers. The Clinton campaign never figured out a way to tell that story to voters and, as a result, never closed the passion gap.

* The Iowa Box: When former Clinton deputy campaign manager Mike Henry penned a memo -- subsequently leaked to the New York Times -- making the case for skipping the Iowa caucuses, the campaign quickly moved to deny the report and insisted that such a move was never considered. The irony of course was that Henry was right. The progressive, anti-war nature of the Iowa Democratic caucus electorate was a poor fit for Clinton and, unlike New Hampshire, there was only a small Clinton organization ready and waiting in the state. (Bill Clinton essentially skipped Iowa in 1992 as home state Sen. Tom Harkin dominated the caucuses; four years later, Clinton was not challenged for his party's nod.)

Given all of that, why didn't the Clinton campaign skip Iowa? Because they couldn't. Clinton was the frontrunner in the contest, and the frontrunner doesn't get to skip ANY states. So the Clinton campaign was in a box - they had to play in a state where they knew from the start they faced an uphill fight.

* Circular Firing Squad: Clinton also knew from the get-go that there were, um, creative tensions within her innermost circle of advisers. Campaign manager Patti Solis Doyle, deputy campaign manager Mike Henry and communications director Howard Wolfson were all close; pollster and chief strategist Mark Penn was an island to his own -- held in little regard by, among others, senior adviser Harold Ickes. The positioning among this group -- as well as in the broader Clinton universe that grew to include longtime associates like Maggie Williams and Cheryl Mills -- became a point of distraction for many within the campaign. People were so focused on placing blame or taking credit for the day in and day out struggle of the campaign that few were able (or willing) to look at the big picture.

Any number of people we have chatted with over the last few weeks about what happened to Clinton made the argument that the campaign had ill-served the candidate. True -- to a point. Ultimately, the campaign looks and acts like the candidate wants it to look and act. That means it was Clinton's responsibility to recognize problems within her inner circle and work to change them. It happened, but it happened too late to really matter.

* Underestimating Obama: Starting way back in 2006, it was clear to anyone paying attention that Obama was a force to be reckoned with in national politics. Everywhere he went, massive crowds appeared; his books sold millions and stayed atop bestseller's lists for months; money was pouring in for his political action committee faster than his limited staff could count it. And yet, the Clinton campaign seemed unwilling to acknowledge the threat Obama posed to her chances at the nomination, largely dismissing him as too inexperienced to compete with a figure as accustomed to the national spotlight as Clinton.

In the early days of the cycle, Clinton's campaign could have done much to define Obama in a less favorable light -- an ambitious liberal state legislature seeking a promotion too quickly -- that would have, perhaps, slowed his rise to the transformational candidate he eventually became. But by the time the Clinton campaign realized the reality of the Obama threat, it was too late -- the movement had begun.

* Controlling Bill: One of the overarching questions when Clinton announced her intention to run for president was what role her husband, who also happened to be the former leader of the free world, would play. Bill Clinton was, is and will always be a man of massive talents and equally massive flaws. So, managing his role in the campaign was always a top-of-mind issue for people closely watching the campaign.

In the runup to the Iowa caucuses, Bill Clinton played his role perfectly, standing in the background, advocating for his wife as the most able and ready candidate for the job. That all changed ahead of the South Carolina primary in late January, where Clinton time and again made news for comments he had made that some interpreted as racially charged; he was a HUGE distraction for the campaign in those days and provided the impetus for the massive surge of support in the black community for Obama. The former president appeared chastened after South Carolina and, in his defense, did his wife considerable good by his relentless stumping in rural areas of Texas and Ohio. Overall, however, the campaign's inability to keep Bill Clinton in line and on message did his wife's effort more harm than good.

That's one reporter's opinion based on a close (perhaps too close) reading of the ups and downs we have all been through over the past 18 months. Have a different take? We want to hear from you in the comments section below.

By Chris Cillizza | June 4, 2008; 5:00 AM ET