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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: unclewest who wrote (256334)	7/1/2008 6:31:44 AM
From: LindyBill	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793914

From what I read, the most honest account out so far by anybody involved in the Iraqi invasion is Douglas Feith's "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism." He has caught the most flack and been the most open. NRO has posted a series of interviews with him about his book, and he has a Web page up on it. waranddecision.com Here are the highlights from his interview: 1) Critics argue that U.S. officials manipulated intelligence in order to boost public support for the war. There mantra is "Bush lied, people died." Not true, says Douglas Feith. Bush believed the same intelligence information that Clinton believed. Saddam, meanwhile, was corrupting that intelligence, leading the world to believe the WMD stockpiles were there. 2) Feith discusses the war blunders. First, the failure to provide adequate security forces after the fall of Saddam. Feith describes how this grew out of a sense that a build-up of U.S. forces would play to enemy propaganda. Second, the decision to maintain an occupation government in Iraq for over a year. Feith says this came counter to the idea of "liberation, not occupation." 3) Why was the CIA's pre-war intelligence about Iraq so faulty? Simple, says Feith. According to a congressional report, "the CIA did not have . . . a single agent dedicated to the WMD issue in Iraq before the war. Not one." Making matters worse, the CIA neither offered the president alternatives to his Iraq policy, nor did it wholeheartedly support that policy once it was implemented. 4) Feith describes how WMD in Iraq — or the lack thereof — changed everything. Despite the fact that the WMD threat was but one of several dangers posed by Saddam's regime, the failure to discover the WMD stockpiles prompted the Bush administration to shift its rhetoric away from past threats and toward Iraq's future. In doing so the administration only empowered its critics. 5) Is the U.S. equipped to deal with national-security problems around the world? Feith says no, pointing out the antiquated organization of our entire security community as well as the ineffective mess that is the CIA. Of course, our national security ultimately depends on the people in charge. Feith rates a few of the bigger names. tv.nationalreview.com

To: unclewest who wrote (256334)	7/1/2008 10:25:44 PM
From: KLP	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793914

Hi Unclewest....Whatever is a President in this era to do...? Who can he/she believe? If many of the Generals are opting for CYA, and if the CIA and Pentagon is not operating at both a high level of knowledge and information, AND a high degree of truthfulness....Who can the President believe? We'd better figure that out, because if Obama becomes President, hasn't a clue about anything Military, and really doesn't care much about it either....we are in for a really troublesome turmoil.

To: unclewest who wrote (256334)	7/11/2008 3:36:01 AM
From: LindyBill	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793914

Inside the Ring Bill Gertz Thursday, July 10, 2008 WASHINGTON TIMES Policy dispute Defense officials are criticizing what they say is the failure to capture or kill top al Qaeda leaders because of timidity on the part of policy officials in the Pentagon, diplomats at the State Department and risk-averse bureaucrats within the intelligence community. Military special operations forces (SOF) commandos are frustrated by the lack of aggressiveness on the part of several policy and intelligence leaders in pursuing al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and his top henchmen, who are thought to have hidden inside the tribal areas of Pakistan for the past 6½ years. The focus of the commandos' ire, the officials say, is the failure to set up bases inside Pakistan's tribal region, where al Qaeda has regrouped in recent months, setting up training camps where among those being trained are Western-looking terrorists who can pass more easily through security systems. The lawless border region inside Pakistan along the Afghan border remains off-limits to U.S. troops. The officials say that was not always the case. For a short time, U.S. special operations forces went into the area in 2002 and 2003, when secret Army Delta Force and Navy SEALs worked with Pakistani security forces. That effort was halted under Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, who recently blamed Pakistan for opposing the joint operations. Mr. Armitage, however, also disclosed his diplomatic opposition to the commando operations. Mr. Armitage, an adviser to Republican presidential contender Sen. John McCain, told the New York Times last month that the United States feared pressuring Pakistani leaders for commando access and that the Delta Force and SEALs in the tribal region were "pushing them almost to the breaking point." However, the officials said that without the training and expertise of the U.S. commandos, Pakistani forces took heavy casualties in the region, with about 1,000 troops killed by terrorists and their supporters. Another major setback for aggressive special operations activities occurred recently with a decision to downgrade the U.S. Special Operations Command. Under Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, the command in 2004 began to shift its focus from support and training to becoming a front-line command in the covert war to capture and kill terrorists. In May, SOCOM, as the command is called, reverted to its previous coordination and training role, a change that also frustrated many SOF commandos. Critics in the Pentagon of the failure to more aggressively use the 50,000-strong SOF force say it also is the result of a bias by intelligence officials against special forces, including Pentagon policy-makers such as former CIA officer Michael Vickers, currently assistant defense secretary for special operations; former CIA officer Mary Beth Long, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs; and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a former CIA director. The officials said the bias among intelligence officials against aggressive military special operations is long-standing. As evidence, they note that one of the very few recommendations of the 9/11 commission ignored by President Bush was the panel's call for giving the Pentagon the lead role in paramilitary operations. The commission report stated that "lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department." That has not occurred, and the officials said one result is that bin Laden and his deputies remain at large. Said one Pentagon official: "The reason some Pentagon leaders appear to be so indecisive about President Bush's order to catch Osama bin Laden dead or alive is that they have not unleashed the dogs of war. Too many bureaucrats have blocked ideas from the aggressive U.S. commandos in Afghanistan and at SOCOM headquarters who just want to carry out the president's orders to stop al Qaeda from rebuilding." Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell declined to address any specifics of special operations policies but said he thinks senior commanders do not share the critics' views. On the hunt for bin Laden, Mr. Morrell said: "No one should question our commitment to bringing Osama bin Laden and the rest of his cowardly lieutenants to justice, one way or another. It will happen. it's just a question of when." washingtontimes.com