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Politics : Rat's Nest - Chronicles of Collapse -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Wharf Rat who wrote (8181)7/18/2008 12:35:42 AM
From: Wharf Rat  Respond to of 24225
 
Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism
By John Bellamy Foster
Monthly Review
July-August 2008
(Very long)

The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the twenty-first century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies.[1] Beginning in 1998 a series of strategic energy initiatives were launched in national security circles in the United States in response to: (1) the crossing of the 50 percent threshold in U.S. importation of foreign oil; (2) the disappearance of spare world oil production capacity; (3) concentration of an increasing percentage of all remaining conventional oil resources in the Persian Gulf; and (4) looming fears of peak oil.

The response of the vested interests to this world oil supply crisis was to construct what Michael Klare in Blood and Oil has called a global “strategy of maximum extraction.”[2] This required that the United States as the hegemonic power, with the backing of the other leading capitalist states, seek to extend its control over world oil reserves with the object of boosting production. Seen in this light, the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (the geopolitical doorway to Western access to Caspian Sea Basin oil and natural gas) following the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the rapid expansion of U.S. military activities in the Gulf of Guinea in Africa (where Washington sees itself as in competition with Beijing), and the increased threats now directed at Iran and Venezuela—all signal the rise of a dangerous new era of energy imperialism.

The Geopolitics of Oil

In April 1998 the United States for the first time imported the majority of the petroleum it consumed. The crossing of this threshold pointed to a very rapid growth in U.S. foreign oil dependency. At the same time fears that the world would soon reach peak oil production became increasingly prominent, assuming a high profile behind the scenes in establishment discussions. A key event was the publication in Scientific American in March 1998of “The End of Cheap Oil” by retired oil industry geologists Colin J. Campbell and Jean H. Laherrère. “The End of Cheap Oil” predicted that world oil production would peak “probably within 10 years.” The Campbell and Laherrère article and the question of peak oil immediately drew the attention of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the OECD’s energy organization, in its World Energy Outlook of 1998. The IEA claimed that even adopting the pessimists’ assumptions on the real extent of world oil reserves and the existence of a bell-shaped production curve (but without the sharp oil price hike suggested by Campbell), its own long-term supply model “would not peak until around 2008–2009.” Employing the IEA’s own assumptions on reserves, moreover, would push the peak back around a decade further.[3] This, however, was still far from distant. The peaking of United Kingdom North Sea oil production in 1999 (Norwegian production peaked two years later) added a still greater sense of urgency.

Matthew Simmons, CEO of the Houston-based energy investmentbanking firm Simmons and Company International and a member of the National Petroleum Council and the Council on Foreign Relations, published an article in Middle East Insight in 1999 in which he emphasized the “far faster” depletion of major oil fields arising from high-extraction technology. Rather than extending the life of oil fields as previously supposed, the introduction of this technology most likely accelerated their depletion. Referring to oil fields “brought into production since 1970,” Simmons noted that “almost all of these new fields have already reached peak production and are now experiencing rapid rates of decline…fAnd when the stable base of old, but giant, fields also starts to deplete,” he asked, “what will this do to the world’s average depletion rate?”[4] In 2000 Simmons’s concerns regarding diminishing oil supply led to his becoming an energy advisor for George W. Bush’s presidential campaign. As he recounted it in a February 2008 interview, he had “pulled aside” Bush’s “first cousin” in early March 2000 to tell him of an earlier conversation he had had with an assistant to Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, who had been sent to examine the spare oil production capacity of the OPEC countries. As Simmons reported to Bush’s cousin:

I said, “When you have someone who is the head of U.S. oil policy call you and [say ‘shit!’] about five times in 20 seconds, this is so much worse than what they’ve warned us about.” I said, “Between now and the election, if this all breaks out and Bush is misinformed, he can mispronounce every head of state in the world, but this, this will sink you.” And that dragged me into helping create the comprehensive energy plan put forth by Bush when he was running.[5]
Simmons was a member of the Bush-Cheney Energy Transition Advisory Committee, advising on the growing oil constraints. His 2005 book, Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy, arguing that the Saudi oil production peak was imminent, has become one of the most influential works propounding the peak oil notion.[6]
globalpolicy.org



To: Wharf Rat who wrote (8181)7/18/2008 12:42:03 AM
From: Wharf Rat  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 24225
 
The Peak Oil Crisis: The Blackouts Spread
Written by Tom Whipple
Wednesday, 16 July 2008 22:14
Of the 266 distinct nations or entities on the world today, nearly 100 are now reporting continuing energy shortages, mostly in the form of inadequate electricity supply, but in a growing number of cases, shortages of liquid fuels and natural gas. The actual number of countries affected is probably well over 100 but there are dozens of isolated island-states scattered around the world that are rarely heard from and are almost certainly suffering in silence while waiting for the next oil tanker to come in.

The majority of these energy-short states are small, poor and play only a minor role in world trade. While we should feel sorry for the plight of their inhabitants who are, or shortly will be, enduring severe hardships from greatly reduced supplies of electricity, water, food and use of motor transport, the impact of their problems on the better-off OECD world is likely to be minimal for a while.

Shortages, however, are not confined to small, poor states, but, in an increasing number of cases, are appearing in large, relatively well-off and active states on which the OECD world of North America, Europe and parts of Asia are very dependent. Several of the countries having energy problems are actually oil exporting states that, for one reason or another, are not able to turn their increasing oil wealth into smoothly functioning shortage-free economies. Unfortunately, several major countries appear to be on the path to an energy shortage-induced economic and perhaps political collapse within the foreseeable future which obviously will have serious consequences for us all.

Currently, the most serious situations appear to be in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both are nations with populations in excess of 150 million people that are ensnared in devastating power shortages that have destroyed their export industries. Both are facing water and agricultural problems that threaten their food supplies. Liquid fuels are running short and reductions in exports threaten their ability to import oil and natural gas. It was recently revealed that the Saudis already are forgiving $6 billion of Pakistan's $12 billion annual oil import bill.

On top of this, Pakistan has nuclear weapons and its strategic location is vital to the course of the insurgency in Afghanistan. Worsening blackouts, the liquid fuels shortage and probably the food situation are likely to lead to serious political instability before the year is out.

The next important pair of countries in terms of their impact on western economies is China and India, and although their situations are nowhere near as serious as the problems in Pakistan and Bangladesh, both are beginning to suffer from electricity shortages which will impact economic growth. China, which now has a shortfall of around four percent of its normal electricity production, is compensating by cutting back on production of aluminum and zinc which consume prodigious quantities of electric power. The recent earthquake has given Beijing pause in its ambitious plans to expand hydro and nuclear power production. If China cannot increase coal production rapidly enough to keep up electricity generation for its rapidly expanding economy, it is likely to increase imports of coal and oil keeping pressure on world prices.

So far there is no indication of an unusually large increase in Chinese oil imports as there was during the power shortage four years ago. The world price of diesel is simply too expensive to be used to generate electricity for industrial production these days.
India's energy shortages are more serious than China's.

Its nuclear power plants are failing, hydro-power from the Himalayas is drying up due to global warming, and the costs of imported fuels are soaring. Over 85 percent of India's oil must be imported and coupled with the subsidies of oil prices the increasing costs are taking a heavy toll on the state budget. Although the situation in India is not yet as bad as in Pakistan, blackouts and liquid fuel shortages are being reported almost every day somewhere in the country. There is no end in sight to this situation and likelihood of an economic slowdown, coupled with water and food shortages, is increasing.

Several members of OPEC are having electricity and/or liquid shortages. In Nigeria, and Iraq where there are active insurgencies that have damaged the infrastructure, the shortages are endemic. Indonesia, which is just about out of OPEC due to lack of exportable oil, is beginning to face frequent power blackouts and fuel shortages. Even Venezuela and Iran have occasional electricity and fuel supply problems as they are trying to do without substantial foreign technical assistance. In Mexico, demand for gasoline has outrun refining capacity and the country is forced to rely on imports. There are now daily diesel shortages along the border as Americans cross over to fill-up on subsidized half-priced Mexican fuel.

Aside from the major oil-producing states, most countries in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia are enduring some form of energy shortages. In a number of important mineral producing countries such as South Africa, Chile and Zambia, they have already reduced production due to shortages of electricity and diesel fuel.

The global wave of blackouts and shortages is almost certain to get worse. Although most governments have announced optimistic plans to increase electricity production and bring oil to market within the next few months or years, these are almost certain to fail. The cost of building electrical generation capacity is soaring and finding affordable fuel unlikely.

In the OECD world, the effects of these shortages is likely to be felt in the form of much higher prices for declining exports from the energy-poor. For the citizens of the energy-poor world, life is going to become much harder very soon as electric lights, computers, motor transport, refrigeration, fresh water and imported anything become scarcer and scarcer.


fcnp.com