Sokolov:Russians in Georgia Seen As Net Loss for Russia
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 2008-08-21
Text of article by historian, professor Boris Sokolov criticizing the Russian action in Georgia as an ultimate loss for Russia and win for Georgia as Russia's standing in the world has and will continue to suffer as a result of the conflict:
by Russian newspaper Gazeta, owned by metals magnate Vladimir Lisin, on 19 August
Did Saakashvili Lose?
The results of the war in Georgia run contrary to the official propaganda.
Boris Sokolov
The current Russian-Georgian war for all its outward lightning- fast speed and success for Russia will most likely turn out to be a military-political and diplomatic defeat for Moscow in the long term. Of course the simplest scenario is that the insane, completely overboard president of Georgia, who is incapable of adequately perceiving reality, decided to rid himself of the South Ossetia problem in one blow, counting on Moscow not wanting to risk violating the Olympic truce and reacting only with angry rhetoric.
But how could the Georgian people make such a fool their leader in the "Rose Revolution?" And how can such a fool have held on to power for four years in such a turbulent Georgia?
The scenario
In fact, if the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali had not taken place, Moscow would have found another excuse. Most likely it would have been an operation involving Abkhazian formations against the Kodori Gorge. Georgian troops could not have helped but react to such a thing, and that would have given Russia grounds to accuse Georgia of using prohibited troops and arms in the security zone and to deploy formations of the 58th Army to help the peacekeepers and conduct a rapid forced march on Tbilisi. The Black Sea Fleet's naval infantry would have landed from the sea. Most likely, the operation would have been planned for one 24-hour period. The Georgian troops would have been hopelessly stuck in the mountains of South Ossetia and near the Abkhazia borders. By the end of this period, Russian tanks would have already been in Tbilisi, while the troops occupying the Georgian capital could very well have been called Abkhazian and South Ossetian militiamen. Saakashvili would have been overthrown, and the only pro-Russian politician in Georgia, Igor Giorgadze (he is in Abkhazia right now for good reason), would have been proclaimed president. Neither the US, nor the European Union would have been able to react, and they would have been faced with the accomplished fact of a Russian occupation of Georgia and the establishment of a pro-Russian government there. Revenge would have been taken for the "Rose Revolution."
The proof
That the Russian troops were planning to act first and foremost in Abkhazia is proven, in particular, by the fact that on the very first day of battle a mythical Georgian map appeared with a plan of attack on Abkhazia, which was supposedly captured by Russian troops in South Ossetia. True, all of the inscriptions on the map were in Russian for some reason. Clearly they don't know Georgian in the Russian General Staff, and bringing in an ethnic Georgian to falsify the document was dangerous because of a possible information leak. It would have been more logical to have captured a Georgian map in South Ossetia with a plan to take Tskhinvali. But since they intended to start in Abkhazia, the General Staff didn't think to have a corresponding map for South Ossetia as a back-up.
Upon closer examination, Saakashvili's actions appear not only to be completely rational, but it could even be that it was the only thing he could have done to save himself. That Russia would invade Georgia in the very near term Saakashvili and his advisers had no doubt. The railway construction in Abkhazia, the reinforcement of the peacekeeping contingent, the concentration of elite Russian troops near the Georgian border under the guise of exercises and the intensification of South Ossetian provocative shootings all pointed to this. The most convenient time for an invasion would be August and the first half of September. It is likely that the last straw for Saakashvili was the massive evacuation of the South Ossetian population. This showed that war was just around the corner. Most likely, Tbilisi had decided that Russia would try to start a war immediately after the completion of the Olympics, when the western leaders still would not have been able to shake off their Olympic passions and react to the Russian actions. Therefore, Saakashvili decided to pre-empt the potential adversary and start a war on the day the Olympics started, for which the Russian Prime Minister was present, and while the Russian president was resting on the Volga. As a result, instead of immediately invading Georgia, Russian troops were forced to spend two days winning Tskhinvali back from the Georgians.
As a 'goal of prestige,' the Georgian troops could finally defeat the South Ossetian militia (its casualty figures are still unknown). But naturally, Saakashvili and the Georgian Army command were not counting on ultimate victory. Actually, combat operations lasted for only two days. And over that time Russia's casualties were in no way small. According to official, possibly understated figures, the Russian Army lost 364 men (74 killed, 171 wounded and 19 missing in action). Among the seriously wounded was the commanding officer of the 58th Army, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Khrulev. Russia also irretrievably lost no less than four airplanes, including a Tu-22 bomber. And as far as the ships of the Black Sea Fleet are concerned, although they did sink one Georgian missile boat, according to some reports even they suffered damage and casualties.
After the battles ended, the Georgian Army, clearly according to a plan developed ahead of time, rapidly retreated to Tbilisi, practically without losing anyone as prisoners (on television they showed only two wounded Georgian soldiers taken prisoner in Tskhinvali). During the swift retreat they had to abandon a significant portion of their arms and equipment, but clearly there were some arms and equipment remaining for defending Tbilisi. The Georgian troops did not risk defending their cities, so as not to be destroyed unit by unit by the enemy's superior forces.
Casualties
The Russian version of events was not believed in the West. The figure that appeared immediately after the start of the conflict of two thousand peaceful inhabitants of Tskhinvali killed, which was meant to reinforce the claim of genocide against the Ossetians, was obviously fantastical: who could have counted the dead in just a few hours? If there really had been that many killed, then on the second and third days people walking around the streets of Tskhinvali would have had to wear respirators. But they showed us nothing of the sort. As of this point in time, law enforcement organizations have counted 44 non-combatants killed in South Ossetia, and they have concluded that the number of casualties should number in the tens, and not the hundreds or thousands. But the figure of 180 peaceful inhabitants of Georgia killed, casualties of Russian shootings and bombings, appears to be close to the truth. Saakashvili's statement that part of Tskhinvali was destroyed as the result of bombings by Russian ground attack aircraft is not so unbelievable. It is doubtful that Georgia would have risked sending its dozens of available warplanes to bomb Tskhinvali when they would be such easy pickings for Russian air defences. But the fact that Russian aircraft were bombing Tskhinvali was reported in the very first hours. It is most likely that aircraft were indeed bombing, and they were bombing Georgian troops in Tskhinvali.
Losses and achievements
So, what exactly did Saakashvili win, and what did he lose? He lost the Kodori Gorge, Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia, and also any near-term hope of gaining control over the territories of two rebellious autonomous territories. He achieved the internationalization of the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Ossetia conflicts, the insertion of foreign observers, and in the future, possibly even peacekeepers. Most importantly, Saakashvili received European and American guarantees that he would not be ousted by Russia.
What did Russia gain and lose? Pro-Russian forces have established control over the Kodori Gorge and conducted ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The threat of a Georgian invasion of these republics has been eliminated. Those are all of the pluses. The minuses are much greater. For the first time since 1991, Russia is faced with international isolation. Its behaviour reminded its western partners far too much of the behaviour of Germany in 1938-1939, and of the Soviet Union in 1939-1940. It is very doubtful that the leading European powers will risk a second Munich. The comparison of South Ossetia with the Czech Sudetes has already become commonplace in the global press. In the US, whose government immediately and unequivocally stood on Georgia's side, the Russia-Georgia conflict increased John McCain's chances of victory in the presidential elections, as he has taken a consistently anti-Russian position. His proposal to exclude Russia from the G-8 for all intents and purposes has already been carried out. In recent days, consultations between the seven leading industrial powers regarding the Georgia-Russia conflict have taken place without Russia's participation, and the question of its exclusion will be discussed at a meeting of the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the NATO member-states on 19 August.
Worst of all, it looks as if Moscow has lost its main ally in the European Union -Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel, despite Germany's dependence on Russian gas, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory and supported Georgia. And the president of France will hardly risk unconditionally supporting the Russian actions in Georgia in the long term. He is already threatening Russia with serious consequences if it delays the withdrawal of troops. The 'Medvedev Thaw' that many liberals quite recently were dreaming about will now have to be forgotten. The West, it seems, has finally become seriously concerned about Russia 'rising from its knees.'
The most reliable way to force the Russian troops to leave Georgia more quickly would be to deploy a couple of brigades of the American Army there. But for now the Americans are not going to resort to that. Most likely President Bush is counting on being able to force the Russians to leave Georgia's territory without having to take such a drastic step. But they have left something behind to remember them by for a long time to come: destroyed bridges, burning forests, widespread looting of not just arms and combat equipment, but anything that can be carried out. We can forget about a pro- Russian government in Tbilisi forever. And the chances of Georgian and Ukraine entering NATO are now greater than ever. I think that in Brussels they will now be in a hurry to accept Tbilisi and Kiev in the alliance so as not to encourage Russia to engage in a new 'compelled peace' campaign anywhere in the Crimea, Pridnestrovye [Dniester region] or Adzharia.
The author is an historian and professor of the Russian State Social University
[Description of Source: Moscow Gazeta in Russian - Informative, small-circulation daily paper owned by metals magnate Lisin; not affiliated with the Gazeta.ru website]
Originally published by Gazeta, Moscow, in Russian 19 Aug 08.
(c) 2008 BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union.
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