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Japan, Russia: Post-Georgian Relations
Stratfor Today » September 4, 2008 | 1409 GMT
KAZUHIRO NOGI/AFP/Getty Images
Japanese naval personnel on a speedboat during 2007 military exercisesSummary
Japan has postponed naval exercises with Russia in protest of recent military actions in Georgia, Russian media claimed on Sept. 2. The countries were planning to hold their yearly joint rescue exercises in the Sea of Japan on Sept. 9, but Tokyo allegedly chose to delay the maneuvers after learning of NATO’s decision to scrap its war games with Moscow. Japan, like other countries, is reassessing its relationship with Russia. Its interests are mostly — though not entirely — aligned with the United States’ in the Pacific.
Analysis
Japan postponed a joint naval exercise with Russia scheduled to begin Sept. 9 in reaction to the Russian military’s recent operations in the Caucasus, Russian media reported. The move echoes NATO’s cancellation of war drills with Moscow; Japan is closely aligned with the United States but claimed it acted independently in halting the drills. The history of tension between Tokyo and Moscow ensures that regardless of U.S. influence, Japan will be wary of a resurgent Russia.
Russia and Japan have held joint naval rescue exercises annually since 1998, symbolizing gestures of goodwill between the two countries with historic antagonisms. In recent years, China’s rise and Russia’s increasing assertiveness have led Japan to begin shifting its military capabilities from the purely defensive toward the more offensive. After Russia’s dramatic actions in the Caucasus, Japan will want to distance itself further from its neighbor.
Land and Sea Power
The geographies of Russia and Japan have caused tensions between them, especially after Japan’s emergence on the international scene in the late 19th century. Russia mostly consists of a vast expanse of inhospitable steppe and evergreen taiga, comprising a significant chunk of the Eurasian landmass. By contrast, Japan is a tiny archipelago looping along Russia’s far easternmost corner, with broad access to the Pacific Ocean. The two countries thus have opposite natures; Russia is a virtually land-locked power with an overriding paranoia about securing its lengthy and easily traversable borders with Europe and Central Asia, while Japan is an insular sea power, adept at trade and transportation but equally wary of outsiders, especially Russia and China.
Moscow’s and Tokyo’s spheres overlap along Russia’s major eastern point of ocean access — its Pacific coast, and especially Vladivostok, its only Pacific warm water port. When Russia attempts to project power from this coast, or to develop a significant naval presence, tensions between Moscow and Tokyo erupt into conflict. The Russo-Japanese War, World War II and the Cold War saw Moscow vying with Tokyo, and the last of these led to disputes about the territorial status of the Kuril Islands that persist today.
The Russo-Japanese War provides the best example of the neighbors’ relations because it was driven less by global ideologies and more by the participants’ geographical situation and desire for material improvement through trade. The war showed that inherent animosities exist and can ignite into full-blown conflicts without considerable involvement from other actors, though when other states and geopolitical forces are involved strife becomes more likely. The war also proved that Russia faces inherent difficulties in attempting to develop its eastern shore into a launching point for greater conquests. Aside from the enormous distance separating Russia’s Far East from its western centers of power, Japan inhabits a geographic blocking position and maintains a powerful navy — the world’s second-largest today.
Cold War and After
Russo-Japanese tensions erupted again during World War II, and the Soviet invasion of the Kuril Islands at the conclusion of the war rankled in the Japanese mind throughout the post-war period. Japanese frustration over Russian domination in the “northern territories” played into the Cold War developing between the United States and the Soviet Union. During this time, Japan, like Germany, remained occupied by American forces and did not have the option of developing independent relations with Moscow, even if it had wanted to do so. The United States offered Japan a path to recovery and stability, and rejecting the Soviets was simply an easy part of the deal.
After the Soviet Union fell, Russia and Japan had the opportunity to redefine their relationship, and inched ever so slowly toward more cooperation, though the wounds of the Kuril Islands dispute festered. Russia could no longer afford to entertain naval aspirations in the Pacific, and Japan was optimistic about Russia’s potential as a new consumer market for its goods and a source of raw materials. Sakhalin Island, with its wealth of petroleum deposits, became the place where the two countries’ interests most fully converged — though it was once the subject of a territorial dispute too. Tokyo generally refuses to let Japanese companies invest in Russia — Japan accounted for a mere 0.4 percent of Russia’s foreign direct investment in 2007 — mostly due to anti-Soviet memories. But Tokyo allowed Japanese firms Mitsui and Mitsubishi to buy 25 percent and 20 percent stakes in the development of the Sakhalin-2 energy project.
Energy ties are thus essential to the current status quo; Japan must power its advanced economy, and Russia is happy to sell its supplies. Yet aside from Sakhalin, Japanese investment in Russia is negligible.
Cold War II
In August war broke out in the Caucasus, and Moscow’s decisive victory over Georgia — and the West’s incapacity to respond — answered any doubts about Russia’s seriousness in maintaining control of its periphery.
Japan’s decision to postpone its annual naval drills with Russia falls in line with the West’s reactions, especially NATO’s decision to scrap war drills with Russia. With its powerful navy and firm alliance with Washington, Tokyo does not need to fear Russia’s resurgence in the way that members of the former Soviet Union must. But it does need to be wary of Russia’s grand strategy for the Far East. Above all, Japan will strive to contain Russia and China and prevent them from growing closer, as the mere thought of an alliance between these giant neighbors worries Tokyo more than anything else.
Should relations worsen between Moscow and Tokyo in a new Cold War environment, the Kremlin could pinch Japan in a number of ways. It could object more aggressively on the missile defense issue, push against Japanese interests in Sakhalin-2 or even interfere with Japan’s energy supply. It certainly could continue to delay progress on negotiations about the Kuril Islands. Russia could also continue seeking ties with China.
Japan is keeping all this in mind as it — like other countries — reassesses its relationship with Russia. Tokyo’s interests are for the most part aligned with those of the United States, but even without Washington’s influence, Tokyo would be working to distance itself from the Russians
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