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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Chas. who wrote (39749)	9/10/2008 5:55:51 AM
From: Rolla Coasta	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 220437

My definition of WWIII - utter destruction of real estate market worldwide. HK has already seen shutdown of more and more estate agency branches. Need to see a tsunami of capitulations in order to seriously affect the psyche of human mind. It is needless for tj to continuously pump the price to attract financial refugees into his death camps. People will jump off a building or burn charcoal to breathe carbon monoxide asleep in their own flats... one way or another.

To: Chas. who wrote (39749)	9/10/2008 5:06:54 PM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 220437

just in in-tray, per stratfor, mentioning israel, usa, russia, and the rest of the usual suspects Geopolitical Diary: Olmert’s Canceled Trip to Moscow, the Broader Picture September 9, 2008 \| 2359 GMT The Jerusalem Post reported Tuesday that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert canceled his trip to Moscow scheduled for Sept. 14. The trip was apparently canceled because of a recommendation made Sept. 7 by the Israeli police to indict Olmert on bribery charges. While the explanation seems plausible, it is unlikely. If Olmert was unable to go because of political heat at home, a high-level Israeli official could have gone in his place or the visit could been rescheduled. Instead, the cancellation seems to indicate that Israel is switching its strategy on how to handle a resurgent Russia, from a policy of accommodation to one of potential confrontation. The relationship between Russia and Israel has had its fair share of ups and downs, beginning with a close alliance between the nascent Jewish state and the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. This was followed by a period of Soviet patronage of Israel’s enemies, mainly Egypt and Syria, which was designed primarily to strike at U.S. interests in the Middle East but which also threatened Israel as an ancillary effect. But with the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s influence receded from the Middle East. Israel’s biggest existential threat is not from its Arab neighbors but rather from a global power seeking to establish its own interests in the Middle East. In other words, Israel’s neighbors only become a threat once they obtain outside patronage making them bold, organized and armed enough to strike at Israel from all sides. While Israel has made peace with Egypt and Jordan and is eyeing a similar relationship with Syria, there is no guarantee that an emergent global power would not offer alternatives to Israel’s neighbors — alternatives that have been lacking in the post-Cold War world. Russia is exactly such a power. A resurgent Russia once again looking for potential allies in the Middle East (such as Iran, Syria or perhaps in a highly hypothetical scenario even Egypt) that would challenge the United States has always been one of Israel’s main concerns. Therefore, Israel actively engaged in checking Russian power by selling weapons to Georgia. The idea was to contain Moscow and force it to deal with challenges on its periphery, thus keeping it from mucking about in the Middle East. Israel got wind of Moscow’s plans for Georgia before the Aug. 8 intervention and decided that a confrontation with the Kremlin was not a wise strategy, precisely because Israel understands the danger in Russian support of Syria and Iran. Hence, a week before Russian tanks rolled into South Ossetia, Israel announced that it would end all weapon sales to Georgia. This was followed by a general acquiescent attitude toward Moscow after the Georgian intervention, to the obvious chagrin of the Americans who were looking for a concerted effort against the Kremlin. The subsequent Olmert visit on Sept. 14 was supposed to affirm an accommodating policy toward Moscow and to secure guarantees from the Kremlin that Iran and Syria would not be emboldened to threaten Israel. However Russia has not fallen into line with Israel’s overtures. This is not because Moscow is hoping for open confrontation with Israel, but rather because Russia’s current priority is to keep Americans embroiled in the Middle East. To do that, from the Kremlin perspective, Iran has to remain a threat and — if possible — Syria ought to re-emerge as a threat. Russian actions, designed to allow Moscow room to maneuver in the Caucasus and Europe, have therefore — as an ancillary consequence — threatened Israel’s national security. Specifically, a resurgent Russia supporting Iran with nuclear technology and advanced strategic air-defense systems, like the late-model variants of the S-300, is a direct threat to Israel even though Moscow’s actual intention is to embolden Tehran against the United States. A particularly nightmarish scenario for Israel would be a refocused and reorganized Syria (or a hypothetical post-coup Egypt) with renewed Russian patronage. This changes the strategic calculus that Israel has had since the end of the Cold War. For the past 18 years Israel’s biggest concern was not the strength of the Arab states, but rather their weakness — the fear that if there was a war with its neighbors Israel’s military superiority would be so catastrophic that it would destroy the enemy to the point where the resulting chaos would usher in not another secular state but an Islamist one that would sponsor waves of terror attacks against Israel. Israel therefore found itself in the odd position of wanting (and often overtly trying) to keep various Arab secular dictators in power in order to avoid having to deal with a worse alternative. With Russia back in the game, a secular regime backed by the Kremlin is much worse than an unaligned Islamist regime from Israel’s perspective. Therefore, Israel may still have a few cards to play should Russia jump back into the sandbox, starting with destabilizing neighbors that choose to side with Moscow