To: Daniel Simon who wrote (104 ) 9/29/2008 5:52:08 PM From: Eric Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 196 Probably not enough trading float in after hours that's causing the swings. Also this just out from Credit Suisse this afternoon on the solar ITC, _____________________________ ITC looks unlikely before recess Our public policy analyst now believes that the solar ITC will not pass before the Congress breaks for recess. The breakdown in negotiations is apparently a fall out of the bailout negotiations, as fiscal hawks now have become more stringent on any paygo matters, therefore negotiations on the extenders have collapsed. He now believes that the House will break today for recess at the end of the day. Although the Senate and the House passed its versions of the bill, they are not “sending” the versions to each other expeditiously. Given the timeline for the Congress to adjourn, he now believes that the ITC will not happen before the recess. Right now, it is uncertain whether the Congress will even meet for a lame duck session. Impact. This is a negative macro development for solar, in particular for SPWR which we think had the most to gain from the passage of the ITC. Q1-2009 has become a problem quarter once again – recall that Spain has implemented a 500MW cap for 2009 – but all the installations in 4Q08 will count toward the 500MW in 2009. Given that we were progressing at a 125MW/month clip (and today is the last day for connections in Spain under the old tariff), Spain will not be a relevant demand factor by 2Q09. Thus with the weaker seasonality in Germany coming into play in 1Q09, there is now some risk to panel price forecasts from solar companies as move from 4Q08 to 1Q09. For WFR, there is an added concern for 1Q09 – as not only will spot poly prices decline, you also have greater than normal semi price declines in 1Q09 due to the way contracts are negotiated between WFR and its customers. FSLR and ENER are more defensive in this environment – as both have locked up their 2009 sales under take or pay arrangements, and are tied to end-markets with more stable subsidy patterns.