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To: Elroy Jetson who wrote (40647)10/3/2008 3:01:20 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 219890
 
An artist this Fosset.



To: Elroy Jetson who wrote (40647)10/3/2008 8:43:07 AM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 219890
 
But who is going to take its place? Russia, Brazil, China and India are all rising, but they are also competing with Europe and the US for finite natural resources. Only a common future -- a "change through rapprochement" and not a "clash of futures" can carry us forward.
...
It is absurd that Italy belongs to the G-8, but not China or Brazil. And what sort of meaning can a global security council have when India, Brazil, and the European Union are left out, while France and Great Britain are permanent members?

RISE OF THE REST
The Challenges of the New World Order
By Wolfgang Nowak

America is no longer up to shouldering the world’s crises. But who is going to take its place? Russia, Brazil, China and India are all rising, but they are also competing with Europe and the US for finite natural resources. Only a common future -- a "change through rapprochement" and not a "clash of futures" can carry us forward.

AP
Who will take America's place?
"Americans...can swim in only one sea. They have never developed the ability to move into other people’s world." -- Fareed Zakaria

We are living in an era without a single, dominant world power. The globe is beset by crises -- climate change, resource scarcity, food and financial crises, nuclear proliferation, and failing states. No one country can devise solutions to address these kinds of problems. Even the United Nations is not up to the task. Indeed, as British Prime Minister Gordon Brown admitted at the Progressive Governance Conference in April in London, the international organizations founded in the wake of World War II no longer meet today’s needs.

It was just 17 years ago that the American journalist Charles Krauthammer spoke of the dawning of a new era in which, for decades to come, the United States would serve as the epicenter of the world order. Only five years have passed since then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell told an audience at Davos that America claimed the right to initiate unilateral military action.

FOUND IN...
This article has been provided by Internationale Politik–Global Edition as part of a special agreement with SPIEGEL ONLINE. IP–Global Edition is the English- language quarterly journal of the German Council of Foreign Relations, published in association with IP, Germany's premier foreign policy monthly.

You can order the latest issue of Internationale Politik or read more articles on their Web site:

Bridgebuilder on the Ganges
Inter- Imperial Relations
Variable Geometry
America's AgendaAlas, the Iraq war shattered the dream of an age of "liberal imperialism," in which America spreads its values and ideals by coercive means. The financial crisis of the last two years has further accelerated the displacement of power -- from the United States and Europe toward India, China, and Russia, as well as the Arabian Gulf states.

A number of new books published in the United States describe these shifts in the political landscape. The new administration that arrives in Washington in 2009 ought to consider taking a close look at "The Post American World" by Fareed Zakaria, "The Second World" by Parag Khanna, "The Great Experiment" by Strobe Talbott, as well as "Rivals" by Bill Emmott and " The War for Wealth" by Gabor Steingart. Each of these authors accepts the premise of a multipolar world, though their analyses and policy prescriptions are vastly different. Bill Emmott, Fareed Zakaria, and Gabor Steingart imagine continued American or transatlantic leadership, while Parag Khanna sees a burgeoning competition between Europe, China, and the United States to win the favor of states like Russia and India, which he assigns to the "second world." Whatever their differences though, each of the authors takes a clear-eyed look at the realities of the present day -- unlike the neoconservatives who have been largely responsible for steering American foreign policy during the last eight years.

George Bush Sr. is said to have remarked, "We can’t make the wrong mistakes." An American administration that wants to avoid "the wrong mistakes" is going to have to find its place in the new multipolar world.

Who are the decisive powers in this new world order? The United States, Russia, India, China, Brazil and the European Union surely count among them. Interestingly, these countries are growing ever closer together. The current financial crisis has shown how deep their ties have already become. Other similarities are likewise revealing. With the exception of Europe, each of these countries contains within it aspects of the so-called first, second and third worlds. In the megalopolis Mumbai, for example, Asia’s largest slum sits adjacent a thriving economic hub. A person driving across Russia encounters areas of both staggering wealth and miserable poverty. Even in the United States, the richest country in the world, some of its population struggles to earn a decent living.

These countries are neither enemies of one another, nor are they friends; they are "frenemies," competitors for the world’s scarce resources. These countries assure their people that they can shape the coming global order and provide for their future welfare, but their respective visions of the future can differ greatly. A potential "clash of futures" looms on the horizon of the multipolar world.

Not all "frenemies" are democracies in the Western sense. The successes of Singapore and China, as well as of the Gulf states, prove that states need not be democratic to guarantee their people a high standard of living. But, that need not be cause for pessimism. Within the new nondemocratic world powers, productive elites are replacing parasitic elites. Where the former get the upper hand, they produce a system more free and just than the one they inherited. Their goal is to develop the economy and correct social inequalities. They know that where there are slums there will be "failing cities" and "failing states."

NEWSLETTER
Sign up for Spiegel Online's daily newsletter and get the best of Der Spiegel's and Spiegel Online's international coverage in your In- Box everyday.

The Alfred Herrhausen Society, the international forum of Deutsche Bank, is organizing a new project entitled Foresight in order to analyze and compare the future visions of emerging and existing world powers. Through discussion and debate, it hopes to find elements for a common future. The inaugural event held in Moscow brought together participants from Brazil, China, Europe, Japan, India, Russia, the United States and other parts of the world to discuss Russia’s role in a multipolar world. Further symposia are planned in the United States after the presidential elections, Europe, Japan, India, China, and Latin America. These events will also include high-level participants from Africa, the Arab world, and the Asia Pacific countries. One of the main goals of this series is to see the world through the eyes of others, rather than through a purely Eastern or Western lens.

New alliances that set countries against one another will not be able to solve the challenges of the 21st century. New forms of international cooperation, consultation, and compromise will have to play a central role in a multipolar world. It is absurd that Italy belongs to the G-8, but not China or Brazil. And what sort of meaning can a global security council have when India, Brazil, and the European Union are left out, while France and Great Britain are permanent members?

Needed are new forms of international governance: in a world with diminishing resources and accelerating climate change, states might be tempted to pursue their own interests in order to gain short-term advantages. The challenge will be to devise a new international framework and an organized balance of interests. Only a common future -- "change through rapprochement" not a "clash of futures" -- can bring us further.

Certainly, the past ten years provide much cause for pessimism. In order for the next ten years to be a success, we will need to be fortified by a credible, if skeptical, optimism.

Wolfgang Nowak is spokesman of the executive board of the Alfred Herrhausen Society, the international forum of Deutsche Bank.



To: Elroy Jetson who wrote (40647)10/3/2008 8:30:06 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 219890
 
just in in-tray, per stratfor

Russia, Germany: Discussing a New Alliance
Stratfor Today » October 2, 2008 | 2211 GMT

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (L) and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Oct. 2 in St. Petersburg, RussiaSummary
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and German Chancellor Angela Merkel met in St. Petersburg on Oct. 2. Among the topics of discussion was the possibility of a new collective security agreement between Europe and Russia, dubbed Helsinki II. Russia’s proposal is meant to undermine the U.S.-dominated NATO alliance — a constellation of countries whose effectiveness is already being questioned.

Analysis
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and German Chancellor Angela Merkel met Oct. 2 in St. Petersburg to discuss a multitude of issues ranging from the fallout from the Georgia-Russia war to energy supplies and the global financial situation. One topic of discussion was even more intense: a new collective security agreement between Europe and Russia, dubbed Helsinki II. Moscow is pushing hard for discussions about an agreement between Russia and Europe outside of NATO, in order to undermine the U.S.-dominated alliance, but the push comes as many within the United States are considering the worth of Washington’s alliances around the world.

Russia has been especially vocal about its initiative of a new legally binding treaty on collective security in Europe, which Medvedev put forward in Berlin in June. At the time, most of Europe seemed to ignore Russia’s move to balance its security concerns in Europe with those of the United States, which is installing ballistic missile defense interceptors and a related radar in Central Europe. However, all of Europe and the United States have taken a step back to re-evaluate their dismissal of Russia since it proved its prowess by invading Georgia in August.

The Russians do not belong to any overarching security architecture like NATO, and previous Russian attempts at such organizations — such as the Warsaw Pact — have failed to approach anything resembling integration on weapons systems or communications. While there are technical arrangements, as with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Collective Security Treaty Organization, these do not rival NATO.

The so-called Helsinki II pact would echo the Helsinki agreement in 1975 that entailed closer relations between Europe and the Soviet Union. The agreement emerged at a time when the United States appeared weak after being tied down in Vietnam, and European politicians were experimenting with “ostpolitik,” a tactic of seeking rapport with the Soviets.

Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
The Russian security proposal is a calculated overture to a Europe that could not be in greater disarray on security and defense matters. European security and defense policy — which French President Nicolas Sarkozy has attempted to revitalize — has dragged on for decades. With Washington and its allies entangled in Iraq (for the United States) and Afghanistan (for the bulk of NATO’s truly expeditionary combat power), Russia has an opportunity to halt NATO enlargement and renegotiate the alliance structure in its Western periphery.

To this end, Moscow is targeting Germany, the one player that has both the geopolitical impetus to bargain with the Kremlin (it is dependent on Russian energy) and the means within NATO to nix membership invitations to countries that Russia does not want to see join, such as Ukraine and Georgia. Moscow’s tactic is based in history: In great part, it was West Germany’s decision to negotiate with the Soviet Union that gave the original Helsinki accord its symbolic power, and now the opportunity has arisen again for Germany to cut a deal.

But it is not just Russia and Europe that are rethinking their alliances; the issue has popped up among the U.S. presidential candidates as well. And it is not just the security alliance of NATO that is being questioned anymore; the larger issue of the effectiveness of the United Nations is also on the table.

During the first presidential debate between John McCain and Barack Obama, McCain raised one of his boldest foreign policy ideas — one that has received little attention so far. Speaking about Iran, McCain said, “What I have proposed for a long time, and I’ve had conversations with foreign leaders about forming a league of democracies, let’s be clear and let’s have some straight talk. The Russians are preventing significant action in the United Nations Security Council.” McCain’s comments echoed previous arguments along the same lines.

Yet the proposal to found a “League of Democracies” is striking and reflects a viewpoint that is gaining support in various foreign policy circles — not necessarily just among U.S. allies. It is a view that rejects multilateralism for the sake of multilateralism and instead imagines forging tighter bonds within an elite set of partners in order to minimize the strategic flaws inherent in grand alliances.

The obvious starting point for this line of thought is the perceived inadequacy of the United Nations. This inadequacy lies not merely in the amount of bureaucracy and politicking necessary to make resolutions at the United Nations, and the problems with enforcing these resolutions, but in the United Nations’ almost complete lack of military capability, beyond small contingents for monitoring and peacekeeping.

NATO faces a different set of problems. It is the most fully integrated international military alliance in history, yet it still suffers from the faults inherent in alliance warfare. Its constituent members often bicker over sharing expenses and hesitate to pony up their share of the costs of military upkeep.

But despite occasional lack of enthusiasm and budget contributions, NATO commands a decent level of cooperation from its members, most of which have relatively capable militaries. The greater problem is that these militaries do not have the capability to engage on more than one front; most of that capability has been taken up by operations in Afghanistan, where NATO forces are scrounging for more materiel, from armor to helicopters. The mission there has frozen NATO members, much as Iraq and Afghanistan have constrained the United States.

NATO leaders have long recognized NATO’s shortcomings and the need for structural reform, but the nature of alliances, with diverse members’ diverse interests, requires that such reforms go through the appropriate political channels, opening up the possibility for innumerable hang-ups and delays. While reform is possible, it will take time, and thus offers little consolation for Western leaders looking to counter Russia’s resurgence now.