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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (43273)11/30/2008 3:30:48 AM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217865
 
second hand cars will disapear from Africa. Cheap loans made new cars available and epople in Europe and Japan were changing cars like they changed their underwear.

Africa became dumping grpund for the second hand vehicles because everyone cold get loan to buy new ones. This may chnage as people will hang on to their existing cars for a loang time as they used to do in the 80's and the few second hand cars in Africa were really old.
Today they are quite new. See Elmat's parking lot. the ones with dusty roof have already run of spare parts or owner has no money to repair. and they are left abandoned. The clean ones are moving, still but possibly will collapse too very soon.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (43273)11/30/2008 2:39:47 PM
From: Pogeu Mahone  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 217865
 
Mortgage law in China: comparing theory and practice
Missouri Law Review, Fall, 2007 by Gregory M. Stein
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VII. THE STABILITY OF THE CHINESE BANKING SECTOR

Most banks operating in China are owned or controlled by the Chinese government, and these banks' lending decisions are more likely to reflect official government policy than astute business judgment. (85) This unusual set of motivations causes the Western observer to wonder whether China's banks are financially viable. Since the competition facing the typical Chinese bank is almost entirely domestic, and thus responsive to the same internal political stimuli, China's banks appear to have little to fear from their local competitors. The same non-business factors that cause one bank to make a poor business decision likely cause that bank's rivals to make similarly poor business decisions. Every Chinese bank is wearing the same pair of weighted shoes.

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Project Management Standard Program A bank also is a business, however. It collects money from its borrowers, who are paying interest on their loans, and must pay interest to its own depositors from these collections. If China's banks make too many loans that are financially unwise, then at some point they may become insolvent. The government may be able to sustain these banks temporarily with infusions of funds--these banks are, after all, instruments of state policy and can be kept afloat with general operating revenues from the government. (86) But if huge, money-losing banks are on China's balance sheet, they could become an enormous drain on China's economy.

As previously noted, China has an astronomical savings rate, and many of China's savers place some of their money in interest-bearing bank accounts. (87) While the rate banks pay on savings accounts is relatively low, the enormous amount of money currently on deposit in China creates an extremely large interest burden and places great pressure on Chinese banks to lend out their deposits at a higher rate. The larger the proportion of nonperforming loans, the greater the pressure banks feel to ensure that the rest of their portfolios perform adequately.

This business pressure is compounded by the government's continuing insistence on funding projects that it deems worthy. The financial demands of depositors combined with the policy mandates of the government make it imperative that China's banks lend briskly. This probably explains why loan officers must meet lending quotas based on volume rather than on the ultimate success or failure of the projects being funded. (88) Several different experts confirmed that the modus operandi of Chinese banks seems to be to lend first and worry later. When I asked one lawyer how the system manages to work, he replied, "As long as the economy keeps growing...."

Estimates of the proportion of nonperforming loans vary. I frequently heard knowledgeable experts--several affiliated with Chinese banks--state that 30-40% of loans held by Chinese banks are nonperforming. One bank attorney told me that the official estimate is in the 20-23% range. A Western attorney advised me that one of his clients, who purchases nonperforming loans from Chinese financial institutions, believes a more accurate number would fall in the 40-50% range. A Chinese expert summarized the issue more tersely: all banks in China are insolvent. Nearly every expert agreed that the four leading Chinese banks, which control a huge segment of the lending market, are insolvent. Another Chinese banker denied the existence of the problem altogether.

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