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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: geode00 who wrote (78687)12/17/2008 5:16:59 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 89467
 
The Great Unraveling
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By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Op-Ed Columnist
The New York Times
December 17, 2008

Hong Kong - The stranger, a Western businessman, slipped into the chair next to me at an Asia Society lunch here in Hong Kong and asked me a question that I can honestly say I’ve never been asked before: “So, just how corrupt is America?”

His question was occasioned by the arrest of the Wall Street money manager Bernard Madoff on charges of running a Ponzi scheme that bilked investors out of billions of dollars, but it wasn’t only that. It’s the whole bloody mess coming out of Wall Street — the financial center that Hong Kong moneymen had always looked up to. How could it be, they wonder, that such brand names as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and A.I.G. could turn out to have such feet of clay? Where, they wonder, was our Securities and Exchange Commission and the high standards that we had preached to them all these years?

One of Hong Kong’s most-respected bankers, who asked not to be identified, told me that the U.S.-owned investment company where he works made a mint in the last decade cleaning up sick Asian banks. They did so by importing the best U.S. practices, particularly the principles of “know thy customers” and strict risk controls. But now, he asked, who is there to look to for exemplary leadership?

“Previously, there was America,” he said. “American investors were supposed to know better, and now America itself is in trouble. Whom do they sell their banks to? It is hard for America to take its own medicine that it prescribed successfully for others. There is no doctor anymore. The doctor himself is sick.”

I have no sympathy for Madoff. But the fact is, his alleged Ponzi scheme was only slightly more outrageous than the “legal” scheme that Wall Street was running, fueled by cheap credit, low standards and high greed. What do you call giving a worker who makes only $14,000 a year a nothing-down and nothing-to-pay-for-two-years mortgage to buy a $750,000 home, and then bundling that mortgage with 100 others into bonds — which Moody’s or Standard & Poors rate AAA — and then selling them to banks and pension funds the world over? That is what our financial industry was doing. If that isn’t a pyramid scheme, what is?

Far from being built on best practices, this legal Ponzi scheme was built on the mortgage brokers, bond bundlers, rating agencies, bond sellers and homeowners all working on the I.B.G. principle: “I’ll be gone” when the payments come due or the mortgage has to be renegotiated.

It is both eye-opening and depressing to look at our banking crisis from China. It is eye-opening because it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the U.S. and China are becoming two countries, one system.

How so? Easy, in the wake of our massive bank bailout, one can now look at China and America and say: “Well, China has a big-state-owned banking sector, next to a private one, and America now has a big state-owned banking sector next to a private one. China has big state-owned industries, alongside private ones, and once Washington bails out Detroit, America will have a big state-owned industry next to private ones.”

Yes, an exaggeration to be sure, but the truth is the differences are starting to blur. For two decades, a parade of U.S. officials came to China and lectured Beijing on the necessity of privatizing its banks, said Qu Hongbin, the chief economist for China at HSBC. “So, slowly we did that, and now, all of a sudden, we see everybody else nationalizing their banks.”

It’s depressing because China in many ways feels more stable than America today, with a clearer strategy for working through this crisis. And while the two countries are looking more alike, they appear to be on very different historical trajectories. China went crazy in the 1970s, with its Cultural Revolution, and only after the death of Mao and the rise of Deng Xiaoping has it managed to right itself, gradually moving to a market economy.

But while capitalism has saved China, the end of communism seems to have slightly unhinged America. We lost our two biggest ideological competitors — Beijing and Moscow. Everyone needs a competitor. It keeps you disciplined. But once American capitalism no longer had to worry about communism, it seems to have gone crazy. Investment banks and hedge funds were leveraging themselves at crazy levels, paying themselves crazy salaries and, most of all, inventing financial instruments that completely disconnected the ultimate lenders from the original borrowers, and left no one accountable. “The collapse of communism pushed China to the center and [America] to the extreme,” said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief China economist at Royal Bank of Scotland.

The Madoff affair is the cherry on top of a national breakdown in financial propriety, regulations and common sense. Which is why we don’t just need a financial bailout; we need an ethical bailout. We need to re-establish the core balance between our markets, ethics and regulations. I don’t want to kill the animal spirits that necessarily drive capitalism — but I don’t want to be eaten by them either.

-Maureen Dowd is off today.

Copyright 2008 The New York Times Company



To: geode00 who wrote (78687)12/21/2008 10:25:00 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
The Anti-Greenspan
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Why Obama's new Fed pick may be the most important member of his economic team.

newsweek.com

By Michael Hirsh
Newsweek Web Exclusive
Dec 19, 2008

He's probably the least-noted member of Barack Obama's new financial regulatory police, but Dan Tarullo may end up having the most impact. Think of Tarullo as the anti-Greenspan, or perhaps as a pro-regulation virus planted in the heart of a Federal Reserve System that for two decades has been predisposed to letting markets self-correct. Certainly Tarullo—who was named Thursday to fill one of two open spots on the seven-member Board of Governors—is far from you run-of-the-mill Fed official. Most governors have been academic economists, bankers or businessmen. Tarullo, a Georgetown law professor who specializes in bank regulation and international monitoring, is basically a high-toned cop. "Our regulatory system has let us down," he said on PBS's Lehrer show last April, before the worst of the subprime fallout hit. "We've had multiple opportunities in the last 10 or 15 years to take account of the new forms of financial activity. We haven't done so."

Most media attention is focused on Obama's nomination of Mary Schapiro, a tough-minded former futures regulator, to head the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Gary Gensler, a Treasury undersecretary in the Clinton administration, to chair the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. But those two may end up waiting on direction from the new super-empowered Fed. Many experts agree that one reason the subprime securitization disaster occurred is because it cut across so many once-segregated sectors; mortgage lending and securitization were once entirely separate practices. The SEC, for example, is only supposed to oversee publicly issued securities, and can't do anything about lending practices. Only the Federal Reserve Board can monitor the entire financial landscape. As a result, Tarullo could potentially play a bigger role than either Schapiro or Gensler in the future financial system, some experts say. "It just depends on what deal was made" with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, "or whether there was a deal," says Ted Truman, a former senior Fed official. "It's not automatic that someone with that kind of expertise would immediately have a role in banking policy. Board members are assigned in terms of seniority."

Bernanke, a conservative, has already expanded regulation. Under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act passed by Congress in 1994, the Fed was given the authority to oversee mortgage loans. But then-Chairman Alan Greenspan, an Ayn Rand libertarian who by his own admission believed that markets could mostly self-correct, kept putting off writing any rules and stoutly resisted other efforts to regulate derivatives on Wall Street. Bernanke, by contrast, earlier this year instituted "Regulation Z," which created common-sense rules such as forbidding loans without sufficient documentation. Bernanke has also vastly expanded the Fed's lending powers to deal with the crisis. He believes the Fed should at some point return to its old modest role as a regulator of the money supply and inflation. But since he is also known to want re-appointment as chairman next year—and incoming Obama economic advisor Larry Summers is said to covet the post—it's likely that Bernanke will go out of his way to satisfy Tarullo.

And that may mean a whole new regulatory structure that will dwarf anything Schapiro does at the SEC or Gensler can accomplish at the CFTC. Those who who've worked with the soft-spoken Tarullo says he brings the right blend of save-the-world zeal and balanced judgment. "I think it's a great choice," says a former senior member of the Clinton administration. "It's the right person with the right skill set and the right judgment at right time."

The question is whether Tarullo will push for too much regulation. In his 2008 book on international banking regulation, "Banking on Basel," Tarullo repeatedly argues that the subprime crisis is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to regulate. "The crisis has—at least for a time—altered the political environment for financial reform by placing banks on the defensive," he wrote. "Domestic reformers may have the upper hand if they move quickly." The debates at the Fed should tell us a lot in the coming months.