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Strategies & Market Trends : The Residential Real Estate Crash Index -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: MulhollandDrive who wrote (173013)12/22/2008 11:11:36 AM
From: MulhollandDriveRead Replies (1) | Respond to of 306849
 
VIX Fails to Forecast S&P 500 Drop, Loses Followers
By Jeff Kearns and Michael Tsang

Dec. 22 (Bloomberg) -- Investors are starting to abandon volatility as a forecasting tool for stocks after one of the most-used measures of price swings failed to anticipate the biggest monthly decline in U.S. equities in 21 years.

The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index flashed “buy” signals for the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index during October’s 17 percent drop, the biggest since the stock market crashed in 1987. The so-called VIX also lost 44 percent since Nov. 20, a bearish signal, even as the S&P 500 rose 18 percent.

Money managers relied on the 18-year-old VIX as a guide for the S&P 500 because the gauge correctly predicted the equity index’s range 84 percent of the time and signaled the end of the bear market in 2002. Volatility, along with stock valuations and equity analysts, failed to signal the scope of declines in the worst year for stocks since 1931 as $1 trillion in credit losses spurred the first simultaneous recessions in the U.S., Europe and Japan since World War II.

“It used to be that an extreme one-week move in the VIX either up or down would give you predictive power, and now it’s just completely broken down,” said Stu Rosenthal, money manager at Volaris Volatility Management, a unit of Credit Suisse Group AG in New York that oversees $4 billion and handles volatility trading strategies for pension funds, hedge funds and wealthy individuals. “You have only 18 years of data, most of which was during one of the greatest bull markets in history.”

Calls and Puts

The VIX is calculated from what investors pay for options on the S&P 500. Because that reflects the cost of insuring equities with calls and puts, analysts developed models to estimate how far stocks are likely to fluctuate based on the level of concern implicit in option prices. Calls convey the right, without the obligation, to buy a security at a set price by a given date. Puts give investors the right to sell.

The S&P 500 traded beneath the lowest level predicted by the VIX from Sept. 29 to Oct. 30, the longest stretch ever, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The benchmark index for U.S. equities also closed 10 percent or more below the lowest price implied by the index on 14 occasions during that period.

The breakdown was unprecedented for the VIX, which had indicated ranges for the S&P 500 that were off by more than 10 percent on just five occasions. Ben Londergan, Chicago-based chief executive officer of Group One Trading, says the gauge remains one of the best guides for investors.

‘The Weatherman’

“Saying the VIX isn’t worth looking at because it failed to predict October is like saying, ‘The weatherman said it was going to snow and it didn’t, so I’m going to stop looking at the forecast,’” said Londergan, whose firm buys and sells VIX options for traders as the contracts’ main market maker. “It’s not infallible, but it’s the best guess actual money is trading on.”

The S&P 500 declined 1 percent to 878.74 at 10:44 a.m. in New York, erasing last week’s advance, as a deteriorating outlook for corporate earnings offset expectations that government spending will revive the economy. The VIX fell 3.7 percent to 43.25.

The S&P 500 advanced or fell at least 1 percent on all but three trading days in October, the most since the crash of 1929. The swings made the VIX unreliable even as it set successive highs. In the 24 consecutive trading days that ended Oct. 30, the S&P 500 closed at a price lower than predicted by its so- called 30-day implied volatility.

‘Gotten Killed’

On Sept. 11, less than a week before New York-based Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. went bankrupt and four days after the government takeovers of Washington-based Fannie Mae and McLean, Virginia-based Freddie Mac, the VIX closed at 24.39. That meant traders bet the S&P 500 wouldn’t fluctuate more than 24.39 percent on an annualized basis, or about 7 percent in the next 30 days, and implied a range for the index of 1,161.11 to 1,336.99.

One month later, on Oct. 10, the S&P 500 closed at 899.22, or a record 23 percent lower than what the VIX predicted.

“You would have gotten killed if you used it,” said Ryan Caldwell, who helps manage about $14 billion at Waddell & Reed Financial in Overland Park, Kansas. “Lately, it’s been tough to use it as a reliable gauge of market direction.”

While the VIX’s climb to 80.86, the highest close on record, coincided with the S&P 500’s 11-year low on Nov. 20, the volatility gauge has plunged since then, a bearish signal to investors who use it as contrarian indicator.

Arbitrage Index

The 44 percent drop since Nov. 20 through last week was the steepest in any period of 20 trading days for the VIX, suggesting investors should sell because options dealers are cutting the price of insurance too quickly. During that stretch, the S&P 500 climbed from 752.44 to 887.88, its biggest advance since the period ended Nov. 6, 2002, Bloomberg data show.

Investors who heeded the VIX this quarter suffered unprecedented losses, according to an index from New York-based Merrill Lynch & Co. that mimics returns of a strategy exploiting the difference between the predicted and actual magnitude of price swings.

The Merrill Lynch Equity Volatility Arbitrage Index plummeted 64 percent this quarter, wiping out more than a decade’s worth of gains, as price swings in the S&P 500 exceeded its implied volatility. From 1990 to 2007, the strategy produced an average return of 13 percent and never recorded a losing year.


Stock valuations and Wall Street analysts also gave “buy” signals prior to the October rout that turned out to be wrong.

Earnings Yield

The S&P 500’s earnings yield, calculated by dividing analysts’ overall profit forecast for companies in the index by its price, rose to 6.7 percent at the end of September, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That was 76 percent above interest payments on 10-year U.S. Treasuries, the biggest gap in 20 years.

Analysts’ forecasts for profits at S&P 500 companies have proven too optimistic for five straight quarters, making price- to-earnings ratios that use estimated income unreliable. The number of “sell” ratings from Wall Street firms also declined to 5.72 percent of stocks tracked by analysts from 5.75 percent in January even as markets plunged, according to Bloomberg data.

Traders may have underestimated the likelihood that price swings would increase because the S&P 500 had suffered only one protracted bear market since 1990, said Volaris’s Rosenthal. That depressed option prices and skewed historical readings.

The VIX had never reached 50 before October. In the five times that the measure got within 2 points of that level --1997, twice in 1998, 2001 and 2002 -- it heralded gains in the S&P 500 that averaged 16 percent in the next three months.

‘Ring the Bell’

“If you looked at the VIX spike and then volatility coming back down, back then I thought ‘Ring the bell, maybe the worst is over,’” said Peter Sorrentino, who helps manage $16 billion at Huntington Asset Advisors Inc. in Cincinnati, including $127 million in options. “Not only did the VIX hit a new high, but the market also hit a new low. If you had used that as a signal to go all in, that was almost a career ender.”

For Fritz Meyer at Invesco Aim Advisors Inc., the biggest problem with relying on the VIX as a forecasting tool is that the index is still a product of predictions about the future.

“It’s just a bunch of guys in the options pit guessing,” said Meyer, the Denver-based senior market strategist at Invesco Aim, which oversees about $358 billion. “I don’t believe it.”

bloomberg.com



To: MulhollandDrive who wrote (173013)12/22/2008 11:35:54 AM
From: MulhollandDriveRead Replies (1) | Respond to of 306849
 
Developers Ask U.S. for Bailout as Massive Debt Looms -WSJ

By LINGLING WEI and JON HILSENRATH

With a record amount of commercial real-estate debt coming due, some of the country's biggest property developers have become the latest to go hat-in-hand to the government for assistance.

More
A recent report by Deutsche Bank shows a sharp drop in the number of loans paying off from October to November. (.pdf)They're warning policymakers that thousands of office complexes, hotels, shopping centers and other commercial buildings are headed into defaults, foreclosures and bankruptcies. The reason: according to research firm Foresight Analytics LCC, $530 billion of commercial mortgages will be coming due for refinancing in the next three years -- with about $160 billion maturing in the next year. Credit, meanwhile, is practically nonexistent and cash flows from commercial property are siphoning off.

Unlike home loans, which borrowers repay after a set period of time, commercial mortgages usually are underwritten for five, seven or 10 years with big payments due at the end. At that point, they typically need to be refinanced. A borrower's inability to refinance could force it to give up the property to the lender.

A recent letter sent to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and signed by a dozen real-estate trade groups, painted a bleak scenario: "Right now, we believe there is insufficient systemic capacity to refinance expiring, performing commercial real-estate loans," said the letter. "For many borrowers, [credit] simply is not available," the letter noted.

To head off some of the impending pain, the industry is asking to be included in a new $200 billion loan program initially created by the government to salvage the market for car loans, student loans and credit-card debt. This money is intended to go directly to help investors finance purchases of securities backed by these assets. If commercial real estate is included, banks might have an incentive to make more loans to developers since they'd be able to repackage and sell them more easily to investors with the assurance of government backing.

As part of their lobbying efforts, some industry representatives have asked lawmakers to explore the idea of setting up a separate program aimed at boosting lending to commercial real estate only.

"We've been urging Washington to put this as one of the top priorities in dealing with the economy," says Steven Spinola, president of the Real Estate Board of New York, underscoring the need for the government to help spur commercial property lending either directly or indirectly.

The real-estate executives are warning that the approaching surge in commercial mortgages coming due poses another major threat to the global financial system, which already is on life support. With rent prices falling and vacancies rising due to the weakening economy, delinquencies on commercial mortgages already have begun to rise sharply.

Up until now, delinquencies on commercial real-estate loans have stayed below historical levels thanks in part to the limited amount of speculative construction in recent years. But now they're rising at a time when a huge volume of loans are coming due and some of the few institutions that were still making loans are retreating from the market.

"The credit crisis has got so bad that refinancing of even good loans may be drying up," says Richard Parkus, head of commercial-mortgage-backed securities research at Deutsche Bank.

Commercial real-estate owners, of course, are just the latest to get in line in Washington, D.C., for the billions of bailout dollars that the government has begun to hand out. Other businesses that have received or are campaigning for some form of aid include banks, credit-card issuers, car companies and even farm equipment maker Deere & Co.

Real-estate owners are pressing the government to take preemptive action before thousands of properties begin to fail. Among those who have been active in the lobbying effort: William Rudin, whose family is a large Manhattan office-building owner, Stephen Ross, chief executive of The Related Cos., a major U.S. developer, and Steven Roth, chief executive of office and retail landlord Vornado Realty Trust.

In recent weeks, industry representatives have met with officials in the Treasury Department, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, senior lieutenants of Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairwoman Sheila Bair, members of President-elect Barack Obama's transition team, and Sen. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.).

One potential challenge for the industry: Though some Treasury and Fed officials are worried about the impact of its troubles on credit markets, other sectors -- such as the residential mortgage and auto industries -- are more pressing concerns.

Treasury and Fed officials have said they would consider including commercial real-estate in the new $200 billion loan initiative. But such a step won't happen soon. The program is not likely to be operational until February. Even then, expanding it to include the immense commercial real estate market would likely require additional financial support from the Treasury.

For now, the Treasury has agreed to backstop the Federal Reserve on as much as $20 billion of losses on the program. That means Treasury will take the first $20 billion of any losses using funds approved by Congress for the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program.

There's widespread agreement that a record volume of commercial real-estate loans made during the boom years are starting to come due. According to Foresight Analytics, the $530 billion of commercial mortgages that will be maturing between now and 2011 includes loans held by banks, thrifts and insurance companies as well as loans packaged and sold as commercial-mortgage-backed securities -- or CMBS.

At the heart of the financing scarcity is the virtual shutdown of the market for CMBS, where Wall Street firms sliced and diced commercial mortgages into bonds. During the recent real-estate boom that took off in 2005 and lasted through early 2007, that market fueled the lending to real estate because banks could sell easily the loans they made. But the credit crisis that started in the summer of 2007 has put the securitization market on hold, which, in turn, has caused lenders of all stripes to become increasingly reluctant to make new loans.

While commercial real-estate developers restrained themselves during the boom years when it came to speculative development, property investors bid up the prices of office buildings, malls and other projects to record levels assuming rents and occupancies would keep rising. With cash flows now falling, a growing number of developers are having a tough time repaying their debt. In cases where owners need to sell buildings to satisfy loans, the current environment makes that difficult. A revitalized lending climate is necessary, they say, to keep them afloat.

What's not clear is how soon the crunch will come. The Real Estate Roundtable, a major industry trade group, predicts that more than $400 billion of commercial mortgages will come due through the end of 2009. Foresight Analytics estimates that $160 billion of commercial mortgages will mature next year.

Jeff DeBoer, president and chief executive officer of the Roundtable, says the group came up with its estimate by looking at the $3.4 trillion of commercial real-estate loans outstanding. It's not unusual for roughly 10% of the industry's debt to roll over every year, he says, referring to refinancings.

This year, some $141 billion worth of commercial real-estate debt owed by property owners and developers to lenders came due, according to Foresight Analytics. Most of that was refinanced or extended by existing lenders. The lion's share of those loans was made between five and 10 years ago. Despite the recent decline in property values, the underlying buildings were still worth well more than their mortgages and were generating sufficient cash to pay debt service.

But the delinquency rate on payments to mortgage lenders is rising, particularly for properties that were financed at the top of the market. Delinquencies on commercial mortgages jumped to 0.96% in November, up from 0.62% in September.

Some analysts predict the delinquency rate will leap to 2% by the end of next year. During the real-estate collapse of the early 1990s, the worst-performing commercial mortgages -- those that were made in 1986 -- sustained losses of about 10%.