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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: maceng2 who wrote (44595)1/1/2009 10:18:43 PM
From: TobagoJack2 Recommendations  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217518
 
i read this just in in-tray, and became simultaneous excited beyond a 30 min long pig's orgasm and wanted to chuck up breakfast, an unique feeling

this probably was already posted.. but in case not....The Nightmare German Inflation by Scientific Market Analysis, 1970.. for full article ... usagold.com

How Investments Fared

At the start it is important to understand how hard it was to obtain real income during the inflation. Professionals, skilled workers and others used to enjoying good income found their real salaries disastrously cut. Those who depended on savings, pensions or investment income for a living faced a terrible situation.

Interest from bonds or savings deposits soon depreciated to where they had no real value. Stocks paid meager dividends or none at all; corporate managements needed the money for working capital, or used it for capital building and speculation. Owners of rental property fared no better; the government froze rents, which soon meant that tenants were occupying premises virtually rent-free. Dipping into capital led to big losses, since cash, bonds and even stocks quickly shrunk drastically in value. The urgent need for income had important effects on the true prices of various types of property and investments.

Cash: Money held in cash lost value rapidly and soon became completely worthless. Of all investment forms, this was the most disastrous.

Bank Deposits: In theory, bank deposits became as worthless as cash. However, after the stabilization the government decreed partial reimbursement, and sums in the range of 15-30% of the original deposit value were repaid. Naturally, however, the great majority of depositors withdrew their funds at some time during the inflation, after much of the value had been lost, and exchanged them for goods. Few Germans held money in deposits through the entire period.

Bonds, Mortgages: As usual in an inflation, bonds and mortgages fell in value even faster than cash. After the stabilization, some restitution was provided by law. Holders of government bonds were reimbursed to the extent of 2.5% of the original bond values. Mortgage holders also received some repayment, while a 1925 law provided for 15-25% reimbursement of corporate bondholders, though the payment was delayed for some years. Here again, few investors held bonds or mortgages throughout the entire period; most holders got rid of them for whatever pittance they would bring during the inflation.

Real Estate: Farmers and holders of urban property seemed to benefit if their property was mortgaged; the inflation soon wiped out the mortgage debt. However, they received no income, as noted above, since rents were frozen. After the stabilization, heavy new taxes and the urgent need for cash forced most holders to remortgage their property, often more heavily than originally, so that their gains were illusory. Still, those who held real estate throughout managed to save the capital thus invested. However, those who sold during the inflation (often through desperate need for cash) fared poorly. Because it brought no income, real estate sold at extremely low real price levels during inflation.

Foreign Exchange: Those who held funds in dollars, pounds or other stable currencies, or in gold, saved their capital. The government set up rigid exchange controls as the inflation proceeded. As usual under such conditions, a black market flourished. The ones who fared best were the small minority who had the foresight to exchange marks into foreign money or gold very early, before new laws made this difficult and before the mark lost too much value.

Personal Property: Capital was preserved by those who early changed it into objects of lasting value--rare coins, stamps, jewelry, works of art, antiques--or into merchandise such as clothing, fabrics, etc. Of course, most people did not understand the advantage of accumulating such property until the inflation was well along. By that time the prices of all goods had risen so much that they seemed outrageously bad bargains. In the event, however, cash proved an even worse bargain.

Common Stocks: In an inflation, common stocks are generally considered a desirable hedge to protect against or even to profit from the rise in prices. In practice, it is not so simple. In this country stock prices have been known to fall violently just when inflation was most evident (1946, 1957, 1966, 1969). Market fluctuations--the rise of exciting new speculative stocks, waves of fear or greed--all make it much too easy to buy or to sell at the wrong time or to go into the wrong stocks.

Getting down to specifics, we can say that those who bought a well-diversified list of stocks in solid, well-established companies quite early in the inflation and who held on throughout the period and also through the stabilization crisis saved much or all of their capital. However, there were many pitfalls along the wayside for the greedy, the fearful and the over-clever. Those who did best were investors with a certain unemotional, stolid character, a basic confidence that strong, well-managed companies would come through, and an immunity to excitement, anxiety and speculative temptations.

Many very sharp but brief advances and declines in the market led to widespread speculation, and well-intentioned investors often wound up as traders. Naturally most of them did as badly as amateur speculators generally do. Many decided that speculation was the only sensible approach; when the entire economy and financial structure was visibly crumbling, who could wait patiently with confidence in the long-range value of anything?





To: maceng2 who wrote (44595)1/1/2009 11:52:18 PM
From: carranza23 Recommendations  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217518
 
In the mean time I am going to throw out models, typically quickly assembled, so as I can see how they compare to current market action and hopefully develop a more comprehensive model that will reflect market reality.

Good idea but I think models are the modern day equivalent of alchemy.

It's the broad trends which matter, and it is easy to lose sight of them because of the noise and the chatter, the signal to noise ratio. The media, politics, the ever present and increasingly detailed discussions, the self interested spin, they all conspire to turn us into a bunch of financially addled children.

As I see the broad trends, first, we have recession, and a fairly severe one at that, which is likely to continue throughout the year and perhaps longer.

Second, it is undisputable that there was a near panic caused by the realization that the credit bubble, the largest in human history, was unsustainable and badly [some would say fraudulently] based. It was not based on increased productivity nor on the creation of real wealth but was instead dependent on the continued increase on the value of the US consumers' real estate. This badly based bubble led directly to the single most spectacular increase, in the shortest time, in the money base in the US in history as policy makers did their best to minimize the damage caused by suddenly ended credit. So far, these injected amounts have not had their effect because the velocity of money has slowed significantly and the financially strapped credit institutions have hoarded cash.

Third, we have seen a historically unprecedented accumulation of currency reserves, mostly of USD, in Asia and the ME in the last few years due to trade and oil exports. As a result, the US has in the space of a relatively few years become the largest debtor after being an enormous creditor.

Those, in my view, are the historical facts from which future financial inferences, and investments, must be made. The few inferences I can draw which seem to have any validity are that the huge amount of money injected into the financial system will someday begin to move. I think this is inevitable. Even a tiny bit of a return to financial stability will be a fuse that sets velocity off. When it does, the sheer size of the injected amounts will cause substantial inflation, thereby devaluing the dollar and the value of foreign exchange reserves held in Asia and in the ME. Even assuming a 20 to 30% devaluation due to inflation [this is a lot, I know, but recall that the dollar's value appears presently much too high], US debt will still be overwhelming unless a robust economic recovery based on increased production and productivity takes place. Will this take place? The $20 trillion question.

In the meantime, I think the only sure thing we can count on is inflation and more conflict between creditor and debtor nations. They are unfortunately held in a Faustian choke hold: while they may wish to reduce their dollar holdings, doing so will only devalue them more. China, in particular, I think has no choice but to spend its reserves, as the recession continues, on infrastructure and modernization. Its peasants need to be brought into the modern age. It needs to become environmentally responsible.

Long story short: after a period of seeming deflation, inflation is the broad theme for 2009 and 2010. Stuff - gold, energy, commodities, etc. - should do well. Most things denominated in the inflating USD will not.

That's my model.