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To: LindyBill who wrote (289190)1/23/2009 11:57:00 PM
From: TimF3 Recommendations  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 794040
 
They both are worthless as "fighter bombers."

Not at all. As a bomber they can do what a F-15, or F-16 can do.

Often the air force won't use those except for high altitude either, but all four aircraft (F-15,F-16,F-22,and F-35) are very capable of flying and attacking at low level. None of them is as damage resistant as an A-10 but than what is?

The Marine F-35 is really worthless. The VTO ability shortens it already short legs.

VTO is useful for use from ships smaller than aircraft carriers, and it would have been useful if Soviet tanks ever attacked the Fulda gap as air bases would be attacked, and being able to operate from dispersed fields would be important. But I think we agree that it isn't nearly as important as it used to be. If we where engaged in a large land war against a major air power, or if we where to scrap the idea of having and deploying large carriers, it would be very important again, but I don't see either of those things happening. "Worthless" might be a bit strong, but the benefit of VTO is for the most part probably not worth the reduced range and increased cost and complexity.

But as for short range the A-10 is also relatively short range (but much longer loiter time than the F-35B), and takes longer to arrive at the target area (unless its already loitering nearby). Don't get me wrong, I think the A-10 is great at what it does, but even for ground attack missions its not like it (or anything else) is perfect in every way, you compromise one ability to get improvement somewhere else. In the case of the A-10 you give up range and speed, and gain gun fire power, and toughness. Its definitely a trade off worth making, but I wouldn't rely on just the A-10 for all tactical ground attack missions (even if we had enough of them for that).



To: LindyBill who wrote (289190)1/24/2009 3:47:59 AM
From: unclewest  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 794040
 
FROM SMall Wars Journal

Jan. 23, 2009

President Obama and the coexistence doctrine

This week, the world witnessed the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States. If opinion polls and the views of the global media are accurate indicators, much of the world is happy to see President Obama installed in office, and equally pleased to see the back of former President George W. Bush.

The world's happiness at this change is presumably tied to an assumption that the United States will have a new foreign policy, one based on "realism." In his inaugural address, Obama pledged to work with the world as he finds it. The new president said:

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

Obama thus seems willing to accept the nation-state system as it is. This new attitude should be a relief to foreign governments, both authoritarian and democratic, many of which found the Bush approach to democracy promotion either destabilizing or illegitimate.

If the Obama administration is now supporting a new era of "coexistence," it will please Col. David Maxwell of the U.S. Army, a career Special Forces officer and a contributor to Small Wars Journal. In his "Proposal for a Unifying Strategic Doctrine for National Security," Colonel Maxwell proposes retiring the "negative lexicon of the [global war on terror]/Long War" and replacing it with a "positive strategic doctrine" he calls "Co-existence." How does Colonel Maxwell define "Co-existence"?

A doctrine of Co-existence recognizes that each nation-state must be in charge of its own security and while friends, partners, or allies can provide external support, in the end a nation must assert its sovereignty and protect itself. The U.S. or another country cannot win a counter-insurgency fight in another nation's territory. It can only provide external support to that nation fighting against lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. ... A doctrine of Co-existence recognizes that a nation's security can be protected by like-minded nations working together to protect the nation-state system and nations' sovereignty.

As the painful experiences of this decade have reminded us, the United States can succeed in irregular warfare only when it works "through, by, and with" indigenous forces, hopefully those of a legitimate government.

However, we are in an era when the power of nonstate actors is growing, and the authority of many nation-state governments is dwindling. This opens up opportunities for both nation-states and nonstate actors to "game" the nation-state system. For example, inside Pakistan, powerful nonstate actors function in parallel with the legitimate government, and very likely with the approval, support, and protection of certain factions within that government. The Iranian government has provided support for nonstate actors within the territory of other nation-states, a practice also followed by many other governments in many other places. Support of "proxy" nonstate actors is a long-standing method used by nation-states to achieve goals when other methods are unavailable or impractical. A policy of "Co-existence" with nation-states might leave open some gaps if some of those nation-states are bypassing the nation-state system to advance their own interests.

Withdrawing from Iraq: too slow or too fast?

MORE AT : foreignpolicy.com