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To: Cactus Jack who wrote (159669)2/4/2009 1:49:21 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361974
 
McDermott, Will & Emery Lays Off 60 Attorneys & 89 Staffers
_______________________________________________________________

By Lynne Marek
The National Law Journal
February 4, 2009

The Chicago law firm McDermott, Will & Emery has cut 60 lawyers, or about 5 percent of its attorney head count, and 89 staff employees, citing a slowdown in clients' business and a resulting drop in firm work on corporate transactions, among other matters.

"We are not immune to the continued deterioration in market conditions," firm Chairman Harvey Freishtat said in a memo to employees. "The business of our clients has slowed and this has affected our own levels of activity, particularly in the transactional area."

The firm, which was founded in Chicago, had about 1,100 lawyers and 1,210 non-attorney employees before the reduction. McDermott follows in the footsteps of other major law firms across the country, including Morrison & Foerster, Blank Rome and Mayer Brown, that have also cut their attorney workforces in recent months in the face of decreased client demand in certain areas, such as real estate and financial securities work.

Firms with a large presence in Chicago, where McDermott has its biggest office, seem to have been particularly hard hit, with Katten Muchin Rosenman; Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal; Kirkland & Ellis; and Seyfarth Shaw all paring attorneys since the beginning of October, sometimes in step with annual evaluations.

Even smaller Chicago firms have been trimming their lawyer workforces, noting a slowdown in work from clients who are also cutting their own budgets in response to the global economic recession. For instance, Levenfeld Pearlstein, which froze rates this year in response to client cost pressures; Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon; and Neal Gerber & Eisenberg each eliminated a handful of lawyer positions last month.

Chicago Legal Search recruiter Chris Percival said that the city was simply catching up with reductions that law firms based primarily on the coasts had made earlier, mainly last year. Still, another Chicago recruiter, Art Gunther, who leads the Gunther Group, said Chicago firms may be cutting more because they tend to operate leaner than their competitors.

"Chicago firms are pretty financially conservative and don't want to be left with more personnel than they really need," Gunther said. "While that may be something that every firm in the country is worried about, I think Chicago firms have a history of being frugally managed."

The economic environment also offers an opportunity to "thin the ranks without a reputational blow," Gunther said.

McDermott's Freishtat said in the memo that the firm "performed well" last year and "remains strong" going into this year. He plans to start visiting all 15 of the offices next week to talk with employees about the financial results and plans for this year. McDermott declined to say how many attorneys were cut from each of its offices or practice areas.

"Be assured that we remain a very strong firm with a deep talent pool, an impressive and diverse base of clients and practices, an international platform, and a healthy balance sheet," said Freishtat, who is based in the firm's Boston office.

The chairman called the decision to cut workers "tremendously difficult" and said that the staff affected will be meeting with their managers. The firm will provide severance benefits, career counseling and a fund "to assist staff who may face economic hardship after leaving the firm," the memo said.

McDermott has taken other steps to respond to the market downturn's impact on clients, including additional expense reductions and an expansion of client services.




To: Cactus Jack who wrote (159669)2/4/2009 1:55:41 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361974
 
In Tough Times, the Best GCs Look a Lot Like the Best Litigators
_______________________________________________________________

By Robert G. Abrams
Legal Times
February 4, 2009

As the Wall Street meltdown continues and the federal bailout is deployed, it is still unclear what the bottom line will be. But one thing companies can be sure of is there will be litigation, and lots of it.

That puts the onus on general counsel to take immediate action to protect their constituents on an unprecedented number of levels. For any company directly or indirectly affected, having the right general counsel in place is critical if it is to manage the potential onslaught and emerge with its finances, reputation and operating structure intact.

What constitutes the "right" general counsel? While there is a laundry list of attributes that any effective in-house lawyer will possess, the game changes dramatically when major litigation, government investigations and shareholder disputes loom simultaneously. In challenging times, the qualities that distinguish top trial attorneys may be the key differentiators for successful general counsel. These qualities are big-picture thinking, judgment and credibility, and effective communication skills.

At the outset, an effective general counsel must be able to evaluate his company's exposure to the financial crisis from a variety of perspectives, some obvious, some emerging and others not yet revealed. He must make educated decisions to eliminate or mitigate risk and map out appropriate strategies. He must sell the plan to the board, investors and senior management. And lastly he must execute that plan.

Going back only a few years, it is easy to find telling examples of the named attributes at work (or not) and the value of having the right (or wrong) general counsel. As the financial hangover looms over 2009, corporations should be evaluating who will lead them through the difficult times ahead.

THINK OF THE BIG PICTURE

A key attribute of great general counsel is big-picture thinking -- that is, the ability to appreciate and consider all legal, business and public relations aspects of a situation, along with potential pitfalls and possible remedies. Counsel must recognize and balance the sometimes conflicting interests and desires of forceful constituencies -- directors, officers, external auditors, regulators and shareholders. Counsel must also think beyond the immediate crisis and consider long-term corporate goals.

An in-house lawyer who sees the whole scenario can help protect or salvage a company. Consider the case of Tyco International, where the chief executive officer and chief financial officer looted the company of more than $100 million. Afterward, a new general counsel implemented significant changes to guard against future wrongdoing and to restore investor and employee confidence.

One such change was the naming of a full-time ombudsman, who provided a critical means of gathering information in an environment of trust. This example of big-picture thinking signaled to internal and external audiences that Tyco was serious about addressing its errors.

More generally, think about government and internal investigations. In the past, the rush to self-report and obtain credit for cooperation meant companies would disclose highly confidential information. This disclosure frequently led to complete waiver of the privilege over that information. The information then often landed in the hands of plaintiffs counsel, thereby giving them a road map to the alleged wrongdoing.

However, a general counsel with foresight (and, more importantly, a litigation background) would hesitate before making sweeping disclosures and would weigh whether the short-term gains achieved by waiver would outweigh the long-term implications for the company. (And, of course, we now see that those general counsel who did not rush to report or systemically waive privilege for cooperation credit did grasp the bigger picture -- given the September 2008 release of the Filip policy, which retreats significantly from the government's position on giving cooperation credit.)

As companies strive to reduce risk, control costs and batten down the hatches, they should set a premium on a general counsel's ability to think beyond the legal ramifications of each decision. General counsel will increasingly need to choose between taking winnable (though not slam-dunk) cases to trial and risk potentially huge damage awards, high attorney fees, and a drag on shareholder value versus settling early. Before choosing the latter route, general counsel must look months and years down the road. Do the benefits of removing big-ticket litigation from the books today outweigh the message about the company's readiness to fight questionable lawsuits and the risk of emboldening competitors and plaintiffs lawyers tomorrow? When are settlements with licensing deals, long-term contracts or supplier agreements in the company's best interest, and when aren't they?

JUDGED CREDIBLE

Sound and steady judgment is also of paramount importance to all great general counsel. It is the key to achieving the access and influence necessary to persuade top decision-makers to accept counsel's strategies and vision.

The in-house lawyer's judgment is measured by his ability to make wise choices quickly and under immense pressure. A general counsel who has the confidence of his constituents will have the credibility to steer those constituents in times of crisis. But if they do not respect his judgment, they may second-guess his decisions and recommendations, perhaps rendering him ineffective or delaying action when delay is a real enemy.

A general counsel's credibility is a major determinant in whether a board adopts his tough or otherwise unpopular recommendations. When a general counsel is trusted, decisions such as whether to initiate and how to define the scope of an internal inquiry will be left to him. A strong history of making the right calls, even in less fraught situations, will give the general counsel the latitude he needs to prudently manage the company's response to major regulatory investigations, class actions, derivative suits and other litigation. Conversely, a general counsel with no such history will not be able to urge the tough calls when they need to be made. Indeed, he may not even speak up.

Remember the highly publicized incident where the general counsel for Hewlett-Packard Co. failed to question the advice of outside counsel to acquire board members' phone records through pretexting. By failing to exercise better judgment, the general counsel injured the company's reputation and created avoidable legal problems. Ultimately, the chairman of the board was charged with violations of state law and forced to resign. And to this day, the actions of the board, general counsel and outside counsel are held up as a what-not-to-do lesson on corporate governance.

Conversely, this past April, after announcing nearly $20 billion (on top of a previous $18 billion) in write-downs and the resignation of its chairman, UBS AG illustrated just how much currency judgment and credibility carry. The company's general counsel was named chairman, despite the fact that he was not a banker by training. Evaluating the unexpected choice, a former colleague explained that the general counsel had "a strong sense of fairness" and "keeps his head cool in a crisis."

PERSUASIVELY SAID

Finally, a general counsel must be able to communicate well with his audience in order to convince them to accept advice and reach consensus. Just as a trial attorney anticipates how different ways of presenting information to a jury will be received, so must an in-house lawyer think about how his arguments will be heard by various constituents. A wise counselor tailors his message to his audience.

Take the example of a general counsel who concludes that the company must offer a more robust disclosure of financial risks because its investment portfolio is heavily loaded with exotic derivatives that now have no market. Recognizing the issue and appreciating the ramifications are only the first steps; the ability to convince others that his recommendation is the right course of action may be the hardest part.

In-house lawyers at embattled companies can learn a lesson from the general counsel of Siemens AG, which recently put to rest a two-year internal investigation into corporate corruption. While the fines ultimately levied were record-setting, the investigation had the potential to last many more years at tremendous cost, causing untold business disruption and a severe drag on shareholder value.

In mid-2007, the internal investigation had reportedly stalled because managers were stonewalling. It was not until the general counsel made the bold decision to offer amnesty to internal whistle-blowers, protecting them against claims for damages and unilateral job loss, that the investigation got back on track. Amnesty was likely not a popular idea the first time it was mentioned within Siemens' walls, but it was the kind of game changer that an effective general counsel should suggest.

Whether a company has the right general counsel in place can be the deciding factor in how well that company survives or avoids a host of legal woes. Big-picture thinking, judgment and credibility, and effective communication -- we see these attributes at play every day when top lawyers engage in bet-the-company litigation. For many general counsel, it won't get much more bet-the-company than this.

Just ask Lehman Brothers or the Tribune Co. or General Motors or ...

*Robert G. Abrams is co-chairman of global litigation at Howrey. Based in the firm's Washington, D.C., office, he can be contacted at abramsr@howrey.com.



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (159669)2/4/2009 4:02:38 AM
From: SiouxPal  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 361974
 
Gonzales lauds 'tremendous job' by his Justice Department

cnn.com



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (159669)2/4/2009 4:22:01 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361974
 
Madoff Tipster Markopolos Cites ‘Ineptitude’ in SEC’s Inquiry

By Jesse Westbrook, David Scheer and Mark Pittman

Feb. 4 (Bloomberg) -- Harry Markopolos, a former money manager who sought to convince regulators for nine years that Bernard Madoff was a fraud, said the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission suffers from “investigative ineptitude.”

Markopolos, in testimony prepared for Congress today, said he contacted the SEC in 2000 after examining Madoff’s investment strategy and determining in four hours that returns exceeding 10 percent weren’t possible. Markopolos, in almost a decade of communication, said only one SEC staff member understood Madoff’s scheme and “the threat it posed to the public.”

“My experiences with other SEC officials proved to be a systemic disappointment and lead me to conclude that the SEC securities lawyers, if only through their investigative ineptitude and financial illiteracy, colluded to maintain large frauds such as the one to which Madoff later confessed,” Markopolos said in 65 pages of written testimony.

U.S. lawmakers, who began investigating Madoff’s case last month, are hearing from Markopolos for the first time as they try to determine how regulators missed his alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme, the biggest in history. The proceeding may shape the SEC’s fate as Congress debates whether to bolster the regulator or turn its responsibilities over to another agency.

Markopolos, 52, will testify to the House Financial Services Committee’s capital markets panel along with SEC directors Linda Thomsen, enforcement; Andrew Donohue, investment management; Erik Sirri, trading and markets; Lori Richards, compliance and inspections; and Acting General Counsel Andy Vollmer.

Clout, Relationships

SEC Inspector General David Kotz told lawmakers Jan. 5 that he was investigating whether Madoff’s clout and relationships with regulators helped the money manager avoid detection. Madoff sat on an SEC advisory committee and was chairman of the Nasdaq Stock Market.

Markopolos, in his written remarks, said that resume made him fear for his life as he and a team of advisers scrutinized the manager’s Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. His testimony included 310 pages of e-mails and financial documents.

“Our analysis lead us to conclude that Mr. Madoff’s fund and the secret walls around it posed great danger to those questioning and investigating them,” he said. “He was one of the most powerful men on Wall Street and in a position to easily end our careers or worse.”

Markopolos described repeated meetings with SEC investigators in Boston and New York, saying they appeared to lack the financial expertise needed to understand his warnings or brushed them off. He later tried to alert the media, without success, he said.

‘Clearly Deceiving’

“BM’s math never made sense, his performance charts were clearly deceiving, and his return stream never resembled any known financial instrument or strategy,” he said, referring to Madoff by initials. “To believe in BM was to believe in the impossible.”

Markopolos in 2005 shared his concerns with Meaghan Cheung, a branch chief in the SEC’s New York office. Markopolos said he gave Cheung with a 21-page report alleging that Madoff was paying off old investors with money from fresh recruits.

“Ms. Cheung never expressed even the slightest interest in asking me questions,” Markopolos said. “She never initiated a call to me. I was the one always calling her. She was unresponsive and mostly uncommunicative when I did call.”

SEC spokesman John Nester declined to comment.

Cheung approved an internal memo in November 2007 to close an SEC investigation of Madoff without bringing any claim. She later left the agency.

‘Behaved Ethically’

No active telephone number was listed for her in two Internet directories. On Jan. 7, she told the New York Post she had worked hard to pursue fraud at the agency for 10 years.

“Everyone in the New York office behaved ethically and responsibly and did as thorough an investigation as we could do,” she told the newspaper.

After more interactions with SEC officials, Markopolos said by last year he had “truly given up on the BM investigation.” Federal prosecutors arrested Madoff Dec. 11 after he allegedly confessed to his sons that his investment-advisory business was “one big lie.”

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, sworn in Jan. 27, should assess the staff and determine what skills it lacks, Markopolos said.

“My bet is that Ms. Schapiro will find that she has too many attorneys and too few professionals with any sort of financial background,” he said.

The regulator will only attract employees who understand balance sheets, income statements, derivatives and complex trading strategies if it adopts the “industry’s compensation guidelines,” Markopolos said.

Central Office

Schapiro should set up a central office to respond to all whistleblower complaints, which are handled by the agency’s regional bureaus on an “ad hoc basis,” he said. Markopolos also said the new chairman should consider relocating the SEC to a city in the U.S. Northeast from Washington.

“Washington is a political center not a financial center,” he said. “If the SEC wants to attract the top talent, relocating its headquarters to somewhere between Rye, New York, and New Haven, Connecticut, is where this agency will best attract the foxes with industry experience it so desperately needs.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Jesse Westbrook in Washington at jwestbrook1@bloomberg.net; David Scheer in New York at dscheer@bloomberg.net; Mark Pittman in New York at mpittman@bloomberg.net.

Last Updated: February 4, 2009 00:01 EST