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Strategies & Market Trends : The Residential Real Estate Crash Index -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Jim McMannis who wrote (189396)	3/8/2009 2:43:42 PM
From: Lizzie Tudor	Respond to of 306849

LOL yeah I think Reich is kind of a character, he doesn't really bug me, he was always out in "LEFT" field, one of the minority voices

To: Jim McMannis who wrote (189396)	3/8/2009 3:17:53 PM
From: bentway	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 306849

I think we need a Volker/Reich combo on the economy. Volker is big enough that he could carry Reich in a little baby carrier strapped to his chest. Volker could dish out the harsh medicine we need, and Reich could insure that the little guys don't starve under overpasses.

To: Jim McMannis who wrote (189396)	3/8/2009 8:52:25 PM
From: NOW	Respond to of 306849

Back to our argument about the underlying central causes of this current mess, glad to see that Noland is on the right side of this argument: "There is no doubt the securitization and CDS (Credit default swap) markets were key facets of the Credit boom and are today at the heart of the devastating bust. Financial “innovation” always plays a critical role in major Bubbles – and this process of experimentation and innovation is consistently evolutionary in nature. While it is in many ways reasonable to cast blame upon these markets and their operators, Lessons Learned requires an understanding as to how these markets came to play such decisive roles. What critical features of the financial landscape contributed to the marketplace’s enthusiasm for these types of instruments? More specifically, how was it that Total Mortgage Credit growth surpassed $1.5 TN annualized during the first-half of 2006? How did asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance balloon to $900bn annualized in late-2006? How was it that Wall Street asset growth surpassed $1.0 TN annualized during the first-half of 2007? How could CDO issuance have possibly reached $1.0 TN in 2007 – and that the CDS market mushroomed to more than $60 Trillion at the very top of the Credit cycle? The ratings agencies provide such easy and browbeaten scapegoats. They adorned “AAA” ratings on Trillions of MBS, ABS, and CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) during the heyday of the boom – back when home prices were forever rising, incomes were surging, Credit losses were disappearing, and New Era Babble was as unnerving as it was alluring. The rating agencies, Wall Street, Congress and virtually everyone else believed the boom was sustainable. But the radically-altered Post-Bubble backdrop now finds the rating agencies appearing as nincompoops complicit with shady Wall Street operators. Such a post-boom spotlight is predictable. From an analytical perspective, however, focus on the idiocies and malfeasance of the boom is certain to neglect key Bubble nuances. From a “Moneyness of Credit” perspective, the Wall Street Credit mechanism evolved to the point of creating virtually endless debt instruments perceived by the marketplace as safe and liquid stores of nominal value (contemporary “money”). One cannot overstate the principal role top-rated money-like debt instruments played in fueling the Bubble, although let’s not get carried away and convince ourselves that the rating agencies had much at all to do with market psychology and speculative dynamics. For more culpable villains I suggest Washington look in the mirror. The “moneyness” enjoyed by Wall Street finance was either explicitly or implicitly underwritten within the beltway."