To: i-node who wrote (466115 ) 3/24/2009 11:44:45 PM From: tejek Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574796 Eisenhower did NOT start the Vietnam war. The Geneva Conference July 1954 In July of 1954, a conference was convened in Geneva in an attempt to resolve the problems in Indochina. Although an agreement was reached, its provisions were quickly violated and the plan never came to fruition. The agreement reached on the 20th and 21st of July included: (1) the nation of Vietnam was guaranteed its independence (2) national elections, under international supervision, would be held two years hence (July 1956) (3) in the interim period, Vietnam would be divided at the 17th Parallel(just to the north of Hue on the map). Control of the north would be held by the Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh while control in the South would be held by forces who had fought with the French. The United States disapproved of the agreement, did not sign the accord, and announced that it felt no obligation to abide by it. Instead, in September 1954, the United States became, along with Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This alliance was designed to resist the spread of communism in southeast Asia. Two Vietnams Thereafter, the situation evolved such that there were two Vietnams. The north defined itself as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It became a communist regime led by Ho Chi Minh with its capital in Hanoi. The "southern" nation was called the Republic of Vietnam. It established its capital in Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) and was led by the French-educated Catholic, Ngo Dinh Diem. South Vietnam quickly became an ally of the United States and Diem was "our man" in Vietnam.The rationale developed by the Eisenhower Administration to explain its economic and military support of South Vietnam became known as the "domino theory." Likening the countries of southeast Asia as a row of dominos, the President argued that if one country fell, it would trigger the fall of others (like a row of dominos). In The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Brookings Institution, 1969), Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts point to the rise of a decision rule within the Eisenhower and subsequent administrations: "Do what was necessary to avoid losing South Vietnam by force." The history of the war is, in part, the growing economic, political, and human costs of "what was necessary" to prevent this domino from falling.faculty.smu.edu