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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: ManyMoose who wrote (34801)4/13/2009 11:06:17 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Good point.

If it is not a high polling talking point Obama isn't going to do it.

How many polls he had to take before he would allow the military to rescue the captain taken hostage by Somali pirates?



To: ManyMoose who wrote (34801)4/15/2009 4:05:37 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Somali Extremists Have al Qaeda Ties
Another failed state has become a training ground for terrorists.
APRIL 15, 2009

By ALI SOUFAN
The mortars fired at the plane carrying New Jersey Rep. Donald Payne out of Mogadishu Airport on Monday were a sharp reminder that although the recent focus on Somalia has been on piracy, the bigger threat comes from terrorists operating onshore. On land, radical jihadists now have one of the largest territories from which to operate since the Taliban hosted al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

The terrorist group that fired on Mr. Payne is al Shabab ("the Youths"), a one-time military wing of the Islamist Courts Union that ruled Somalia for six months before Ethiopia invaded and deposed them in December 2006. Designated as a terrorist organization by the State Department, al Shabab's aim is to create a Taliban-style Islamic state in Somalia. In pursuit of this goal it uses the most ruthless of methods: executions, beatings, torture and suicide bombing.

Since Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia earlier this year, al Shabab has taken control of important towns inland and along the coast, including the port towns of Kismayo and Marka. The group has also reportedly entered into financial arrangements with pirates operating from port cities under al Shabab's control. Al Shabab's numbers are steadily rising; it's estimated that they now have up to 7,000 fighters. And it helps that they pay their fighters with cash as well as the promise of martyrdom.

Unfortunately, al Shabab is a particularly difficult terrorist group to combat because of its asymmetrical and loose organizational structure. Similar to post-9/11 al Qaeda, its senior leaders give broad direction but leave day-to-day operations to individual commanders who control groups of around 100 fighters. So even if senior leaders are killed, individual commanders can easily continue operating.

Al Qaeda has had a relationship with Somali extremists since the early 1990s when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan. During my time as an FBI agent targeting the al Qaeda network, I interviewed several operatives in the late '90s and '00s who told me how bin Laden established a base in Nairobi to facilitate the group's Somali operations under the cover of a nonprofit group called Help Africa. Members of the Nairobi cell coordinated the 1998 East Africa embassy suicide bombings that killed 12 U.S. citizens and hundreds of Africans. This marked al Qaeda's emergence as an internationally recognized top terrorist group and earned bin Laden a place on the FBI's most-wanted list.

To this day, al Shabab's leadership is closely linked to al Qaeda. Many in the current leadership cadre are graduates of al Qaeda training camps. Al Shabab leader Ibrahim Haji Jama trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan (his nom de guerre in Somalia is al-Afghani). Another leader, Abu Taha al-Sudani, known also as Tariq Abdullah, was al Qaeda's leader in East Africa and is believed to be the main financier of its African operations.

Veteran al Qaeda terrorists help make up al Shabab's ranks. They include Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, a former member of bin Laden's Nairobi base who is wanted by the U.S. -- a $5 million FBI bounty is on his head -- for his involvement in the 1998 East African embassy bombings. Two other prominent al Shabab members, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and Issa Osman Issa, are also wanted for their involvement in terrorist activities.

Bin Laden himself has described al-Shabab as "one of the most important armies in the Mujahid Islamic battalion." And in a recording last February, bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, devoted the bulk of his message to praising al Shabab in Somalia, calling their recent activities "a step on the path of the victory of Islam."

Somalia's president, Sharif Ahmed, the leader of the Islamic Courts Union, is today seen as a moderate. He has promised to restrain his former comrades. But even if he is sincere, he lacks the resources and troops to stop the lawlessness in his country.

All of this is important because the freedom of radical extremists to operate in Somalia is a direct threat to America and the West. The lawlessness in Somalia and along its coastlines, combined with its porous border with Kenya, allows terrorists to easily travel in and out of Somalia to Somali communities across the world. Cities such as Minneapolis, Stockholm, Cardiff and Dubai, all have large Somali populations, as do neighboring countries like Yemen, Kenya and Ethiopia.

One terrorist who blew himself up in Somalia, Shirwa Ahmed, was an American from Minnesota. Several terrorist attacks in Yemen, including the Sept. 17, 2008, attack on the American Embassy and the recent suicide bombing that targeted Korean tourists, were linked to Somalia-trained al Qaeda operatives. The FBI put al Shabab near the top of its list of terrorist groups it believed might attempt to attack the U.S. during President Barack Obama's inauguration.

There are options we can pursue to begin improving the situation. A comprehensive international diplomatic push to stabilize Somalia is crucial. In the meantime, the U.S. has to put in place a regional strategy that encompasses diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law-enforcement and military initiatives aimed at weakening the terrorists and enhancing living conditions for civilians.

The plan may include covert actions against al Shabab leaders and camps; apprehension and prosecution of wanted operatives; increasing aid to the president and his allies if they are determined to be trustworthy; increasing aid to Kenya to help it better police its borders; and an effort to bring neighboring Eritrea and Ethiopia on board. We should also expand the mandate of African Union troops based there. (Western troops are unlikely to be sent to the region because of earlier failed missions.) This can be done in concert with pressuring al Shabab's foreign supporters. Money flows to the group from wealthy Arab donors, and arms are believed to travel through Eritrea and Yemen.

On Sept. 11, 2001, America learned that a seemingly insignificant far-away country could turn out to be a major threat to our security. If al Qaeda manages to pull off another terrorist attack, there is a strong chance it will be linked to Somalia. This time we've been warned.

Mr. Soufan was an FBI supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005.

online.wsj.com



To: ManyMoose who wrote (34801)10/22/2009 10:06:27 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Obama and Darfur
Dictators and double standards.
OCTOBER 22, 2009.

"I am deeply concerned by reports that the Bush Administration is negotiating a normalization of relations with the Government of Sudan. . . . This reckless and cynical initiative would reward a regime in Khartoum that has a record of failing to live up to its commitments."

—Senator Barack Obama, April 2008

We found this not-so-ancient statement on the Obama campaign's Web site, under a picture of the candidate and the quote, "I'm asking you to believe." On Monday, the Obama Administration took its own first step toward normalizing relations with Khartoum, promising a "menu of incentives and disincentives" for a government the U.S. has repeatedly accused of genocide. Please don't call it "reckless and cynical."

What's on that menu isn't clear, since its contents are only described in what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calls a "classified annex to our strategy." The Administration only promises that it won't make any concessions to Khartoum until it sees evidence of better behavior. Two State Department officials told Foreign Policy magazine that the annex consists of benchmarks "on whether or not progress is being made." Tough stuff.

What's plainly off the menu can easily be guessed by Mrs. Clinton's reference to the incentives and disincentives being "political and economic." In other words, even if Sudan continues to behave badly it will not incur penalties—such as a NATO-enforced no-fly zone—that could actually force it to change its ways. At worst, Sudan might be forced to live with a somewhat longer list of U.S. or international sanctions, none of which have had the slightest effect on its policies toward Darfur, much less its abiding popularity with China and Arab states.

Sudanese President Omar Bashir does have a knack for making tactical concessions to the West, such as expelling Osama bin Laden in 1996 or agreeing to a peace deal with his restive south earlier this decade. So he may choose to take a similar route now. But as Mr. Obama himself once seemed to understand, this is a regime with an almost flawless record of violating its commitments. Any policy of "incentives" is likely to give the regime the breathing room to prepare its next round of atrocities.

The larger wonder is how all of this can go down so smoothly with those in the human-rights community who have championed Darfur and assailed the Bush Administration for not doing enough. Instead, they are congratulating Mr. Obama, in part because he didn't take the even softer line on Sudan being advocated by U.S. special envoy J. Scott Gration. Perhaps the Darfur activists should ask why Khartoum instantly praised the new policy for representing the "new Obama spirit."

It's hard to avoid the conclusion that for many activists and columnists, as for Senator Obama, Darfur was less a moral cause than a partisan club. Anyone can put a "Save Darfur" sticker on his bumper. For the sake of the people of Darfur, we hope that's not all they're going to get from President Obama.

online.wsj.com