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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: energyplay who wrote (49640)5/5/2009 2:43:19 PM
From: KyrosL  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217974
 
Here it is:

Case for gold – just not now

By John Dizard

Published: May 3 2009 14:01 | Last updated: May 3 2009 14:01

While I believe we will be in a secular bull market in gold for several more years, it’s time to be not just cautious on the metal, but an outright seller. April brought some hope to the gold bulls, with a brief break above $900 an ounce, based in part on the notion the Chinese government was about to ease out of its dollar reserves and into gold. But that was based on a mistaken read of Beijing politics, and some naïve ideas about the utility of the metal as a reserve asset.

The Chinese government has been sending a series of messages to the US administration about the risks of its optimistic budget plans. Most of those are not so veiled hints about international monetary system “reform”, ie de-dollarisation. A couple of weeks ago, though, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which manages the largest part of the country’s foreign currency assets, announced that its gold holdings now came to 1,054 metric tonnes, 70 per cent higher than it had previously reported.

This was consistent with China’s line that it is not a captive customer of the US Treasury’s but Safe’s announcement was taken far more seriously as a trading signal than it should have been. Andy Smith, a veteran gold trader in London, points out that “Safe is not that high up the policy food chain”. He’s right – it’s a subsidiary of the People’s Bank of China, not an independent power.

As Mr Smith says: “They had been under pressure to show they were performing on their grand strategy for diversification. They had to do something, so they pulled their gold purchases out from the mattress. These were not new purchases, but old stuff they hadn’t got round to reporting before.”

Nevertheless, this was good for some front page headlines, and gold, which had just moved slightly over $900, moved further up on the announcement. It was what the Wall Street fiduciaries call a sucker’s rally.

Beijing does have a problem with finding enough liquid assets in which to park its reserves, but it is effectively impossible for gold to replace the dollar. The PBOC’s main strategy, which is trying to come up with some composite, or commonly agreed, international reserve currency, is problematic, but has more possibilities.

The logistical issues with replacing the dollar with gold as a means of payment are hard to overcome. If you need to pay for a tanker full of oil, you can have an assistant trader do a wire transfer with dollars or euros in five minutes. To transfer the same value of gold from one place to another takes far longer, and far more paperwork, even if it’s just moving the metal from one cage at the New York Fed to another. If you are actually shipping it from one continent to another, the shipping, security, etc is expensive and clumsy.

Gold is a good store of value, but much more practical for individuals with millions, or institutions with hundreds of millions, rather than countries with hundreds of billions.

And, unfortunately for the gold bulls, the store-of-value story only works as long as you can afford to store value. If you need cash to pay bills, you unstore it. GFMS Ltd, the statistical service, reports that scrappage, or gold recycled through dealers to be melted down, was over 500 tonnes in the first quarter, a normal quota for a full year. That would offset the buying by the gold exchange traded funds. Mitsui believes scrapping could be over 1,000 tonnes. Whatever the number, distressed sellers have been weighing on the supply, and now the psychology, of the market.

Dennis Gartman, the trader, Canadian closed end fund manager, and market analyst, says: “I don’t think gold recovers for a long time. The gold ETFs probably have 25-30 per cent too much metal in them. That will be liquidated. You will be surprised by how far down it goes.” Mr Gartman is also a long-term gold bull, but that is very long term. Like years. In the meantime, he says, “I can see gold going back to $750 with ease.”

Just eyeballing the charts, that looks a reasonable level, but I believe the metal bounces down to its lows within a few months, and begins to recover by the end of the year.

What brings it back? The investment demand for gold is driven by inflation and systemic risk. Outside Zimbabwe, we don’t have an inflation problem right now, and the sanguine reaction to the auto bankruptcies tells me that systemic risks have been substantially mitigated. Or, rather, the perception of those risks.

No later than the end of the third quarter and the beginning of the fourth quarter, though, the public is going to become aware of the next wave of systemic issues. Outright defaults, not just bad marks, in part from commercial real estate and leveraged corporate loans, will require politically difficult recapitalisations in the US. European institutions will become more obviously distressed.

So you will want to own more gold, but there’s no reason not to wait until it gets close to, or past, $800.



To: energyplay who wrote (49640)5/5/2009 7:53:08 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217974
 
between a tax-payer guaranteed and fed-embraced as bad as instant-loss of 1.4 tril over just so many months which really only benefited financial elite overlords the world over, and a few failing states, and some issues with clueless leadership intent on witch hunts, we are set for good show in the second half, and imo, the still-just-starting dire crisis should add new ingredients of failing states (as in california/new york, as opposed to pakistan/mexico).

should all crisis be averted, then money supply should be at 10x pre-crisis level, and velocity at 2x pre-crisis level, allowing us a respite, stock up on more gold at substantially higher average price, in time for the next crisis

in the mean time, watch n brief from stratfor

U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan: Seeking a Trilateral Solution
May 5, 2009 | 2241 GMT

Alex Wong/Getty Images
House Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner and Speaker Nancy Pelosi with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Washington, D.C., on May 5Summary
U.S. President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will meet in Washington on May 6 to forge a common strategy to fight the jihadist insurgency in South Asia. Karzai will look for greater cooperation from Pakistan, while Zardari will look for reassurance and aid from the United States. The Obama administration, meanwhile, is already in the process of downgrading expectations for this war.

Analysis
Related Link
Special Report: U.S.-NATO, Facing the Reality of Risk in Pakistan (With STRATFOR Interactive map)
U.S. President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will attempt to hammer out a common strategy to battle the growing jihadist insurgency in South Asia when they sit down for a meeting at the White House on May 6.

The trilateral meeting comes at a crucial time: Afghan Taliban forces are increasing the tempo of attacks with the help of their al Qaeda allies, and attempts to negotiate with so-called reconcilable Taliban are already falling flat. On the other side of the Durand line, Pakistani military forces are desperately attempting to confine Taliban forces to the northwestern Swat valley, where a peace deal with Taliban militants has all but collapsed.

Karzai’s demands for this meeting are relatively straightforward. The embattled Afghan leader is facing re-election in August, and now has a Tajik former warlord in addition to a Hazara former mujahideen commander by his side as vice-presidential running mates to take advantage of a deeply fractured opposition. After facing a stream of criticism from White House officials for leading a corrupt regime and exaggerating civilian losses caused by U.S. and NATO attacks, Karzai is coming to Washington with the understanding that he still runs a good chance of remaining in the presidential palace after August elections, and that U.S. officials will likely be dealing with him for some time to come. From his Pakistani counterpart, Karzai will demand greater intelligence sharing and cooperation in targeting the jihadist supply line that originates in Pakistan and fuels the insurgency in Afghanistan.

But this is no longer “just” about the war in Afghanistan. The growing Talibanization phenomenon in nuclear-armed Pakistan is now dominating the headlines as fears mount that Pakistan’s leadership will be ineffective in countering the Taliban’s “salami tactics” and preventing the militants from spreading beyond their Pashtun strongholds into Pakistan’s Punjabi heartland. Pakistan traditionally has dealt with the Talibanization threat by alternating between strong-armed tactics and flimsy peace deals in an attempt to box the Pakistani Taliban into the lawless northwest. Such tactics have thus far backfired: With each new military offensive that displaces a local population, more refugee camps are created from which the Pakistani Taliban can pluck fresh recruits.

It is little wonder, then, that the leadership in Islamabad finds itself hamstrung. Even as U.S. officials cheer the Pakistani military on during its “wakeup call” offensive to push the Taliban back in the Buner and Dir districts around Swat, Pakistani commanders on the ground acknowledge that trying to move aggressively into Swat would be suicidal. Taliban forces are already preparing for a major counteroffensive and see the Pakistani military’s moves as playing into their hands. Pakistani troops simply lack the capability and will to handle the backlash.

Obama will attempt to boost Pakistan’s confidence when he meets with Zardari. While Zardari is in town, Obama is expected to push through nearly $1 billion in aid and put the final touches on a new counterinsurgency plan developed by U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus to train two Pakistani battalions at a U.S. base in Kuwait, along with other forms of military and intelligence assistance. While such assistance is critical if Pakistan is to have any hope of regaining the initiative against the Taliban, a number of fundamental problems remain unaddressed.

No matter what assurances the United States gives Islamabad on India’s intentions, the Pakistani military will give priority to its eastern front with India. Some 6,000 troops have been transferred from the eastern border to the Pakistani northwest, but Washington cannot expect Pakistani commanders — who are far more willing to devote resources to conventional warfare than counterinsurgency — to divert much more than that. This severely limits the extent to which force can be brought to bear in the lawless tribal areas. In addition, the Pakistani security apparatus suffers from a lack of cohesion, as the armed forces and intelligence services are heavily penetrated by Islamist sympathizers who work on both sides of the insurgency. Washington has long pressured Islamabad to reform agencies like Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), but the Pakistani leadership doubts that the United States will remain committed to the region for the long haul. As a result, many Pakistani leaders do not feel particularly compelled to deal with the domestic backlash from doing things like purging the ISI and bulldozing through Taliban territory when they feel they may later be abandoned.

The Pakistanis have reason for such concerns. The Obama administration is clearly alarmed about the developments in Pakistan, but also is beginning to understand its limits in the region. The Pakistani military is fighting an uphill battle against the Taliban while Taliban forces in Afghanistan are in no mood for reconciliation. Insurgencies have long lives, and this is a region that has seen countless occupiers. Most of the militants that U.S., NATO, Pakistani and Afghan forces are battling today have the motivation and patience to fight to the end.

However, the United States has neither the luxury of time nor patience. There are a host of competing issues that need to be dealt with, and Obama has given a number of subtle — and a few not-so-subtle — hints that he is not about to rest his re-election four years out on the fate of the jihadist war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The focus has now turned to ensuring that, at the very least, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal (most of which is believed be concentrated in Punjab) is secure, and that appropriate measures are taken to enhance security of those facilities.

Now is also the time to start downgrading expectations. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave a lengthy interview to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria on May 3, in which he unequivocally stated that there were no prospects for political reconciliation with Afghan Taliban right now, and that he has “real reservations about significant further commitments of American military (forces), beyond what the president has already approved.” He compared the situation to the Soviet experience, and said that if the Soviets were there with some 120,000 troops, did not care about civilian casualties, and still could not win, “then there is a lot we (the United States) can learn from that.”

Gates emphasized the need to train Afghan forces to fight the war, but the defense secretary was very clearly sending a message that this administration is not prepared to escalate the U.S. military commitment to a war that is already in deep trouble. Regular readers will understand that this message, which could not have been made without the president’s approval, does not come as a surprise to STRATFOR. Petraeus, who has pushed for a long-haul strategy in the region, likely has a different strategy in mind for fighting this war. It will be interesting to watch this policy debate in Washington as the administration pushes ahead with its own agenda. Meanwhile, Islamabad and Kabul will try to squeeze as much out of the United States as they can while they still have time