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Politics : View from the Center and Left -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: d[-_-]b who wrote (111709)	5/23/2009 11:17:32 AM
From: Dale Baker	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 541379

I'm glad you prompted me to look into this - the final decision from the 1993 court, written by Rehnquist himself it appears, clarifies the issues exactly: The Decision Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist reasoned that, in substance, Wisconsin's law served the same purpose as federal antidiscrimination law. Whereas in R.A.V., the ordinance struck down was explicitly targeted at expression, the statute in this case was directed towards conduct that was not expressive as such, but was instead directed at violence in particular. The Court further stated that Wisconsin was within its rights to offer sentence enhancement in bias-motivated crime because it had a compelling interest in preventing the negative secondary effects of such crimes. Among these secondary effects mentioned were the increased likelihood of a bias-motivated crime to provoke retaliation, to inflict greater emotional distress on the victim, and to incite community unrest. The Court explained that these secondary effects were more than adequate reason for such a sentencing enhancement, especially if, as stated above, the law was not explicitly targeting beliefs or statements. Regarding the "chilling effect" argument presented by Mitchell's side, the Court stated that it "[found] no merit in this contention." The Court determined that this rationale was far too speculative in nature to merit a genuine complaint of a statute's constitutional overbreadth. Because lesser crimes such as "negligent operation of a motor vehicle" (cited in the opinion) were very unlikely to ever be racially-based, the Court stated that for this statute to be overbroad one would have to consider the prospect of a citizen actively suppressing their bigoted beliefs because they believed they could be used against him or her at a trial for a serious offense, such as burglary, battery, or murder. Finally, the Court noted that it is relatively commonplace for a defendant's prior speech to be presented to the court as evidence. This is a tool in the judicial process, often serving a vital role in establishing the defendant's motive.