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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Snowshoe who wrote (54256)	8/29/2009 5:17:07 AM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 219492

it is unimportant what was, or could have been, but only important what they believed at the time

To: Snowshoe who wrote (54256)	8/29/2009 1:19:44 PM
From: RJA_	2 Recommendations Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 219492

>>In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend how Japan's leadership managed to rationalize their way around the economic facts when they contemplated making war on the U.S. In fact, it was directly pointed out to them by Winston Churchill in the April before their December attack: From the WW2 memoirs of Winston Churchill, letter from Mr Churchill to M. Yosuke Maisuoka (Japanese Ambassador) 2 Apr 41: I venture to suggest a few questions which it seems to me deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese Government and people. 1. Will Germany, without the command of the sea or the command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer, or autumn of 1941? Will Germany try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves? 2. Will the German attack on British shipping be strong enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores, with Great Britain and the United States transforming their whole industry to war purposes? 3. Did Japan's accession to the Triple Pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war? 4. If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain, and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable them to dispose or the Axis Powers in Europe before turning their united strength upon Japan? 5. is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian Fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be? 6. Will the British Air Force be stronger than the German Air Force before the end of 1941. and far stronger before the end of 1942? 7. Will the many countries which are being held down by the German Army and Gestapo learn to like the Germans more or will they like them less as the years pass by? 8. Is it true that the production of steel in the United States during 1941 will be 75 million tons, and in Great Britain about 12.5 million, making a total of nearly 90 million tons? If Germany should happen to be defeated, as she was last time, would not the 7 million tons steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single-handed war? From the answers to these questions may spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe, and a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and the two great sea-Powers of the West. I was rather pleased with this when I wrote it, and I don't mind the look of it now.

To: Snowshoe who wrote (54256)	8/31/2009 2:00:13 PM
From: Sam	Respond to of 219492

OT In the end, however, the Tojo government chose the path of aggression, compelled by internal political dynamics which made the prospect of a general Japanese disengagement in China (which was the only means by which the American economic embargo would have been lifted) too humiliating a course to be taken. Consequently, the Japanese embarked on what can only be described as a suicidal venture,... Not all such ventures are "suicidal" in the same way, but there are an incredible number of analogous missions that end in some sort of disaster or another. Which is one good reason why the anti-Federalists were right in arguing against a standing army. Even if there are other reasons why it is a reasonable idea, at least don't make a large standing army. The Swiss probably have the right idea as far as that goes.