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To: Elroy Jetson who wrote (102091)9/17/2009 12:43:34 AM
From: Hawkmoon  Respond to of 116555
 
Since 1980 money has become less valuable, costing less to borrow and earning a smaller return. Yet lenders having ever more money on deposit to lend, had to reach out to ever more risky borrowers to find someone who was willing to borrow.

First off, what were the average interest rates received by depositors/investors between 1980 and 2008?

newyorkfed.org

We had rampant inflation in the early 1980s and Volcker raised the Fed Funds rate to 14% in 1980 in a "tight money" policy.

Sure there's a crap load of indebtedness right now. There existed a ton of liquidity over the past 10-20 years. But where did a good portion of that money come from? Possibly from exporting nations, depositing their profits in US instruments in order to maintain their favorable currency ratio to the US dollar (manufacturer financing)?

The Japanese made a TON of money selling stuff to US consumers as did the Arabs selling oil, but we really couldn't complain because they were financing our deficit spending. And now it's the Chinese. And both countries continue to hold our debt, despite the perspective you hold that the USD has become less valuable. It used to be 30 year T-Bills, but when the Treasury stopped issuing them for a number of years, they moved into 30 year Mortgage debt. And they've kept right on doing, despite their B&Ming about US deficit spending.

They must be doing it for some selfish reason, right? Possibly because they are reaching for every straw that will keep their own people employed making stuff they can sell to Americans?

Because no new debt is entering the system asset prices have stopped rising and begin to decline. As they decline marginal borrowers default, further pushing down asset prices and causing more borrowers to default.

No sh*t Sherlock.. And if you, as you seem to opine, believe that fractional lending should be abolished, the result would be that asset prices would continue to decline in a deflationary spiral. Take the banking system back to a dollar in loans for each dollar of deposits and you're going to create the "mother of all depressions". It would be tantamount to what Churchill did when he returned the UK to the pre-WWI gold standard price, despite the inflation that had occurred during the war.

Let's face it.. when investors, whether Japanese, Arab, or Chinese, are willing to deposit money in the US, the banks are under serious pressure to find borrowers. If they don't, then they wind up paying interest above what they are collecting. Banks are not in the business to be safety deposit boxes. And they can't differentiate between American or Foreign depositors. It's all money that has to be lent out at an interest rates higher than what they are paying the depositors.

Now maybe we should have done something to prevent these tremendous trade deficits by being more forceful in confronting this obvious mercantilism. And maybe our financial regulators should have been more diligent is overseeing the mortgage and securization industries. But hey, those foreigners were willing to invest in the US and bankers were more than happy to lend it out to Americans. After all, it tied these nations to our economy, and therefore, our Foreign Policy. Most of all, it created massive origination fees without the lending institution having to carry the loans on their books. It was insane, but given the reality of all that liquidity and manufacturer financing, it was quite an opportunity to profit using foreign money.

The logic is pretty simple, if cynical. I loan you $1 million dollars and you default, it's your problem. If I loan you $1 Billion, it suddenly become MY PROBLEM. Thus, what happened in the US financial markets over the past two years is not just a problem of the US. It's EVERYONE'S problem and if the US falls, we're going to take a lot of economies with us.

If you fight this process of deleveraging as Japan has done, the bad debt hangs on for decades and your economy remains in a coma supported by government spending.

First off, define "bad debt" with regard to Japan. Provide some examples.

Because, as I understand it, Japan is more guilty of continuing to lend money to non-profitable firms in order to prop them up. So if this means permitting these unprofitable firms to roll over their previous debt with new issuance, then yes.. it's bad debt. But it's also an issue of restructuring those firms in order to make them profitable. This normally means layoffs and reduction of payrolls. But, of course, this has political consequences at the voting booth.

US banks are writing off debt on a massive scale, even performing debt that's been handicapped by Mark to Market accounting requirements. But it's apparent that it's going to require a few more years to wring out all the excesses.

And furthermore, if nations like the Chinese and Japanese are in a situation where they need to continue to hold US debt, why are you in such a rush to write it all down at once?

Finally, where do you draw the line in writing off debt? If debt payments are still coming in every month, why should it be written off at all?? Why should a bank be required to write down debt based upon the value of the securitized asset those mortgage bonds are wrapped up in, if those mortgage loans are still in good standing?

Write down what's in default.. Don't force banks to Mark to Market debt that is still in good standing and not delinquent.

And one last thing.. never forget that, for all the problems that exist with the US financial system, Europe, Japan, and China are in far greater difficulties.

Japan because of it's tremendous national debt to GDP and declining demographic taxpayer base. Europe because of it's hidden excesses regarding it's own real estate bubble and over--leveraged banks, and China because of the lack of political accountability in the face of growing internal economic pressures from unemployment.

Hawk



To: Elroy Jetson who wrote (102091)9/17/2009 1:37:06 AM
From: Hawkmoon  Respond to of 116555
 
Japan 'zombie' Banks Repaid Most Of 1990s Bailouts
06/17/09 - 03:12 AM EDT

TOKYO (AP) — Japan recouped much of the public money it pumped into banks during the country's financial crisis last decade, when toxic loans totaled as much as $1 trillion, a top regulator said Wednesday.

Japan endured an economic and financial malaise in the 1990s known as the "lost decade" after a real estate bubble, built on excessive lending, burst. Insolvent lenders propped up by government bailouts became known as "zombie" banks, and cast a long shadow over the world's second-largest economy.

The banking system of the 1990s was burdened with 90 trillion yen ($930 billion) to 100 trillion yen ($1 trillion) of bad loans, Financial Services Agency Commissioner Takafumi Sato said Wednesday at the Foreign Foreign Correspondents' Club in Tokyo.

Banks have repaid 8.45 trillion yen of the 9.6 trillion yen of public money injected into the financial system during the troubled decade. "That was good business in retrospect," Sato said.

Reflecting the views of other Japanese officials and analysts, Sato said that what Japan underwent offers lessons for the global financial crisis unfolding today, including the need for public money to prop up weakened banks.

thestreet.com



To: Elroy Jetson who wrote (102091)9/17/2009 1:42:00 AM
From: Hawkmoon  Respond to of 116555
 
Zombie companies were the problem in Japan, not so much zombie banks
Posted by JUSTIN FOX Monday, May 18, 2009 at 10:11 am

Thanks to Ezra Klein's brand new blog at washingtonpost.com, I just discovered a 10-day-old post by Jim Surowiecki that puts some meat on the bones of an argument that's been bouncing around my head for a while. We've all heard lots and lots about how zombie banks supposedly doomed Japan to a lost decade of semi-depression, which means that our government's attempts to prop up troubled big banks may lead to the same and yada yada yada.

But my memory was that in Japan the core problem was more zombie companies than zombie banks. Surowiecki agrees, and—as he tends to do—backs up his opinion with research papers:

As this paper by Joe Peek and Eric Rosengreen shows, during the nineteen-nineties, Japanese banks constantly “evergreened”—they kept extending additional credit to companies that already had loans with them. By extending credit, the banks enabled weak corporate borrowers to keep making their interest payments, and to put off bankruptcy. That made the banks' balance sheets look better, and also kept companies afloat. The economists Ricardo Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, and Anil Kashyap, in fact, found that thirty per cent of publicly-traded firms were “on life support from banks in the early 2000s.”

Evergreening had two effects. First, because the borrowers had little chance of ever actually paying off their debts (because their underlying businesses were so weak), it kept Japan's economy from making the adjustments necessary to start growing again. Caballero, et al, conclude that the practice led to lower investment, job creation, and productivity for the economy as a whole. Second, it limited Japanese banks' profitability, because it effectively meant that, instead of making good new loans, they were constantly throwing good money after bad. As a result, they were never able to earn their way back to health. ...

Then he makes a crucial point that I think economists without a bunch of first-hand Japan experience tend to miss:

In thinking about the relevance of the Japanese experience to our own, what's important to note is that Japanese banks did not engage in evergreening solely because it temporarily improved their balance sheets. Rather, they did so because social norms and explicit government pressure encouraged them to do so. (As Peek and Rosengren put it, in Japan, “many lending decisions are strongly influenced by a perceived duty to support troubled firms.”) In fact, Peek and Rosengren point out that government-controlled banks were more likely, not less, to keep extending credit to weak firms.

There's definitely been some government pressure here (mainly in the form of foreclosure moratoriums) to keep banks from cracking down on troubled borrowers. And we've had a couple of zombie companies in GM and Chrysler, where government took over the lending when banks would not. But the foreclosure moratoriums have been expiring, Chrysler is now in bankruptcy and GM is approaching its endgame. The rest of corporate America is in the midst of a vast and brutal restructuring that's running into very little interference from either social norms or government. Here in the U.S., the biggest risk may not be that we take too long to adjust to a changed financial landscape—which was Japan's problem—but that we do it too precipitously and risk unnecessary financial and economic carnage in the process.

curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com